

**“GI JOIN US”
BEHEIREN
AND
THE VIETNAM ERA PROTEST MOVEMENT IN JAPAN**

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Preface

This paper is about Beheiren, a popular Japanese citizen's movement of the late 60's and early 70's, and to a lesser extent about the dissident GI movement within the United States Armed Forces in Japan. Common to both of these movements was the desire to remove US military and economic influence from Asia, and to curb resurging Japanese military and economic expansion in the same area. In short, both viewed themselves as groups struggling against imperialism and its numerous causes. Of course, within each group there existed differing interpretations of what these goals meant and how to achieve them, as well as other goals which are more personally centered. The variations in interpretations are probably as many as the number of people involved in both groups, however, the purpose here will not be so much to analyze personal goals as it will be to depict some of the immediate factors which formed and motivated the movements, and the activities through which the movements expressed themselves with an eye to how this activity affected the United States and Japan.

Before going further I should point out here why I chose this topic and explain my relationship to it. An important factor which led me into the area of study in which I am now involved is my personal military history. I spent almost six years in the United States Marine Corps from 1965 to 1970 and after doing an eighteen month tour in Vietnam I was stationed for three years, 1967-1970, at Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan. It was this four and one-half year period in Asia which spawned my deep seated interest in Oriental culture and history, and it was my relationship with the US military which precipitated my active political consciousness. Because of my inside exposure to the activities of the military in Asia, both on the working end in Vietnam and to a greater extent through my experiences as a communications supervisor routinely handling classified information, I became opposed to US Asian policy and requested that my security clearance be withdrawn. Subsequently I became active in the GI movement and during 1970 I was involved with members of Beheiren in anti-war activity. It was a period of great significance in my life, and for me a period containing many important events which are to date little studied in English and whose overall meaning is, to some extent, still unclear in my mind. When the opportunity arose then to do an independent study, this topic was the foremost contender for my efforts. I wanted to work on a project which would require dealing mainly with primary sources, in an area of personal interest, and which would be an original contribution to the pool of historical knowledge. The study of Beheiren offered all three.

In the beginning I envisioned a study with an even split in emphasis between Beheiren and the GI movement showing how they aided each other in working towards their own goals. As my research progressed, though, I discovered that the scope of such a project was too large for a paper of this nature given what I already knew and what material was available. Also, I realized that Beheiren was much more complex and deeply rooted into Japanese social history than I had imagined, and so therefore, I turned my prime focus upon Beheiren, seeking to acquire a more enlightened view of social protest within Japan, and dealt with the GI movement only because its support and the results of its activities were of great importance in Beheiren's program.

As I have said, I wanted to work basically with primary materials, and in this case there was not much else. Few books mention Beheiren or the GI movement in Japan, and those that do deal only with them in passing. I started my research in the English language Japanese press but found that the amount of information available there on the subject was minuscule compared to the total information they contained. After searching reams of newspapers and then checking several known important dates to find little mention of Beheiren activity in the English language *Mainichi Shimbun* I concluded

that time would be better spent searching elsewhere. I then turned to the *Japan Quarterly* and found it helpful, especially in its summaries of Japanese language newspaper editorials and magazine articles which enabled me to get a feel for the widespread opinion against the Vietnam War and US military policy in Japan. Numerous other periodicals were also searched with some success and by far the most useful were the Beheiren originated publication *AMPO* and the “underground newspapers” of the GI movement, particularly *Semper Fi* from MCAS Iwakuni. Also of value in my study were several documents which I obtained from friends and a fair number of letters to myself and to others from persons involved in Beheiren and GI movement activity. Above all though, the highlight of my research was the personal interviews which I did with three involved activists, plus the replies received to questionnaire which I sent out, and an interview done by a friend which was given to me. These interviews and the search for material tied up a lot of time in travel and in rummaging through stacks of random material, but the results were good and so many new leads to people and material were provided that it was impossible on this project to follow them all up.

This is truly an introductory study. The narrative is spread thin over a complex and active period of history and the conclusions at which I arrive are for the most part tentative at best. A wealth of information remains to be gathered and digested; there are many persons whose experiences, yet untold, are an important part of the whole, and there are volumes of material in Japanese which, for my part, are still inaccessible. Possibly most important of the unavailable material is the records of the United States, diplomatic and military secrets, investigation reports, and political analyses which are classified and out of reach at this time. These may indicate the real effect of the protest activity on the direction of history. Possibly there are Japanese today working on this part of history. I hope that others will take an interest and contribute.

This paper is mine, and for its weak points and interpretations I am responsible. However, I owe a debt of gratitude to many who have helped in one way or another to provide material, ideas, guidance and support. Instrumental to the project was Professor Delmer Brown, Chairman of the History Department, who underwrote the whole thing by agreeing to be my advisor, and whose comments and criticisms helped me to find my direction in the study. Professor Clark Smith of the Rhetoric Department provided the first boost to my research by making available his extensive personal collection of “underground newspapers” and other GI material and by freely giving me space in his office in which to carry on part of my work. Sid Peterman, Don Philippi, and Bruce Hartford were of great help by relating their experiences in Japan to me. I am grateful to Don also for the use of his collected material and unpublished manuscript, and to Sid for his insights and moral encouragement. The material and enthusiasm which I received from my old friends Lonnie Renner and George Bacon were beneficial to the project and I cannot begin to assess the value of our shared experiences in relationship to this undertaking. Dick Engle of PCS in San Francisco was of great help to me by generously giving me information and allowing me to use his files of movement material, and I am also grateful to Steve Rees for the use of his files, and to Harry Faries of PCS in Iwakuni for the material which he sent. Appreciated too are Jim Yeakley for relating his experiences, Jon Livingston of Pacific News Service for use of his files, Professors Chalmers Johnson of the Political Science Department for taking time to discuss the problem area of modern Japan and suggesting research material, and Professor William McCormick, International Education Director, for advice on procedural aspects and for making material available. Also I wish to thank Marilyn Elrod and the other members of Congressman Ronald V. Dellums’ staff for the willing cooperation and help which I received from them. Finally I want to apologize to anyone who I may have forgotten and

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Introduction

United States Armed Forces have occupied Japan ever since the end of the Pacific War under various agreements from the surrender of Japan to the security treaty of 1960. Article VI of the 1960 treaty grants the use of bases in Japan to the United States for the security of Japan and maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. During the Vietnam Era these bases were numerous and provided not only for the security of Japan and the Far East, but direct support for combat units in Southeast Asia. American supply facilities in Japan provided material for troops in Vietnam while repair depots such as the one at Sagami played an important role in keeping tanks and other heavy equipment on the battlefield.¹ Japan, too, was a major component in the US medical network as Vietnam wounded were MEDEVAC'ed into the country for treatment and recuperation in the military hospitals at Yokosuka Naval Base, Camp Zama, and other places.

At Kitafuji the US maintained the only firing ground in the Far East for training heavy artillery units, while at Iwakuni the Marine Corps would rotate fighter squadrons to and from Vietnam on a regular basis giving combat damaged units a place for repair and restrengthening. Japan also provided naval repair facilities to the US as well as bases for intelligence operations and other activities, but perhaps the most important element in Japanese involvement was the island of Okinawa. Here, besides all of the other types of facilities mentioned above, existed the primary processing station for troops going to and from Vietnam, as well as Kadena Air Base, an important base for bombers flying raids over the war zone. It was this combination of American military activities which helped to give the Japanese a sense of direct involvement in the Vietnam War, especially since the American bases depended upon a considerable amount of Japanese labor in many areas, even including direct repair work on combat equipment. On top of this American military transport ships also employed Japanese crewmen who worked on the runs to Vietnam and became involved in combat activity.²

Another aspect of US - Japan relations also helped to emphasize the participating role of Japan in the war, and that was the tie between US interests and Japanese business. With the step up of the war American industry could not keep up with both domestic and military demands so Japanese business played an important role in filling the gap. An example of Japanese contribution can be seen when in the year 1966 both US and Canadian airlines began purchasing aircraft from the Japanese, and US aircraft manufacturers began purchasing Japanese machinery. Also during 1966 there was a rapid increase in the quantity of Japanese goods purchased by special military procurement. For the period April-September 1966, the Japanese furnished approximately 300 million dollars' worth of such items as boot soles, cloth, sand bags, barbed wire, cement, petroleum, electronics equipment and consumer products for the PX system, among other things, to the US military. This was 55 percent increase over the same period a year earlier.³ Truly, Japan was a partner in the Vietnam War, not only by virtue of her direct role provided through bases in Japan, but also through her sharing of the economic profits gleaned from increasing demands for material and supplies.

The Japanese public response to the United States' Asian policy as exemplified by the war, and to their growing awareness of Japan's role in that war, was one of concern and disapproval. It was a response that was generated by increasing US involvement in Vietnam as can be seen by the trend of letters to the editor in the Japanese newspapers. In April of 1965 1037 letters, about 14 percent of the monthly total, received by the *Asahi Shimbun* concerned the Vietnam War. This compares to almost no percent in January of the same year, and of these letters about 90 percent were opposed to US policy.⁴ In his review of Japanese magazines of the early part of 1965, Tsuru Shigeto found that the

overwhelming opinion was critical of US policy and he noted that a large number of usually pro-American experts had taken a disapproving stance towards the US action in Vietnam.⁵ Further concern of the Japanese for the events in Southeast Asia can be illustrated by the case of *Sekai* magazine which put out a special issue in April of 1965, the first ever in its twenty-year history, and devoted it entirely to the Vietnam War.⁶ Moreover, *Sekai* sponsored two symposiums on the Vietnam War, one in 1966 and one in 1967. The overall theme presented by the symposium published in the March 1966 issue was one of criticism towards the US policy and of fear of growing Japanese involvement.⁷ The 1967 symposium appeared in the May 1967 issue, which sold out entirely within a week of publication, and the conclusions again were critical of the US and showed further fear for Japan's increasing entanglement in US policy.⁸ Aside from these symposiums *Sekai* and a wide range of the Japanese press throughout the country continued to express dissatisfaction towards America's conduct in the Far East and to repeatedly warn against the danger of Japan becoming a party to another Asian war.⁹ In a random survey taken in August of 1965 by the *Asahi Shimbun*, 75 percent of the 2544 respondents were opposed to US bombing in Indochina, 60 percent thought escalation of the war would involve Japan, and 42 percent believed that a Viet Cong victory would not affect Japan.¹⁰ This poll so enraged US Ambassador Reischauer that he publicly said that he was shocked at the results and charged the Japanese press with being biased in favor of North Vietnam.¹¹

The scope of opposition to the war was not limited to articles in Japanese publications and results of public survey, however. Scholars and government officials also took public action to air their objections to US policy. On 29 April 1965, ninety-two scholars signed an appeal and submitted it to the Prime Minister asking that US bases in Japan not be used for the Vietnam War, that Japan demand a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam as a violation of the UN Charter and the US-Japan Security Treaty, and that Japan work to restore peace.¹² On 11 August 1965, the Fukuoka City Assembly approved a resolution rejecting a US Air Force request to use Hakata Port for the loading and unloading of arms for fear that the port may be used to ship arms to Vietnam.¹³ Three years later Abe Genzo the Mayor of Fukuoka, and Seno Kensuke, Speaker of the Fukuoka City Assembly, asked for immediate closure of Itazuke Air Base following the crash of a USAF Phantom jet onto the campus of Kyushu University.¹⁴ Six days later the Osaka Prefectural Assembly sought to obtain a ban on military operations at Osaka International Airport.¹⁵ In September of 1970, the Japanese Government attributed a fatal accident involving a Japanese boy at the Kitafuji range to poor management of the range,¹⁶ and when the US conducted its first firing practice there in five years on 29 October both the Yamanashi Prefectural Government and the Defense Facilities Administration lodged pro-tests.¹⁷ Mnohe Ryokichi, the Governor of Tokyo, refused to renew the lease on a strip of land across Yokota Air Base on 31 March 1972, and on 22 September he instituted an eviction suit against the US military. He based his case on the grounds that the use of Yokota in support of the Vietnam War was counter to the spirit of the Security Treaty.¹⁸ Also, in August of 1972, Asukata Ichiro, Mayor of Yokohama, closed the Murasame Bridge to American armored vehicles thus effectively stopping the flow of tanks from Sagami Depot to ships waiting at Yokohama piers.¹⁹

This prevalent sentiment against the Vietnam War was also held by Japan's established opposition parties, the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Komeito (Clean Government Party), and the Japan Social Democratic Party (JSDP). The JCP and JSP were the most active of the group and frequently sponsored mass demonstrations against US bases and against the war. More radical than these were the student groups, which were split into numerous sects, who also pursued a policy against US activities in Asia along with their other struggles.

Besides the issue of the Vietnam War there was also a history of established opposition to US military bases divorced from the Vietnam issue. This is exemplified by the long opposition of the citizens of Kitafuji and of other neighborhoods near military bases for removal of these installations from their areas. And of course there were strong feelings in Japan, also, against nuclear weapons, and against the full scale rearming of Japan. An illustration of the sentiments against rearming is the response of the major newspapers to the "Sakurada Statement." On 16 October 1969, Sakurada Takeshi, Executive Director of The Japan Federation of Employers Association, called for revision of Article 9 of the Constitution (the anti-war article) because it was an obstacle to future security arrangements. All three major newspapers attacked Sakurada's viewpoint. The *Asahi Shimbun* (19 October 1969) viewed the statement as an expression of the business world as a whole supporting Sato's desire to rearm Japan, and felt that such a program would lead to nuclear armament and the demise of Japan's pacifism. The *Mainichi Shimbun* (17 October 1969) said that revising Article 9 would be a case of "straightening the horns and killing the cow," and would build a military-industrial complex. The *Yomiuri* (18 October 1969) said that the statement was reminiscent of the prewar military's "state of emergency slogan," and that it forgets the lessons of the war and is a "trial balloon" in its implications.²⁰ It was in this kind of atmosphere that Beheiren, short for Betonamu ni Heiwa o Shimin Rengo or "Citizens Committee for Peace in Vietnam," was able to form and gather strength among the Japanese people.

Beheiren was a citizens movement; loose and unstructured it served as the voice of those who could find no appropriate place in the hierarchy of the established parties or the student movement. It arose in Japan in April of 1965 on the same wave of growing sentiment that occasioned the upsurge in letters to the Japanese newspapers in the wake of full scale US intervention in the Vietnam conflict. It was a child of previous movements which had arisen in the past and a carrier of a tradition of protest rooted deep in Japanese history. Beheiren had as its goal the establishment of peace in Vietnam without US interference and then expanded from this base to combat war by combating imperialism and military expansion, both American and Japanese. Beheiren was not an anti-American movement, only anti-US policy and it was a natural thing when it became allied with the dissident GI movement within the US Armed Forces.

The dissident GI movement too, had behind it a long tradition as it was rooted in the eternal dissatisfaction of American Enlisted Men with the degrading class system of the United States military, a dissatisfaction that has arisen from time to time as outbursts upon the record of US military history.²¹ During the Vietnam Era this dissatisfaction became combined with the popular feeling against the war and American policy and as a result a very active movement spread throughout the Armed Forces to the chagrin of military leaders. The movement was late in arriving in Japan, but when it did it became in league with Beheiren and in time grew to be one of the strongest expressions of organized resistance within the military. Fundamental to the GI's success in maintaining this movement was the support it received from Beheiren and from the Pacific Counseling Service, an American anti-war group, which sent staff members into Japan to help GI's with aid from Beheiren.

The activities of Beheiren and of the GI's were mutually supporting. Both wanted the US out of Vietnam and out of Asia. Both wanted an end to militarism and the conditions and systems which supported militarism and fostered economic and military imperial expansion. The GI's used Beheiren's help to fight towards these ends within the military, and Beheiren utilized the adverse publicity which the GI's created for the military to gain support for their struggle among the Japanese people. Reaction of the US military to the joint onslaught of Beheiren and the GI's was rash, full of fear, and served to aid disruption as much as it alleviated it. In the end the problems created by this stiff

opposition undoubtedly played a part in the overall social and military collapse which forced the Vietnam withdrawal, while also they contributed to the increase of the social and political cost of maintaining bases in Japan itself. This latter factor can be seen partly through the actions initiated by the Japanese Government to expel foreigners engaged in anti-war work and by the bonus law proposed to placate residents in the neighborhood of bases.²²

In turning now to the main text of the study I shall describe the origins, philosophy, and activity of Beheiren in order to analyze its position in Japanese History and its importance as a movement of the Vietnam Era. This importance will be gauged both in the light of domestic Japanese political and social activity and in view of the greater sphere of United States policy and US-Japan relationships. For this description and analysis I shall look upon the GI movement in Japan as an indirect branch of Beheiren activity, in so much as its activities were supported by Beheiren and served to aid Beheiren's objectives

I

Founding and Foundations of The Beheiren Movement

Beheiren was formed officially on 24 April 1965, and its first meeting, called by thirty-eight intellectuals, was held in Tokyo's Shimizudani Park.²³ The basis of its existence was aptly expressed by its three slogans, "Peace in Vietnam," "Vietnam for the Vietnamese," and "Against the Japanese Government's Complicity in the Vietnam War." The impetus for its founding was America's escalation of the Vietnam War combined with an increasing awareness by the Japanese of Japan's complicity in the war.²⁴ Beheiren, however, was not established on the spur of the moment by recently enlightened individuals, nor was it based on any radical new philosophy. It was in fact an outgrowth of previously established intellectual and anti-war associations and had within it a line of thought which stretched back centuries in the Japanese experience.

The post-Pacific War foundation of Beheiren is located in the Shiso no Kagaku Kenkyukai (Society for Research in the Science of Thought) which was founded in 1946 by such intellectuals as Maruyama Masao, Tsurumi Shunsuke, Tsurumi Kasuko, Tsuru Shigeto, and others. It was a society which admired the fundamental American ideals and which "was to be the standard bearer for a new 'popular pragmatic academism,' struggling against the rigid framework of Marxism and the German idealism that dominated the academic world."²⁵ The Cold War period with America's abandoning of her ideals in favor of rabid anti-communism turned the group against an American policy which was counter to the America that they had idealized, and they expressed their convictions by opposing Japanese participation in this new American arrangement. An illustration of their thought is the statement which they issued against the Security Treaty in 1960 which said, "We have studied the traditions of the United States and have a profound affection for the country. It is that affection which prompts us now to urge the Kishi government to sever its opportunistic ties with the United States and to seek a way to forge ties of genuine Japanese-American friendship."²⁶ The 1960 struggle was a defeat for idealism but the Society lived on, and when the Vietnam buildup created a popular cause it was people from the society who helped develop Beheiren; and both their idealism and their antipathy towards rigid ideological structures can be seen in its philosophy and organization.²⁷

Directly connected with the construction of Beheiren was the Koe Naki Koe no Kai (Voiceless Voice Society), a group also influenced by the Shiso Kagaku no Kenkyukai. This group played an important role in representing the citizens outside of the established opposition parties, and in fact took its name from a statement by Prime Minister Kishi who said, concerning the wide spread criticism of his policy, "I think that we must also incline our ears to the voiceless voices. What we hear now is only the audible voices, that is all."²⁸ Claiming to be Kishi's "Voiceless Voices" the Koe Naki Koe not only participated in the formal protest activities of the political parties, but transcended rigid ideology and set itself apart from other so-called "citizens groups" by showing solidarity with the radical students who had taken to the streets in mass demonstrations. Later, under the leadership of Takahata Michitoshi, a former secretary general of Shiso Kagaku no Kenkyukai, Koe Naki Koe became one of the central groups around which Beheiren was built, and this fundamental commitment to action rather than ceremony became an important facet of the Beheiren movement.²⁹

Beheiren's composition included, besides the Koe Naki Koe and Shiso Kagaku groups, the Wadatsumi Kai (Seagod Society), the Heiwa no tame ni Te o Tsunagu Kai (Join Hands for Peace Society), Krisutosha Heiwa Kai (Christian Peace Society), and other groups as well as a wide variety of individuals.³⁰ The fact that it was a broad coalition

reaching out to many different types of people was a point which Beheiren often cited with pride. The people who filled its ranks were housewives, professional people, intellectuals, day laborers, students, teachers, people from all walks of life who could find no satisfactory outlet for their political feelings within the highly structured, intricate framework of the traditional political parties or through the dogmatic fanaticism of the numerous, competing student factions. In contrast to these groups Beheiren was virtually unrestricted in its structural organization and political philosophy, requiring only adherence to the principles of its three slogans. Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, a leading member of Beheiren said of it, "There is no central organ of leadership, no rules, and no party line. Beheiren stresses the importance of individual spontaneity and autonomy. Participants are only asked to share in supporting (the) slogans...."³¹ Fukushima Junro in his comparison of New Left groups called Beheiren "a movement and not an organization," and said of it:

*.....there is neither a membership list nor any national organization. There is no president and no chairman. Anyone who subscribes to its three slogans.....can establish anywhere and at any time his own Beheiren.... There are Beheiren in senior high schools, in universities and among university ronin.... There are Beheiren organized according to localities....There are Beheiren organized one to a workshop or one to an enterprise.*³²

Beheiren was a citizens movement designed to be a vehicle of protest and public indignation more than a political machine, and as such was easily accessible to all who felt moved to act.³³

Central to Beheiren and its direction in society were the intellectuals and activists of the Tokyo core group which operated out of an office in Kagurazaka. The normal leader, often referred to as chairman, was Oka Makoto, a popular novelist and social critic who, as a student, had traveled around the world without money, and who had spent time in the United States. Another prominent figure in the Tokyo group was philosopher Tsurumi Shunsuke of the Shiso Kagaku no Kenkukai, a Professor at Kyoto University, who had also been to America and studied there. Typical of Shiso Kagaku group Tsurumi was upset by the disparity between American ideals and American policy, as can be seen by his comment on the Vietnam War. "No where can I recognize the America I knew in the America that been pursuing this filthy war for more than ten years."³⁴ His cousin, Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, was, as previously mentioned, also very active in the leadership as was Muto Ichiyo who took over the publishing aspects of the movement and Yoshikawa Yuichi who served as the general secretary. Muto and Yoshikawa were both leaders of the Communist Workers Party, a break-away group from the Japan Communist Party, and according to Don Philippi, were experienced in the JCP's Peace Movement and interested in directing Beheiren for their own goals.³⁵ In fact Muto did gain control of AMPO, Beheiren's English language publication and turn it into a regular periodical of contemporary Asian events from the New Left standpoint. The leadership of Beheiren, like its constituent parts, represented a gathering of diversities, diversities made workable as an integrated whole by the basic philosophy which characterized Beheiren.³⁶

The most important part of any program of action or of any organization, no matter how loosely constructed, is its conceptual basis, the core of ideas from which it builds and takes direction. For Beheiren the fundamental premise was two-fold. One aspect was the recognition of the real nature of the problems with which society was confronted, and the other was the proper theory of action of how to meet these problems effectively. The immediate problems of course were a product of the times, but the theory of action was built on elements that had deep roots in Japanese social history. The problems as defined by Beheiren were 1) imperialism and the oppression of indigenous peoples, as

best illustrated by the United States Vietnam policy, and Japan's role in this scheme of economic and military expansion, both as an exploiter and a potential victim; and 2) the inability of other opposition forces in Japan to deal productively with the vital issues. Fukushima Junro illustrated the first problem and Beheiren's action when he characterized Beheiren by saying:

*...the anti-war movements in Japan are characterized by a guilty consciousness that Japan is no third party to the Vietnam War but is actually an American working partner in the harm wrought on the people of Vietnam. ...Beheiren grasped these facts, contended that the Japanese were inflicting harm on the Vietnamese and succeeded in changing the Japanese public attitude from one of "sympathy towards the victims of a war being fought in a faraway country" to one which considered the "Vietnam War as being fought in Japan itself."*³⁷

Beheiren's own perception of the problems, though, are best viewed in the ideas of Oda Makoto. In an interview in 1969 Oda described the Peace Movement in Japan as a movement that takes the view that the Japanese will be victims in a nuclear war in Asia. He says that this was the standard view prior to 1960 and that after 1960 the new movement picked it up and added the idea that since Japan has become so rich she is now in a position to be both the victim and the oppressor in the course of world power and that people should become aware of this and combat it. Furthermore, he says that to participate in society is to participate in society's crimes.³⁸ This idea of common responsibility for social action is illustrated again in an interview Oda made in 1973 where he said that it was the responsibility of the people to protest the activities of the Japanese government and businesses in order to combat economic imperialism. Those who do not resist and struggle, he points out, are accessories to the repression of other people and jointly responsible for Japan's crimes.³⁹ Beheiren's function in dealing with this whole situation, he explained, is to provide a viable alternative to the other opposition groups which have either bogged down in parliamentary procedure on one hand, in the case of the political parties and labor unions; or have bogged down in the extreme of revolutionary violence on the other hand, in the case of the radical student. Beheiren, he remarks, seeks a compromise between these two extremes and aims to promote action by being tolerant of ideas and individuals since intolerance and criticism hamper action, which is the important thing.⁴⁰

The Beheiren formula for carrying out this struggle was neither in the tradition of ritualistic, encumbered parliamentary political process nor imbued with the violence and rigid dogma of the numerous student sects. Instead the Beheiren philosophy stressed the importance of individual awareness and spontaneous action interconnected with self-enlightenment as the method by which problems could be effectively confronted. In explaining Beheiren's perspective Tsurumi Yoshiyuki said:

It is extremely difficult to tell where peace ends or war begins, or where oppression ends and victimization begins. Similarly, for the individual it is difficult to discover just how far his work and his mode of life are contributing, directly or indirectly, to the war in Vietnam, to the oppression of Okinawa and so on. Similar vagueness is found in all social and human relationships, as well as in the fuzzy political rhetoric of the established political parties...

This vagueness is a result of the degree to which the system has penetrated the individual, making mainly and object of external forces. Beheiren's idea is that the first step in overcoming this is not explanation but direct action.

By making a clear decision to resist, by acting out his own direct action program, the individual first eliminates the vagueness from himself, and then discovers that the social situation surrounding him is also clarified, not on paper but in fact. Thus in a society in which

*buck-passing is the traditional mode of dissipating creative energy, Beheiren's first principle is truly regenerative and liberating: "When you advocate something, you must be the first to do it."*⁴¹

This form of thought has its origins in pre-modern China and Japan and has characterized certain aspects of social opposition in Japan ever since feudal times. This can be seen through comparing Tsurumi's statement of Beheiren's concepts with the ideas of the earlier thinkers of the Oyomei school of Confucian thought. Nakae Toju (1608-1648) the father of this school in Japan taught that:

*....since there is within the mind a divine awareness illuminating it, what we call "enlightenment" will come. Once this realization occurs, rectification will follow, the evil idea and wrong deed will disappear, and the mind will revert to its normal state or purity and divine enlightenment.*⁴²

The idea of enlightenment leading to action or the rectification of evil, was passed on from Nakae and became a part of Japanese education. Najita Tetsuo points out in his book on the interaction of conflicting concepts in Japanese history that:

*....all Samurai were instructed in the Oyomei principle of action. This principle held that at critical points in one's life...one must reach into his spiritual self and commit himself decisively to a course of action because he believes that course to be right, not because it might be advantageous.*⁴³

This commitment to action is most dramatically illustrated in pre-modern Japan by the rebellion of Oshio Heihachiro in Osaka in 1837. Najita states:

*In Oshio, the principle of personal autonomy was re-defined to mean social action. The quest for true self was in rendering public every act of self-clarification. Objective events and subjective activities were coincidental; The rectification of evil in the self ipso facto meant action against injustice in society.*⁴⁴

And this in part was Beheiren's credo, the rectification of society by means of self-clarification through action.

The people who formed Beheiren in 1965 formed it from their own personal history of social action and intellectual development, a history influenced both by American idealism and the Japanese Oyomei tradition. In the following chapters we shall see how they translated this idealistic, self-motivating philosophy into dynamic enterprise.

II

Beheiren Apart From The GI Movement

Beheiren was never a large group on the scale of the labor unions or political parties, but its influence and ability to create mass action was sometimes tremendous. In its earlier years, before its union with the GI movement, Beheiren channeled most of its energy into educating the Japanese on the true nature and ramifications of the Vietnam War, and into personal action in the form of co-coordinating its own demonstrations and in joining in and showing solidarity at the demonstrations of other groups. Also, during this time, Beheiren exhibited the international nature of the overall conflict by acting in cooperation with activists from outside of Japan, by carrying its struggle into the foreign media, by giving aid and sanctuary to American deserters, and by opposing publicly Japan's immigration laws.

Beheiren's first activity of note after being established was participation in the founding of the Hansen Seinen Iin Kai (Anti-war Youth Committee). This group was a project of the Socialist Party and Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions) to build an alliance between workers and youth to oppose the Vietnam War and the Japan-Korean Security Treaty.⁴⁵ Beheiren's association with this group, and later its show of solidarity with other groups is a testimony to its philosophy of action outside of ideology. In the summer of 1965 on August 15, the twentieth anniversary of Japan's surrender in the Pacific War, Beheiren sponsored the first twenty-four hour "teach-in" on the Vietnam War. The "teach-in" was televised nationally and was attended by Carl Oglesby of Students for a Democratic Society.⁴⁶ In the following years Beheiren sponsored various speaking tours and "teach-ins" including the nation-wide tour of Ralph Featherstone of the Student Non-violent Co-coordinating Committee, and Prof. Howard Zinn of Boston University in June of 1966; and "teach-ins" with Jean Paul Satre and Simone Beauvoir in 1966 and 1967.⁴⁷ The connection between Beheiren and foreign activists and intellectuals was maintained throughout its existence and the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, to mention one group, cooperated with Beheiren and was represented in Japan at times by such scholars as Franz Schurmann of the University of California who made a speaking tour of Japan in February of 1970 with Oda Makoto and Konishi Makoto.⁴⁸

The international and outward-looking attitude of Beheiren can also be seen in some of its various other activities of this period. It published advertisements in both the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* against the war in Vietnam. The first ad was a full page spread in the *New York Times* of 16 November 1965, and was paid for by funds raised from all over Japan. Tsurumi Yoshikuyi said that this ad represented the first time that Japanese people had spoken directly to the American public against the war, and that it reversed the Japanese concept of power flow between the U.S. and Japan.⁴⁹ Then, in 1966 Beheiren conceived the "U.S.-Japan Citizens Anti-war Treaty" as an alternate to the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty, and in 1967 Beheiren raised money for medical supplies to Hanoi and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.⁵⁰ Also in 1967 Beheiren participated in the Tokyo "War Crimes Trials" sponsored by the Japan Communist Party;⁵¹ and in August of 1969 Kansai Beheiren⁵² held an anti-war Expo 69 in Osaka, a counter move to the official Japan Expo 70 which was scheduled to open there in the following year.⁵³ These activities earned Beheiren a reputation in the world peace movement as can be seen by the fact that Beatle John Lennon and his wife Yoko Ono's peace message to the world at Christmas 1969, was sent to Beheiren in Japan for incorporation in their New Year's demonstrations.⁵⁴ Beheiren's stature by this time was

prominent, built up by constant and innovative activity which had repercussions both in Japan and around the world.

Perhaps the most famous adventure of Beheiren in its early period was the forming of JATEC (Japan Technical Committee for Assistance to U.S. Anti-war Deserters) to aid American servicemen, who opposed the war, to desert and receive asylum. The formative experience which set JATEC in motion was the desertion of four sailors from the aircraft carrier USS *Intrepid* on 11 November 1967. Beheiren helped these men to escape and reach sanctuary in Sweden, and realized a new role for itself in the anti-war campaign.⁵⁵ The English language *Mainichi Daily News* of 20 January 1968 reported that Beheiren was active in Sasebo during the aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise*'s call there, urging sailors to jump ship, and until the Japanese government finally sealed off escape routes, between 1967-1969 about sixteen GI's were helped out of the country.⁵⁶ After escape was made virtually impossible JATEC and Beheiren provided hideouts within Japan itself for numerous deserters, like Daniel D. Dennis. Dennis deserted on 28 October 1968 from Camp Zama hospital in Tokyo where he was recovering from wounds received in Vietnam. He received shelter from JATEC until he was arrested on 12 March 1969 in the Kansai area by the Japanese police for immigration law violation. Beheiren provided a lawyer for Dennis, Mr. Ono, and held a press conference to publicize his plight. They also staged demonstrations before the police station where he was held and when he was turned over the U.S. Military Police and shipped back to Tokyo they retained another lawyer, Mr. Oka, for him in the Tokyo area.⁵⁷ Though deserters had legal resident status in Japan,⁵⁸ as in the case of Dennis, the Japanese police would consistently turn them over to the American military, so this new phase of Beheiren's program also brought it into conflict with the Japanese government. In an article in *AMPO* JATEC's goal in this conflict is described as gaining the right of political asylum in Japan.⁵⁹

The conflict with the government arising from the aid of deserters was not Beheiren's only clash with the immigration authorities, as many foreigners joined Beheiren in June 1969. By combining in a group called *Gaikokujin* (foreigner) Beheiren these people brought increased pressure upon the immigration law through court proceeding, and in some cases were able to win a favorable verdict. The life of this group, however, was short as the government managed to expel most of the members by refusing visa extensions and, because, according to Don Philippi, those members who were not expelled became fragmented by ideological debates.⁶⁰ The *Gaikokujin* Beheiren was initially formed by Stefano Bellieni, an Italian; and Doug Lummis, an American; with the cooperation of Muto Ichiyo.⁶¹ Don Philippi, an American, soon joined the group, as did others, such as Sandy Sher, Kathy Horikoshi and Phyllis Ogata, University of California students attending the International Christian University in Tokyo.⁶² The group began working to publish an English language magazine, *AMPO*, to give publicity to the movement and serve as the organ of Beheiren along with the Japanese language periodical, *Shukan AMPO*, which was also being prepared at this time. Both began regular publication in November 1969.⁶³ Furthermore, the *Gaikokujin* Beheiren worked among the GI's in the Tokyo area⁶⁴ and also mobilized groups of foreigners to carry out protests within Japan. On the weekend of 15 and 16 May 1970 they formed the Tokyo Mobilization Committee to protest the war and led about seventy-five foreigners in a demonstration at the U.S. Embassy on 15 May. Members of the group entered the Embassy to conduct a teach-in on the war and were removed forcibly by the Japanese police. On the 16th they held a rally with Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese speakers which was attended by a mixed group of foreigners and Japanese including U.S. military dependents, and which totaled about 1,500 people. Following the rally they demonstrated again at the U.S. Embassy where they encountered police violence.⁶⁵

Members of the Gaikokujin Beheiren, moreover, were instrumental in serving as interpreters for the movement and also participated in the regular activities of the Japanese main body. The inclusion of Gaikokujin Beheiren increased Beheiren's cosmopolitan flavor and further set it apart from the usual in Japan's very ethno-centric society.

Another thing which set Beheiren apart, especially if one is inclined to view Japan in the light of its military tradition, is the assistance which was given to dissenters within the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). In an interview in *AMPO* Yoshikawa Yuichi said that Beheiren had close contact with the SDF soldiers' struggle against returning to Japanese militarism and imperialism. He illustrates this by pointing out that when the Niho SDF base was opened to the public several Beheiren members stood by the gate and passed out balloons with anti-military slogan on them to children entering the base, to the consternation of military officers.⁶⁶ This aspect of Beheiren's program went into full swing when Air SDF Sergeant Konishi Makoto revolted in 1969.⁶⁷ Following Konishi's revolt Beheiren began organizing committees to promote more dissent and in December of 1969, leafleted SDF members in Niigata despite a law prohibiting "influencing soldiers to neglect their duties." On National Founding Day, 11 February 1969, Beheiren leafleted at SDF bases through Japan and demonstrated at Nerima Camp in Tokyo. This demonstration caused the authorities to close and barricade the gates.⁶⁸

Beheiren's tactic of attacking Japanese installations was not confined to its military protest; this tactic was also used to bring into visible contest Japan's immigration policy. Omura Shuyojo in Kyushu is a concentration camp for Koreans being deported from Japan and Beheiren organized outcries against this deportation policy by staging protests in front of Omura's gates.⁶⁹ Beheiren's stand on immigration as indicated by both the Omura protests and the Gaikokujin Beheiren court actions is further witness to its universalistic stance. This stance was an important aid to Beheiren in enabling it to play the pivotal role which it did in the variety of mass actions which were occurring in Japan. These actions, some of which Beheiren organized and sponsored, like the Omura and Nerima demonstrations, and some which it merely supported, were important in bringing issues to question and affected government activity and foreign relations.

The U.S. military was a prime target for these demonstration and was hampered by its unpopularity as expressed in outbursts like those in October of 1965 when popular opposition caused a cessation of artillery firing on the Kitafuji range.⁷⁰ Anti-base demonstrations were frequent around the various American bases in Japan such as at Yokosuka and Sasebo whenever nuclear ships would come into port; at Tachikawa Air Base where 26,000 people turned out on 28 May 1967 to protest base expansion;⁷¹ at Camp Oji in Tokyo where housewives rose against the opening of a military hospital in 1968;⁷² at Camp Drake where local citizens formed the "Oizumi Citizens for a Just Peace in Vietnam and the Removal of Camp Asaka" (Camp Drake) and began passing leaflets through the fence to GI's in September 1968;⁷³ as well as other bases throughout Japan. No doubt Beheiren participated in many of these protests; as we have seen before they were involved at Sasebo in 1968 against the Enterprise; and the efforts of all groups added together totaled up to a discomforting influence on the United States. One result of this was, as reported in an editorial in the *Washington Post* of 6 June 1968, that the Center for Strategic Studies of Georgetown University issued a paper entitled "United States - Japanese Political Relations" which warned Japan that she could not take U.S. military protection for granted if U.S. Forces were going to be subjected to harassment by the Japanese population. The anti-base struggle was having its effect upon the U.S., but it was only one part of the demonstration picture.

In other actions citizens were rising up in places like Sanrizuka, near Narita, where the Japanese government was trying to force people off their land in order to building a new airport for Tokyo. Beheiren demonstrators joined in this revolt, viewing the airport question as a component part of the larger evil facing society.⁷⁴ Student protests too, were wracking Japan at this time, and true to its form in conceiving the problems which it faced as being part of the whole society, Beheiren interjected itself into the student conflict. One example of this involvement was Beheiren's public questioning of the administration's conduct during the conflict at Aoyama Gakuin in November of 1968.⁷⁵ Dwarfing these activities in importance, though, were the mass demonstration that brought into question the Vietnam War and its auxiliary issues; the Okinawa and Security Treaty arrangements, and Prime Minister Sato's trips to the United States. The prominent performers in most of these actions of course, were the violent students and the docile masses mobilized by the political parties. Beheiren, nevertheless, served an important function by representing the unaligned citizen and by welding coalitions between feuding groups in order to keep the struggle focused on the main issues which transcended factional strife.

Because of its nature between the two extremes of the Old and New Left Beheiren was able to fill a capacity which gave it greater force than its numbers indicated. In April of 1969 Beheiren played a key role in forming the "Five Faction Alliance" which brought together feuding sects of the Anti-JCP Zengakuren (National Federation of Student Self Governing Associations)⁷⁶ for a united front in the Okinawa Day demonstration on April 28. At that demonstration Beheiren also played the peace maker when, towards the end of the day, one of its propaganda cars led away half of the demonstrators from the embattled Ginza.⁷⁷ The Okinawa Day action and the "Five Faction Alliance" was, however, only a prelude to one of Beheiren's greatest street triumphs. One 15 June 1969, Beheiren sponsored a joint rally and demonstration in Tokyo to protest the Security Treaty and the Vietnam War. For this demonstration Beheiren was able to bring together the various warring factions of the New Left to cooperate in a common effort, making this the first occasion of major combined action since 1960. The event was a huge success with about 75,000 people participating, who at one period formed a column of marchers two and one half miles long from Hibya Park to Tokyo Station.⁷⁸ The real impact of this rally lies in the fact that such considerable numbers were achieved without the help of the political parties and labor unions of the Old Left (JCP, JSP, Sohyo) who did not participate. Fukushima Junro in his article on the New Left fittingly portrays the demonstration by saying:

Citizens from all walks of life, including members from both radical and conservative groups, participated in this demonstration, indicating their concurrence in Beheiren's slogan of protest against the Vietnam War and the Security Pact. The demonstration carefully avoided all violence and clashes with the police, and marked in an orderly manner through the streets of Tokyo. Almost every newspaper said the demonstration was impressive and praised the good sense of the demonstrators.⁷⁹

The impact of this demonstration was so great that on the following day Araki Masui, Chairman of the National Security Commission, openly apologized to the Prime Minister for having under-estimated the strength of Beheiren, and called Beheiren on the major political forces in Japan.⁸⁰ The 15 June demonstrations marked a new plateau in Beheiren's campaign and in the following year Beheiren was to play a more visible role in the activities of the New Left.

In October of 1969 both parts of Japan's political left began to plan for the season of struggle against both the war and the renewal of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty which was approaching in June of 1970. On the 10th of October the New Left including

Beheiren, kicked off their “Fall Offensive” with unified, nation-wide rallies. Despite massive police build-ups the demonstrations were carried out without violence⁸¹ International Anti-war Day, 21 October, was celebrated by both Old and New Left with unified rallies in 832 places in all of Japan’s 46 prefectures, with violence erupting in more than one instance as over 1,500 arrests were made throughout Japan. All of the New Left groups demonstrating in Tokyo were doing so illegally, except for Beheiren which was the only one to receive a permit from the government. In the Tokyo demonstration Beheiren mobilized 10,000 to 20,000 people including about 15 members of the Gaikokujin Beheiren,⁸² and after the demonstration about 2,000 members of Beheiren built and then burned wooden barricades in front of Idabashi Station⁸³ Following this the next big protest occurred during the period 13-16 November when Prime Minister Sato departed on a visit to the United States. To oppose Sato’s visit riots and rallies broke out across Japan and the New Left dominated the scene as the Japan Socialist Party called off its activities to avoid association with the radical groups. On 16 November Beheiren sponsored a mass rally at Hibiya Park drawing 15,000 people despite the cancellation of its rally permit by the government upon request of the Prime Minister. Following the rally about 5,000 Beheiren students carried out street protests in Tokyo throughout the night and then joined other groups at Haneda Airport on the following morning for a mass demonstration.⁸⁴

Street protests were not only used in the instance of objections to Sato’s trip, but had become an integral part of Beheiren’s campaign. A special style of street activity indigenous to Beheiren and utilized frequently by its youth was a tactic called “Folk Guerilla”⁸⁵ movement. This peculiar form of demonstration originated in the summer of 1969 from Beheiren’s weekly gatherings at Shinjuku Station where members would congregate and collect large crowds of up to 5,000 people by speaking, singing and playing guitars. After the police finally managed to bring a halt of this practice the young members of Beheiren began taking to the streets with their guitars and assembling crowds in the open spaces of Tokyo by appearing here and there and playing folk music, hence “Folk Guerilla.”

The intensive campaign inaugurated by the 1969 “Fall Offensive” carried on through the winter and spring and culminated in the Security Treaty protests of June 1970. This period of struggle was different than that of 1960 in that there was no real expectation of actually preventing the extension of the Treaty. Omori Shigeo in his article on the June actions pointed out that this was because the Japan Communist Party had decided on a long term approach to the problem rather than an all-out immediate effort; the Socialist Party and Sohyo were suffering from recent election setbacks; and the students were recuperating from having expended all of their effort in the fall with many of their leaders in jail.⁸⁶ However, even though the various opposition groups were keyed down as to the prospects of immediate victory, the campaign was still pursued by all and viewed as a jumping off place for the battle of the 70’s. Oda Makoto summarized this attitude in an interview when he said that although the Treaty would not be destroyed immediately, the efforts expended against it would have a good effect upon the future movement.⁸⁷ Beheiren was very active in these efforts, mobilizing citizens and coordinating joint actions by the various New Left factions to make June of 1970 a month of dissident expression.

Beheiren began the June program by sponsoring with other citizens groups the “June Action Committee.” The committee staged a demonstration in downtown Tokyo every day from June 1st to July 3rd with an average attendance of 1,500 people. Along with the daily demonstrations several larger actions were also organized. On 13 June there were about 30 different mini-demonstrations held in Tokyo ranging in size from 50 to 3,000 people with a combined rally at the end of the day held at Shinjuku Station. On the 14th

throughout Japan in 87 places New Left demonstrations were held while in Tokyo a joint demonstration was held by the citizens groups and various student and labor factions for a combined total of about 72,000 people, who formed a procession eight kilometers in length. The high point of the whole month, though, came on June 23, Treaty renewal day, when all opposition groups throughout Japan took to the streets in protest. In Tokyo alone the Old Left rallied 150,000 strong in Yoyogi Park; the student factions turned out some 60,000 people, about 57,000 in Meiji Park and another 3,000 which marched on the Diet Building; and Beheiren gathered 30,000 at Shimizudani Park and held a march which lasted all through the evening and into the early morning hours. The national figures for this, Japan's greatest day of protest, were estimated at 770,000 by the National Police Agency, and at 1,500,000 by the *Mainichi Shimbun*.⁸⁸ Either number represents the largest turnout for political protest in Japan's history.

Beheiren came into prominence through the struggle of the 60's because it provided a vehicle of political expression for the common citizens outside of formalized structures, and apart from militant violence and also because it emerged as a mediating influence between the antagonistic divisions of the New Left Spectrum. This prominence, moreover, was enhanced by Beheiren's universalistic and international outlook which set it off from the traditional self-centered concepts of Japanese thought. The demonstration of 15 June 1969 established Beheiren's credentials as a viable factor in New Left politics and tagged it as a force to be considered in the events of the 70's. The beginning of the struggle of the 70's in late 1969 was for Beheiren not only the start of a new decade of opposition, but it also marked formation of a new alliance and the addition of a very different tactic to its campaign. This tactic was war from within against the U.S. military and was accomplished through an alliance with the budding GI movement that was rising up within the ranks of American servicemen in Japan. This movement, unlike the case of the deserters which Beheiren helped to flee the war, was a case of open combat against the war machine itself.

III

Beheiren And The GI Movement

The first rumbles of organized protest among American servicemen in Japan came from Misawa Air Force Base in the late Summer and Fall of 1969. There on 15 October 1961, fifteen GI's gathered around a flagpole on base in the evening to observe Moratorium Day and were arrested by military police. During this period *Hair*, the first GI underground newspaper in Japan was published at Misawa and Beheiren began publishing *Kill for Peace* and an Asian edition of *We Got the BrASS* in Tokyo for distribution to GI's.⁸⁹ The "Oizumi Citizens Council" at this time had begun broadcasting a tape program of anti-war songs and messages called "Radio Camp Must-Go" through the fence to GI's at Camp Drake and was reporting favorable results such as soldiers flashing peace signs to the activists.⁹⁰ These were only ripples on the water, though, and events were brewing at the Marine Corps Air Station in Iwakuni which would rock the boat of military composure and make dissident American GI's a common topic in Japanese society.

MCAS Iwakuni was beset with the usual problems of enlisted dissatisfaction caused by the petty harassment and alienating arrogance of military officers and senior NCOs as typical to most regular American units anywhere. Added to this in the Fall and Winter of 1969-1970 was growing dissatisfaction among the troops over the war, paralleling the civilian protest at home, and an intensified level of racial problems as black Marines became increasingly militant towards discrimination against them.⁹¹ As a result of this situation racial violence began to erupt sporadically on one hand and on the other anti-war literature began to appear. The *Ally*, a New Left newspaper for servicemen was circulated at Iwakuni in the Fall of 1969, distributed by a sergeant named Fitzpatrick;⁹² and shortly thereafter a few copies of other anti-war papers began appearing here and there. The command at Iwakuni made no noticeable reaction however until *Semper Fi*, a paper published by GI's stationed aboard the Iwakuni base, began distribution in January of 1970.

Semper Fi was a product of Cpls Lonnie Renner, Robert Dorton and a few other fellow dissidents who were determined to organize against military oppression. As they developed their plans they discovered that the expenses involved in producing a paper by themselves was prohibitive, so Renner set out to seek Japanese assistance. Knowing that the Zengakuren was involved in student protest, Renner went to the campus of Hiroshima University near Iwakuni and inquired around for them. He was eventually taken to Sakurai Joji, a physics instructor, who agreed to aid in the publication by furnishing the facilities which were used by the students. *Semper Fi* was born, and late one night towards the end of January 1970 the first issue was quietly distributed around the Iwakuni base. The military was shocked and shortly promulgated an order at Iwakuni prohibiting the distribution of "unauthorized literature."⁹³ It was at this time also that Renner subscribed to Beheiren's paper, *We Got the BrASS* and in late January or early February, Eibisu Masao of Beheiren delivered the paper to Renner and established Beheiren's first contact with the Iwakuni movement. In

short order the GI's were put in touch with two other Beheiren members in Hiroshima, Chris Cowley, an Englishman, and his Japanese wife. Through Cowling a working arrangement was set up whereby the Marines would write and paste up *Semper Fi* while Beheiren would print and distribute it. The January issue was followed by a two-page issue each in February and March and then in April regular bi-weekly publication began. By mid-summer the size had also grown to five or six times that of the earlier issues, and despite military attempts to destroy it, *Semper Fi* was becoming an institution at MCAS Iwakuni.⁹⁴

With the appearance of *Semper Fi* the base command, hitherto visibly unaffected by the occasional circulation of copies of imported dissident publications, was put on the spot. On 9 March 1970, the *Asahi Shimbun* published an article on *Semper Fi* and when Japanese would call the base Public Affairs Office to inquire for more information, the military's first response was to refuse to comment.⁹⁵ The issue could not be avoided however, and the first public official notice of the existence of *Semper Fi* came when in the 20 March 1970 *Torii Teller*, the official MCAS Iwakuni weekly periodical, carried an editorial attacking *Semper Fi* by calling it "half-right to dead wrong," "illegally written," and by intimation, seditious. The fight against *Semper Fi* was on, but for the military authorities, it was like trying to bail out a boat with a leaky bucket. Beheiren members passed out *Semper Fi* frequently in the evenings near the main gate of the base and the newspaper's popularity and circulation spread. It carried articles on GI legal rights, local movement news as well as news from the U.S., attacks upon the war and government policy, and exposes of incompetence and corruption aboard the Iwakuni base, and adopted a "print it all" policy which actively solicited contributions of any slant of opinion from everyone who wanted to write. It was a refreshing reminder that the real spirit of America still lived; for the editors of *Semper Fi*, like the founders of Beheiren, were imbued with a heavy dose of American idealism, and idealism which they found lacking in American practice.

To counter the upsurge of dissent the military resorted to confiscation of "illegal literature" and when that failed, the transfer of activists. The confiscations concerned mostly the *Ally*, a newspaper for servicemen published in Berkeley, California and shipped to certain GI's at Iwakuni in bulk. Lonnie Renner reported in a letter to the *Ally* dated 12 February 1970, that Naval Intelligence agents were seizing *Allys* at the base post office and gave instructions to have his bundle sent to a Japanese address. In his letter of 23 February to the *Ally* he again mentions official confiscation of *Allys*. In this letter Renner points out that bundles of the *Ally* received at the post office are sent to the addressee's Executive Officer. The addressee is called in, shown the bundle which has been "damaged" in shipping, warned against distributing "unauthorized literature", given one copy and sent out. Dave Newcomb, in his letter to the *Ally* of 14 April 1970, also mentioned that he could no longer trust the military mail system. In a letter to the *Ally* dated 27 February 1970, Renner instructed that 300 copies of each issue be sent to Eibisu Masao of Beheiren in Iwakuni who was going to arrange distribution. It was easy to hamper the spread of outside newspapers by tampering with the mails, but to stop *Semper Fi* the only recourse the military had was to tamper with the editors. The tactic they adopted was to transfer them.

The first transfers directly aimed at *Semper Fi*, though not the first aimed at dissidents, came on 2 June 1970, when Cpl Renner and Pvt. Dennis Hahn were shipped out of Iwakuni under guard on two hours' notice. The following day Cpl George Bacon was similarly transferred on one hours' notice. All three were prominent members of the dissident community at Iwakuni and instrumental in publishing *Semper Fi*. The transfers, however, damaged the command more than the movement. On both days, the shanghaied GI's were seen away at the air terminal by a crowd of cheering fellow servicemen, to the military's dismay; and before the dust had even settled on the runway, news of the transfers was rolling off the regular Japanese press. A tape recording made by Bacon on the night before his transfer was released to the press by Beheiren, and the *Chugoku Shimbun* of 4 June 1970, ran an article on Renner and Hahn's transfer with the title "Demonstration Inside American Military Base, Anti-war Soldiers Protest Forced Repatriation" and a photograph of a dozen demonstrating GI's standing in uniform with their fists raised above their heads. The military was so shaken by the publicity that it printed a rebuttal in the 5 June issue of *Stars and Stripes* denying that the transfers of Renner and Hahn were for involvement with *Semper Fi*.

Following the transfers of Renner, Hahn and Bacon, the publication of *Semper Fi* was taken over by LCpl Vern Kemp, Cpl Thomas Frensch, Sgt Charles Sundeen and Sgt Jerry West who maintained the papers' close association with Beheiren. Though in the next few months all four were shipped out of Iwakuni, it was not in the manner employed against earlier activists; however, turnover within the movement continued at a high rate and many people passed through the editorship of *Semper Fi*. In an undated letter circa December 1970 - January 1971, Yamazaki Shinji, a Beheiren member, reported to Jerry West that over ten people were presently editing *Semper Fi*. A year later in a letter dated 20 January 1972, Joe Sonntag reported to West that between mid-November 1971 and mid-January 1972 the military had shipped out thirteen editors of *Semper Fi*, many with less than twenty four hours' notice, yet new GI's kept steadily replacing them.

The fight over the paper continued, and for about a year from the Fall of 1972, GI's through legal maneuver, managed to actively utilize the right to distribute *Semper Fi*. The military kept fighting back though, and on 14 December 1973, Gen. Lang of the 1st Marine Air Wing issued an order prohibiting the writing for or distribution of *Semper Fi* without prior command approval. GI's sought redress against this order and were harassed and intimidated by the command. The Iwakuni project report in GIPA of March 1974 characterized this situation by saying that:

Everyone submitting the redress letter was called into his CO's office and lectured on how the Commies out at the Semper Fi house were using him, told that though their letters were legal that they would be watched, and told that they would be smart to stop such foolishness...one GI who is not sympathetic with the Fi but thinks the order is bad submitted a prior approval request to circulate a petition to Congress requesting that the order be rescinded.

The report goes on to relate that the GI who wanted to petition Congress was blackmailed, by threat of court martial for something he had done, to forget the petition. Despite all of the military's efforts, however, *Semper Fi* was never silenced and had published 105 issues through December of 1974.

Beheiren was instrumental in the early phases of *Semper Fi* in providing technical support and a distribution system, and remained involved in varying degrees throughout the years. The existence of *Semper Fi* was a public sore spot of the U.S. military as it was visible evidence of discord among its ranks, a discord frequently made the subject of Japanese newspapers and magazines, and a rallying point around which dissident servicemen could unite their efforts of opposition. The military feared its influence as can be seen from the actions taken to crush it and from the standard warning given to new Marines at Iwakuni against association with *Semper Fi*.⁹⁸ *Semper Fi*, though it was the most consistent, was not the only GI paper in Japan published against the military. As mentioned before there was *Hair* at Misawa, also at various times there was *Yokosuka David* at Yokosuka, the *First Amendment* at Yokota, all published by GI's with Beheiren's aid, and Beheiren's *We Got the BrASS* and *Kill for Peace*, as well as other English language papers aimed at servicemen which were distributed in the Tokyo area.⁹⁹ These newspapers kept alive the voice of dissent but were only one facet of the movement alliance. Perhaps most important for the GI's was Beheiren's role in the establishment of an American civilian counseling and support activity to aid the servicemen and coordinate the movement on a national scale.

In late 1969 there were two American activists, known as Annie and Jan, looking into the possibilities of GI resistance in Asia. By January of 1970 with both the past flare-ups at Misawa and the independent rise of protest at Iwakuni, the two Americans along with Gaikokujin Beheiren and Beheiren decided to call for organized help from the States to provide experienced assistance to the movement. As a result, Sidney Peterman, a Unitarian Minister with the West Coast Counseling Service in Monterey, California, was asked to come to Japan and assess the situation. Peterman went on a preliminary trip, decided that there was a need for full time involvement, and returned to the States. He raised funds in the U.S. for the project and then returned to Japan in early 1970 and set up office with Beheiren at Kagurazaka in Tokyo.¹⁰⁰ Concerning Beheiren's role Peterman said, "It would have been impossible do any of our work in Japan without having a Japanese group to work with and...Beheiren was the best group to associate with."¹⁰¹

It wasn't long before Peterman and the group in Tokyo had set up offices in Iwakuni, Misawa, Yokosuka and Koza in Okinawa, while an associate set up a project in the Philippines, and the name of the organization was changed to Pacific Counseling Service (PCS). Peterman made his first visit to Iwakuni in April of 1970 and met with Lonnie Renner, Vern Kemp, Jerry West and other GI's at the Christian Church in Kintai (West Iwakuni) where Rev. Iwai and other Iwakuni ministers of the Kyodan (Japanese Christian Church) along with Rev. Robert McWilliams, a Canadian missionary, had been sponsoring weekly discussion meetings for the dissident servicemen. GI resistance, military

regulations and the problems of discharge from the service for reasons of conscientious objection were talked over with Peterman at the meeting, and one result was that several weeks later Jan and Annie took up residence in Iwakuni and began working as full time counselors for the movement. Barbara Bye and others followed Jan and Annie and the Iwakuni Project has been kept operating by PCS up to the present date.¹⁰² The relationship between these project staffers and Beheiren was a close one and attests both to Beheiren's continuing interest in the GI's and its ability as a group to cross all kinds of social barriers with its universalistic posture. The interrelation is illustrated by Bruce Hartford, a PCS staffer at Iwakuni in 1972-73 when he described the connection with Beheiren. "My partner lived at the Hobbit (Beheiren's coffee house) and our printing facilities were at the Hobbit. We would have meetings between us and Beheiren there. Also some of the Beheiren people lived at the GI house because we wanted to keep ties."¹⁰³ The introduction of PCS brought counseling for military problems and conscientious objection, and provided a core group immune to the military which gave continuity to the GI movement. It also forged closer ties with Beheiren, but the most devastating thing for the military was that it paved the way for the National Lawyers Guild.

With the rise of the GI movement and the subsequent quasi-legal and outright illegal shenanigans of the military authorities to crush the movement, it became apparent to both the GI's and PCS that civilian lawyers were needed both to defend servicemen in the military courts, and to take civil action against the military when it infringed upon the servicemen's rights. Beheiren furnished Japanese lawyers to the movement to handle cases in the Japanese courts, as on the occasion when Vern Kemp and Mitchell Tubman were arrested on a train for suspicion of marijuana possession;¹⁰⁴ but seldom could the Japanese lawyers get into military courts. So, the National Lawyers Guild, which worked with GI's in the States, joined the PCS projects in Japan to provide free service to GI's in trouble.

Mark Amsterdam and Carol Dudek, along with the Japanese lawyer, Ono Noboyuki, defended Norm Ewing in November of 1970 against charges arising out of the Iwakuni brig riot of 4 July 1970. Ewing had previously been AWOL for three months before the riot, living amongst the Japanese with the aid of JATEC, giving the case more meaning for the Japanese than just a fact of riot. The court room was packed at his trial and though he was found guilty, the presence of civilian lawyers and spectators bode no good for the military's usual practice of only token opposition on the part of the defense.¹⁰⁵ Ewing's case was not a complete victory, but many to follow were, as the NLG successfully defended GI's against an assortment of charges, irritating the military to no end. On 2 March 1972, LCP. Clifford Hunt was defended by NLG lawyers Sandy Karp and Eric Seitz against charges of assaulting an intelligence agent. The court was again packed with spectators as Karp and Seitz brought down a verdict of not guilty.¹⁰⁶ On March 26th of the same year Todd Looney, a sailor, jumped the USS Hancock in Yokosuka before it departed for Vietnam. Supported by Beheiren he held a television and press conference in Tokyo explaining his opposition to the war and then gave himself up at the U.S. Embassy. During his time in Japan, Looney was represented by Eric Seitz.¹⁰⁷ On 15 April Dr Richard Scotti, an Air

Force doctor charged with dealing in drugs at Yokota AFB, was given an administrative hearing instead of a court martial because he was represented by Seitz. The reason for a hearing was to bypass the normal rules of evidence, since the military's case was based on extensive illegal wiretapping. In the crowded court room Seitz ran the government witnesses through the mill, proving their ignorance of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th Amendments to the Constitution, and caused the Air Force to dismiss the case anyway.¹⁰⁸ Also in April of 1972, while Seitz and Karp were in Japan, GI's at Iwakuni filed a lawsuit against the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Air Station in federal court claiming violation of their First Amendment rights,¹⁰⁹ and on 29 June 1972, shortly after the Commanding Officer placed the coffee house Hobbit off limits, GI's filed a suit in federal court seeking an injunction.¹¹⁰ Numerous other cases were also taken up by the NLG and needless to say, the military was highly displeased as shown by their reactions.

In the Spring of 1972 Major Granger, a legal officer at MCAS Iwakuni, sent letters to Japanese immigration asking to have Sandy Karp deported. Granger refused to let Karp see copies of the letters and said his reasons were to keep the provisions of the Security Treaty. Granger then said that he would advise that the NLG be barred from the base and that he would refuse to judge any trial in which they participated.¹¹¹ On 10 November 1972 (The Marine Corps Birthday), the *Torii Teller* printed an article red-baiting the NLG and attacking the professional conduct of NLG lawyer Reber Boulton.¹¹² Plainly the military was irritated, after years of doing as it pleased, right or wrong, at having to face the situation of servicemen standing up for their rights within the system. This irritation and exasperation is best portrayed by a statement ascribed to the Staff Judge Advocate at Iwakuni who said, after Seitz on 17 December 1973, got Pfc. Edward V. Lawrence, charged with attempting to murder an officer, off-the-hook because there were gross errors in the military's case, "I guess everyone is going to ask for a civilian lawyer now. Mr. Seitz here walked off with everything but the court house door."¹¹³

Besides lawyers and counselors, to further promote the movement on the bases, the Americans and Beheiren adopted a tactic prevalent in the resistance within the U.S., the GI coffee house. In Japan the chief forms of leisure for off duty servicemen who did not assimilate into the local culture were either the military operated clubs on base offering cheap booze and a military atmosphere, or the local bars on the strip in front of the base which provided expensive drinks and commercial sex. As an alternative to this the coffee houses proffered a quiet, low key atmosphere without alcohol or military pressures, and also exposure to radical people and literature. The first GI coffee house, The Owl, was opened by Beheiren in Misawa on 15 July 1970,¹¹⁴ and much later the New People's Center was opened in Yokosuka.¹¹⁵ Between these two though came the most controversial GI coffee house in America's Asian history, the coffee house Hobbit.

The Hobbit was opened on 25 February 1972, funded and hand-built by Beheiren in a building near the base in Iwakuni. Two rooms of the Hobbit were set aside for GI work and two others were made into a restaurant.¹¹⁶ AMPO reported that the reason for Beheiren building the Hobbit was to expand its anti-war organizing gains in Iwakuni, the vanguard of the GI movement in Japan.¹¹⁷ In the

following month on the 19th and 20th Beheiren held a national meeting at the Hobbit with people from all over Japan to discuss, as *Semper Fi* reported, the Vietnam War, the problem of the Red Army (The Sekigun of Japan Airlines hijack and LOD airport massacre infamy) and Japanese government over-reaction, as well as the problem of Okinawa revision with the prospect of spreading Japanese military imperialism by the redeployment of Japanese troops to Okinawa.¹¹⁸ From the Marine Corps view Col. Murphy in his affidavit said that the meeting discussed the topics of supporting anti-war GI's, opposition to Japanese munitions industries, transfer of Japanese troops to Okinawa, and forming an opposition movement to Japanese troops stated at MCAS Iwakuni. In either case, the topics of the Beheiren meeting were an indication that the tone of the Hobbit was to be a theme set in opposition to the policies of the U.S. and Japanese governments. By drawing GI participation into the Hobbit, Beheiren not only facilitated the growth of the GI movement, but was also able to exhibit visible American support for its aims against American and Japanese policy.

Reaction to the Hobbit came from both the Japanese and American governments. On 4 June 1972, the Japanese police raided the Hobbit claiming that weapons from the Marine Corps Air Station had been passed through the Hobbit to the Red Army. This was a two edged sword for the Marine Corps, it was nice to have the Hobbit maligned, but horrendous to suggest that U.S. arms were going to Japanese guerillas, indicating either design or incompetence by military authorities responsible for the security of weapons. Col. Murphy is quick to point out in his affidavit that no substantial evidence was ever produced to indicate this fact. Shortly after the Japanese raided the Hobbit, the Marine Corps took steps to prevent GI's from frequenting it. On 22 June Col. H.L. VanCampen, Commanding Officer of MCAS Iwakuni, placed the Hobbit off limits to U.S. military personnel,¹¹⁹ touching off a fight which is not yet settled. The GI's have kept the military under constant pressure over the Hobbit through Congressional inquiries and legal battles including civil suits and courts martial. At least one court martial for failure to obey the off limits order was dismissed to avoid testing the order's legality¹²⁰ and currently a civil suit is pending in the federal court challenging the order.¹²¹ A direct outgrowth of the Hobbit problem was the Hobbit Mobile Bookstore, a portable book wagon devised by GI's and Beheiren to spread literature from the Hobbit around to the servicemen in Iwakuni.¹²² Besides establishing a rallying point for GI's, Beheiren, through the Hobbit, managed to create a tangle of administrative and legal problems to encumber the U.S. military.

Coffee houses, counselors, lawyers and newspapers were aimed largely at the struggle within the military and were carried on for the most part, except for the coffee houses, by the American with only supportive, though vital, assistance from Beheiren. In essence Beheiren had, by aiding the underground newspapers and promoting the appearance of PCS in Asia, set loose a fox in the military chicken coop and by so doing it upset and impaired the immediate effectiveness of U.S. activity in Asia more than any demonstration alone would have done. This was one side of the Beheiren-GI alliance. The other side focused not on the internal encumberment of the military, though it was encumbering, but upon the public show of opposition to the establishment represented by official American

and Japanese policy, an opposition conceived to quicken public conscience and bring pressure upon the official order.

The first tactic used in the public phase of the struggle was the bringing together of dissident GI's and the Japanese press. In January of 1970 MCAS Iwakuni was rife with racial tension punctuated by sporadic outbursts of violence. In the nights paranoia gripped the base as blacks and whites traveled in packs for fear of being assaulted, and all news of the situation was suppressed, except for classified messages to Washington, in an attempt to keep the fact of discord from public view.¹²³ On 5 February 1970, Gen. W.G. Johnson of the 1st Marine Air Wing held a meeting with about 40 GI's, mostly black, to discuss the race problems. Johnson ran the issue around in circles, avoiding any hint of a solution which would change the situation, and left the group dissatisfied. Cpl Robert Dorton, a white, surreptitiously made a tape recording of the entire affair and through Beheiren it was both published in English and given to the Japanese media at a news conference.¹²⁴ The military was beginning a long ride of bad publicity in the Japanese press generated by its own people and Beheiren.

In the following months the press covered *Semper Fi* and the transfers of dissident GI's as has been previously mentioned, as well as several public gatherings between GI's and Beheiren. Then the GI movement hit TV. On the 13th of June 1970, a camera crew from RCC television Channel 4 in Hiroshima, was let on the base to do a documentary. To the perturbation of the base command the half hour program was on the GI movement at Iwakuni and featured GI activist Vern Kemp.¹²⁵ A little over a week later on 21 June an interview was arranged between activists Vern Kemp, Charles Sundeen, Thomas Frensch and Jerry West representing the GI movement, and a reporter from the *Mainichi Shimbun*. On the 22nd an article on the interview appeared in the Japanese language *Mainichi* which said that the four hoped that the Japanese would understand their wish for peace and that the numbers of servicemen responding to Beheiren's anti-war campaign was increasing. In the article the four also took a stand against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. No sooner had the dust settled from this interview when on 4 July 1970, the prisoners confined in the Correctional Facility (brig) at MCAS Iwakuni revolted and destroyed the entire interior of the facility, while holding troops at bay for fourteen hours. First hand news of this disturbing event was all over Japan the following day, released by Beheiren. Oda Makoto, in Iwakuni for a meeting with GI's, was taken on base by GI activists to view the riot,¹²⁶ and later that evening Jerry West, who had been on duty as a guard inside the facility at the time of the riot, met with Oda in Kintai and delivered a statement for the press written by the prisoners.¹²⁷

The military continued to receive bad press through Beheiren's efforts, especially on racism and anti-war protests, as illustrated by the conferences in the Spring of 1972. On 23 February 1972, Beheiren held a press conference in Tokyo to explain the racist situation aboard MCAS Iwakuni and to describe the outbreaks of violence which occurred there over the New Year's period.¹²⁸ Then on 22 April 1972, Beheiren sponsored a press conference, again in Tokyo, attended by GI's from four major bases in Japan including three Marines and a dependent wife from Iwakuni. The servicemen gave public statements protesting the war in Vietnam and Japan's role in it.¹²⁹ Close behind this conference was another one,

likewise in Tokyo, which Beheiren sponsored on 6 May. At this conference two black Marines from Iwakuni made statements charging racial discrimination with the Marine Corps at Iwakuni, and the story went all over Japan.¹³⁰ By encouraging and facilitating the increasing willingness of GI's to speak out, Beheiren helped to erode away the effect of the military's most cherished tradition, the custom of managing the news.

Related to the practice of GI's and Beheiren exposing the military in the media is the shocking disclosure of November 1971, an event whose finer details are still hidden in obscurity. In the middle of the debate on the revision of Okinawa, on 16 November 1971, Diet Member Narasaki Yanosuke got up and revealed that he had evidence of the presence of nuclear weapons at MCAS Iwakuni. The Diet went into confusion and in haste the Liberal-Democrats (party which favors U.S. military and controls Japan) closed off debate and forced the revision through. As a result of the disclosure, irate Iwakuni citizens flocked to the base fence to view the storage area and the Marine Corps was forced to go through the motions of allowing two Japanese officials to inspect the base. Also, since Narasaki based part of his claim upon the color code of the storage area, the military quickly repainted it. The information which Narasaki publicized was so detailed that an inside observer seemed obvious, and Paul Neighorn says in his interview that Narasaki mentioned that he got the information from a GI at Iwakuni.¹³¹ The presence of nuclear weapons in Japan would be in violation of Japanese-American agreements and Japan's non-nuclear principles, and proven knowledge of it could cause a political crisis. The Marine Corps' reaction was to deny existence of the weapons, and quickly ship out four editors of *Semper Fi*, Paul Neighorn, Jim Yeakley, Vince Brew and Don Spreuer.¹³² Though there is no public evidence on who gave Narasaki his information, the fact that the Marine Corps took action against GI activists associating with Beheiren indicates where their fears were, and points to the effectiveness of the protest movement.

Press conference and disclosures of information were not the only means of showing opposition to established policy, this opposition was also exposed by joint gatherings of GI's and Beheiren in public places and by their sponsoring of anti-war shows in Japan. The first public display of solidarity against the war was on 4 April 1970, when dissident Marines and Beheiren held a "Peace and Love" gathering at a park in Kintai where they played guitars and sang songs around a bonfire.¹³³ Eight days later on the 12th they held another gathering in Kintai while over 70,000 people were there viewing the cherry blossoms.¹³⁴ Under banners of peace symbols amidst the cherry trees they played music, sang songs and passed out anti-war literature, and received wide coverage in the Japanese press. The military was publicly embarrassed. Lonnie Renner, Robert Dorton and Dennis Hahn, three leaders of the GI's, were called in by their Executive Officer and warned against political activity, and shortly thereafter Dorton, who had also mailed out love beads to his supervisors, was shipped out of Japan on thirty-six hours' notice.¹³⁵

These gatherings became common place occurrences for the GI's and Beheiren, displaying their solidarity of purpose to the public and serving as an ever present reminder that all servicemen did not support their military's activity. In Iwakuni festivals were held at Kintai on 4 July 1970, 7 August 1971, 3 October 1971 as well

as at other times later and in between.¹³⁶ The gathering of 3 October was of special significance as it received broad public notice. On that day about twenty GI's with Beheiren members held a sit-in on the famous Kintai Bridge,¹³⁷ and displayed huge banners in Japanese and English saying, according to Col. Murphy in his affidavit, "American GI's Say No More War," and "U.S. Forces Take Your Hands Out of Asia;" and according to Paul Neighorn in his interview, "Get U.S. Bases Out of Asia" and "Iwakuni Base Must Go." As a result of this action, three GI's Paul Neighorn, Jim Yeakley and Vince Brew were charged by the military for taking part in a demonstration,¹³⁸ but the charges were dropped when the three were sent out of Japan later over the nuclear weapons scandal. Though Iwakuni was the hot spot of activity for GI organizing in Japan, similar gatherings were held at other bases also. On 18 July 1971, Beheiren sponsored a joint rock festival with GI's from Yokota and Tachikawa Air Force Bases to celebrate the inaugural issue of Yokota's GI paper, *The First Amendment*. The festival was held in Fussa Park with approximately 300 GI's and dependents participating.¹³⁹

Along with organizing festivals Beheiren helped to sponsor anti-war tours of American entertainers. In late 1971 Barbara Dane and Pablo Mendez came to Japan and Beheiren rented the Iwakuni Labor Hall for their concert on November 9th, which was attended by about 150 servicemen.¹⁴⁰ This show, however, was only a preview for the next month when Jane Fonda and the FTA show hit Japan. On December 1971, approximately 1,000 people including about 600 Americans, attended the show at Fussa Citizens Hall near Yokota Air Force base.¹⁴¹ On 18 December it appeared in Iwakuni where about 1,000 servicemen attended, and after the show, two GI's got up and read a petition of twelve demands which, among other things, asked that 1) the U.S. allow the Japanese people to search Iwakuni base for nuclear weapons, 2) that no more planes fly from Iwakuni to Southeast Asia nor fly from Iwakuni with live ordinance, and 3) that the U.S. make financial retribution to the Japanese people for the suffering caused them by the base. These demands were then signed by 150 other Iwakuni GI's and presented to the base Commanding Officer on the following day, resulting in the instigators being returned quickly to the United States.¹⁴² From Iwakuni the show went to Misawa where it played to a crowd of about 600 Japanese and 400 Americans in the Misawa Civic Center, and Beheiren provided an interpreter for the Japanese audience.¹⁴³ The tours of Jane Fonda and Barbara Dane in Japan, as well as the frequent occurrence of GI-Beheiren peace gatherings was a continuing reminder, to both the Japanese people and the U.S. military, of the discordance created by current policy.

The festivals, shows and press conferences were non-aggressive vehicles of public protest, aimed at showing solidarity and at publicizing the cause of Beheiren and the GI's. They were not, however, designed to directly confront or obstruct normal military routine. Beheiren and the GI's also engaged in the latter tactic by holding demonstrations and passing out literature on and in front of military bases. In the Spring of 1970 Beheiren demonstrated frequently in front of MCAS Iwakuni and also broadcast "Radio Camp Must-Go," adopted from the Oizumi citizens, across the fence to the GI's. These demonstrations were ill received by the military authorities. *Semper Fi* reported that on their demonstration of 5 April 1970, in Iwakuni Beheiren carried placards in English reading "Rise and Unite for

Peace,” “Support GI’s Who Reject the War,” “Remove Iwakuni Base, and “Crush Racism;”¹⁴⁴ and Lonnie Renner reported that on several occasions GI’s were forced away from “Radio Camp Must-Go” broadcasts by military police and also ordered not to watch demonstrations.¹⁴⁵ Dave Newcomb in his letter to the *Ally* of 14 April 1970, best expressed the military reaction to the peaceful demonstrations when he said:

MCAS Iwakuni is not healthy. Today there are anti-U.S. demonstrations outside, troops impressed into riot control squads, no liberty and restrictions on troop enlightenment such as no photography of demonstrations, threats of non-judicial (fitting expression) punishment if we watch from our barracks, and no knowledge of the purpose of the demonstrations.

The Marine Corps was afraid of common cause between the GI’s and Beheiren, and tried to keep the two apart. When the GI’s sent out a message of encouragement to Beheiren demonstrators on 31 May 1970, the military publicly denied in the *Stars and Stripes* (5 June 1970) that it had happened. Denying the truth didn’t change things, though, and against all the military’s wishes the GI’s continued to support Beheiren. Beheiren in return supported the GI’s like at Yokosuka on 12 July 1970. On this day a small group of Beheiren members gathered at the main gate of Yokosuka Naval Base to show solidarity with six Marines being held in confinement at Yokosuka for rioting in the Iwakuni brig. About 150 military and riot police were on hand to outnumber the demonstrators.¹⁴⁶

Throughout the years Beheiren maintained itself as a thorn in the military’s side with its various protest tactics around the bases. At Iwakuni for example, on 10 June 1972, they passed out leaflets to GI’s coming off base to discourage them from going to Thailand where the combat units were being deployed.¹⁴⁷ They also blocked traffic at the main gate on Nixon’s inauguration day in 1973,¹⁴⁸ and when the Commandant of the Marine Corps visited Iwakuni in September of 1973 they broadcast tapes alleging his involvement in Watergate.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, they developed a tactic for halting air traffic at Iwakuni by flying kites off the end of the runway which they did periodically in every year from 1971-1973.¹⁵⁰ These are only a few cases out of many, though, as Beheiren was always at the forefront of the anti-base protests during the early seventies.

One big protest in which Beheiren was involved was the Sagamihara action of 1972. Though Beheiren this time was only a contributing member, the protest is notable because of its implications on anti-U.S. military demonstrations as a whole, since it brought on a crisis of sorts between the United States and Japan. The Sagami Depot was an important facility for supplying tanks and armored vehicles in the Vietnam War and on 5 August 1972, demonstrators led by the Japan Socialist and Communist Parties, declaring Japan should not cooperate in the Vietnam War, halted American tanks enroute from Sagami to the port of Yokohama. The demonstrators were supported by Yokohama’s Mayor Asukata Ichiro who, invoking a section of the Vehicle Control Ordinance, denied permission for the tanks to pass over Murasame Bridge on the grounds that they were too heavy. The tanks returned to Sagami and were bottled up there for three months while protesters erected a tent city in front of the base to maintain

surveillance. The involvement of Mayor Asukata and Japanese law threw the whole affair into the Japanese Diet where the Liberal-Democrats and the opposition parties began to hash out a settlement. The United States meanwhile, began applying pressure to its friends, the ruling Liberal-Democrats, to force a favorable settlement. *The Japan Quarterly* reported that:

*The U.S. Army in Japan...pressured the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to take all steps necessary to insure the uninterrupted passage of American combat vehicles. A similar request is reported to have been made by the U.S. Presidential Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, during the Japan-U.S. summit talks in Honolulu early in September.*¹⁵¹

In the end the government revised the law which Asukata had invoked to stop the tanks, thus pulling the rug out from under the protest and giving the U.S. free rein on the highways.¹⁵² However, the fact that American operations were impeded by the demonstrations and the fact that local government officials were willing to help protesters against these operations pointed out the potential for any anti-base movement to adversely affect important operations, as illustrated, and cause friction with the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Beheiren strove to utilize this potential to the fullest, as did the dissident GI's who on occasion demonstrated alongside Beheiren.

In the early stages of the GI movement sympathy towards Beheiren's demonstrations would be shown by gestures such as flashing the two-fingered "V" Peace sign, showing a fist and other signs of solidarity against the established order. This supportive action continued as the most prevalent form of involvement, as Bruce Hartford mentions;¹⁵³ but on more than one occasion GI's in open defiance of all regulations would join or lead the demonstrators on the street. Clyde Weddel, a Marine AWOL from MCAS Iwakuni being harbored by the Japanese, gave a press conference on Christmas Eve 1970, and following that conference led a Beheiren demonstration in which he was forcibly arrested by Japanese police. Subsequently he was turned over to the military.¹⁵⁴ In the following year, two GI's, Sgts Dale Gilsinger and James Foster, were court martialed for marching with three other servicemen in a Beheiren demonstration at Yokota on 13 June;¹⁵⁵ and on 6 August Vince Brew with PCS staffer Joe Sonntag led a group of sixty Japanese yippies in an impromptu demonstration that blocked the main gate at Iwakuni and resulted in two GI's being arrested.¹⁵⁶ On the same day in 1972, GI's from Iwakuni, in violation of military policy, participated in the demonstration in Hiroshima's Peace Park which marked the anniversary of the atomic bombing of that city.¹⁵⁷ Two weeks later on the 21 of August, Lawrence E. Zambanini, a sailor from the USS Oriskany, refused to board his ship and joined Beheiren in the protests at Sagami where he was arrested by the Japanese police on the 22nd;¹⁵⁸ and shortly after Zambanini, Seaman Apprentice Douglas Weaver of the USS Gurkey was also arrested for participating in political activities in Japan. In response to Weaver's arrest, five other GI's held a press conference in Yokosuka on 10 September 1972, to protest. As a result of this action one of the five, PO2 Glen Kerr, was subsequently court martialed for demonstrating in a foreign country on the grounds that previous to the press conference he allegedly raised his fist in salute to Japanese anti-war

demonstrators on the street.¹⁵⁹ During 1972 also, GI's were demonstrating indirectly at Kitafuji by making tapes for the Fuji Mothers Group to broadcast onto the base,¹⁶⁰ and in Iwakuni at Christmas time, when Beheiren held a sit-in at the main gate to protest the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam, a handful of servicemen turned out to support the demonstration by getting as close to full involvement as possible without being liable for arrest.¹⁶¹

Demonstrations against the military, however, were not confined only to areas outside the periphery of the American strongholds. From the earliest period of the GI movement, public protest was also carried aboard to the bases, to be displayed on the home fields of the war machine both by GI's alone and by GI's in concert with their Beheiren friends. As noted before, open GI dissidence appeared in Japan in late 1969 at Misawa where GI's were arrested for a public observance of Moratorium Day, and we have seen how this dissidence then appeared at Iwakuni and, among other forms, was manifested by GI's turning out to hear Beheiren's "Radio Camp Must-Go" broadcasts. GI's at Iwakuni also adopted more direct forms of publicly exhibiting their dissatisfaction. On Armed Forces Day, 16 May 1970, five Marines, George Bacon, Jerry Yingling, Charles Sundeen, Dennis Hahn and David Gillette were arrested for wearing black armbands, watching "Radio Camp Must-Go" and picking up literature from Beheiren through the base fence. As a result of his activities, Cpl Gillette, who worked in Public Affairs was, like Dorton before and so many after, transferred out of Iwakuni on short notice.¹⁶² Besides operating "Radio Camp Must-Go" Beheiren carried out other activities at Iwakuni on this Armed Forces Day, and many members were tossed off base at the main gate by military police as they tried to enter without invitations.¹⁶³ The mere fact that invitations were required, to what had traditionally been an open house affair to the general public, was a Beheiren triumph. Prior to Armed Forces Day Beheiren had let it be known that they would be taking advantage of open house to demonstrate aboard the base. As a result, shortly before the day arrived, the military announced its invitation only policy, severely restricting the usual crowd of Japanese spectators.¹⁶⁴ The device of taking advantage of days of traditional military celebration was a tactic which Beheiren and the GI's were to utilize on various occasions, to the authorities' dismay.

On Navy Day, 25 October 1970, about twelve Americans and sixty Japanese gave out cookies with peace signs on them and also little peace sign stickers during the open house at Yokosuka Naval Base. The Navy responded by tossing several of the Japanese off the base.¹⁶⁵ In the following year at Misawa on May 2nd about thirty GI's and some dependents wore black armbands and passed out leaflets to protest the war and racism. Approximately the same number turned out again on 15 May, Armed Forces Day, wearing black armbands and joining in with the Japanese to demonstrate against the military.¹⁶⁶ On Navy Day in 1972, 14 October, GI's and Beheiren totally disrupted the ceremonies at Yokosuka. In the middle of the program of speech making by American officials, the Japanese turned on an air raid siren they had out in a small boat in the bay. With the siren whining the Japanese and GI's in the stands began yelling "Free Doug," referring to the imprisoned seaman dissident Douglas Weaver, and "Stop the War." Following these chants they began broadcasting a tape recording of a Hanoi

bombing raid to further disrupt the proceedings. The ceremonies became unceremonious, the military police were called in to quell the pandemonium, and physically ejected about twenty-five Japanese from the base. On the next day the Japanese and GI's capped this achievement with a GI Rights rally followed by a demonstration at the main gate with Japanese carrying a sign reading "Human Rights for GI's." After the demonstration five servicemen burned their Vietnam Campaign Ribbons in opposition to the war.¹⁶⁷

In 1973, the Marine Corps at Iwakuni, instead of an Armed Forces Day open house, had one called "Friendship Day," a development which, however, did not change the attitude of the dissident elements. "Friendship Day" was on May 6th and to prepare the base for the celebration, on the night of the 5th, resistance GI's pasted up anti-war posters everywhere. This endeavor in turn filled the evening for the authorities who finally managed to get most of the posters removed before morning.¹⁶⁸ On "Friendship Day" itself Beheiren, "calling for an 'end to the aggression in Asia,' and sabotage of the 'U.S. War Machine'," ¹⁶⁹ protested in front of the main gate at Iwakuni by sitting along the road and passing out literature. According to Col. Murphy, Beheiren attempted to infiltrate the base after failing to pass through the gate "enmasse," and also managed to disrupt the flow of traffic by lying down in the road. The Hobbit Mobile Bookstore was also present at the gate and from the demonstrators' viewpoint, Bruce Hartford described the day as "a good day."¹⁷⁰ Another good day was had by the anti-military forces two months later on July 4th when six GI's were arrested for passing out copies of the Declaration of Independence. Permission to pass out the Declaration was requested in writing by the GI's ahead of time, and typically, to avoid the issue, the military never responded formally to the request.¹⁷¹ The six Marines, Pfc. Bobby E. Monfort, LCpl Paul M. Norman, Pvt. Daniel L. Planty, Pfc Edward Shephard, LCpl Carl D. Badington and Pfc. William F. Cox, distributed the Declaration anyway without permission and were arrested by military police.¹⁷² According to Hartford this arrest triggered such a response, even among officers, that a crowd of servicemen and dependents assembled at the military police office to protest the arrest and to shout at the MP's.¹⁷³ The military was so shaken by these events that an explanatory article appeared in the July 6th issue of the *Stars and Stripes*.

While the GI's kept going strong, 1973 was a transition year for Beheiren. The homeporting issue which saw the establishment of the "Yokosuka Information Center to Block Homeporting" by PCS, Vietnam Veterans Against the War and Japanese groups; and mutiny on the Midway itself was the last singular issue in the joint campaign. Up to 30,000 people a day demonstrated in Yokosuka prior to the Midway's arrival on October 5th, but the political climate was changing.¹⁷⁴ The Vietnam Peace Accords were signed in Paris, signaling a change in the war, and the energy crisis erupted to dampen the national economy and raise new spectres on the Japanese horizon. The citizens now faced other questions that went beyond Vietnam and required a more complex explanation of the mechanics of imperialism and Japan's role in the world. To fit this emerging era Beheiren needed a change in image. In January 1974, Oda Makoto declared Beheiren dissolved and proclaimed the birth of a new movement, Yonaoshi, to take up the struggle. (The name Yonaoshi itself echoes Japanese history and indicates the

roots not only of itself but of Beheiren, Koe Naki no Koe and all the groups before it, but that is for another project.) The GI movement still continues, and many of the old Beheiren cells still function at places like the Hobbit and maintain solidarity with the GI's, but the all-encompassing Beheiren coalition is gone. With the total victory of the Vietnam Liberation forces in the last few months, the name Beheiren itself is an anachronism.

Conclusion

In its nine years of existence Beheiren filled several positions in the progression of history. In the light of Japanese social history it represented the expression of the active but politically excluded intellectuals and common citizens. These people, who could find no place in the stagnant, bureaucratic, committed-to-the-system political parties, or in the violent and dogmatically fractured student groups, made up the constituency of Beheiren. The immediate grounds upon which they banded together was the Vietnam War, a war whose unpopularity is illustrated by the overwhelming sentiment against it in the Japanese press; but the foundations upon which they built Beheiren were as old as citizens movements themselves. In this respect Beheiren is but another manifestation of a traditional aspect in Japanese society, the aspect of idealism and action in contest with the established ruling hierarchy.

In Japanese political history of the Vietnam Era, Beheiren was a unifying factor in the campaigns against the Vietnam War and the Security Treaty. As a broad based coalition of people, it was able to hold together for a time various feuding groups in order to mount a combined opposition against the government, as illustrated by the 15 June demonstration in 1969, and the welding of alliances in late 1969. Though this opposition had no immediate effect upon the Treaty, Beheiren, through its function as both a citizens coalition and a mediator of political factionalism, emerged as a key force in keeping alive the issues of Vietnam, the Security Treaty, and the U.S. presence in Japan. Omori Shigeo perhaps best portrayed this aspect of Beheiren when he wrote:

*Campaigning against war, against the Treaty and in support of wide changes in the existing social system, Beheiren has achieved a unique position and is developing new tactics beyond the reach of the established forces opposing the Treaty. Beheiren will play a pivotal role in the consolidation of anti-JCP faction students, workers and citizens in the struggle during the coming decade.*¹⁷⁵

In the context of American history and the history of U.S.-Japan relations, Beheiren contributed to the process which destroyed the reliability of the American Armed Forces, leading to the Vietnam withdrawal, and participated in events which pressured the alliance between the two countries. Col. Robert D. Heinl in his article "Collapse of the Armed Forces" in the *Armed Forces Journal* of 7 June 1971, pointed out that:

The morale, discipline and battle worthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States...

Sedition - coupled with disaffection within the ranks, and externally fomented with an audacity and intensity previously inconceivable - infests the Armed Services.

This article, which goes on to illuminate the military's growing impotency due to internal strife, is an indication of official thought on the military state of affairs, a thought which must have been a prominent factor in the decision to give up in Vietnam. The GI movement in Japan added to this picture of gloom for the military, and helped to divert energy from pursuit of the military missions to efforts at maintaining discipline and preserving the established order. Without Beheiren, the GI's in Japan may never have mounted such a powerful resistance as they did. Understandably, Beheiren's help was not appreciated by the military for this reason, but also Beheiren was feared because it used the GI's to add weight to its program of pressure on the Japanese government against American military interest. GI's participating with Beheiren destroyed the façade of military solidarity, damaging the Armed Forces official image and credibility in the eyes of the people. The fact of a public alliance between the GI's and the Japanese

imperiled the American rationale, used to pressure the Japanese government, that troops in Japan were “harassed and maligned” by Japanese demonstrators. With these elements leading to a change in public sentiment both the U.S. military and their supporters, the Liberal-Democratic Party, had to adjust in order to maintain their positions of power. Many people in Japan hated the bases and it wasn’t inconceivable that increasing sympathy for the GI’s and Beheiren could lead to decreasing votes for the LDP. It is interesting to note that in the 70’s, the U.S. has reduced and consolidated its bases in Japan, and that the Japanese government introduced a bill in the Diet which would provide extra benefits to people living around bases, especially American bases. One interpretation of this could be that it is an effort to preserve U.S. policy in Asia by decreasing the causes of opposition in Japan, a key country around which that policy is built. If this is true, then Beheiren deserves more than passing credit for placing obstacles in the path of American plans in Asia.

All of the activities of Beheiren, uniting the citizens, opposing the war, joining with the GI’s, points out its place in the fabric of world history. Beheiren was a Japanese fiber in the greater cloth of people struggle against imperialism and its causes, people divorced from chauvinistic goals. The universalism of Beheiren is exemplified by its perception of the interrelated nature of all problems and its willingness to join in the struggles of others. By opposing the war, Japan’s involvement was called into question; by opposing Japan’s involvement, the very direction of society was confronted, and through this kind of process, Beheiren exposed the responsibility of each individual in the flow of history and offered a vehicle for personal political expression apart from the traditional expression of group consensus.

Though Beheiren has ended as a physical entity, the ancient spirit which moved it still lives on, and the lessons learned through the Beheiren experience no doubt will be transmitted on through time to be used again when popular action is called for to rise against the current of events.

Notes

1. According to the article *Base Crisis* in the **Japan Quarterly** (hereafter cited as **JQ**), 20 (Jan-Mar 1973) p. 3, over 2000 vehicles were shipped from Sagami to Vietnam during the period 1966- 1973. Kaji Etsuko says in her article *Thieu's Tanks Stopped, U.S. Taken Aback by New Tactic*, in **AMPO** No. 15 (Dec 1972) p. 5, that it was reported in the March 1972 issue of **Military Review** that during the past three year period (1969-1972) repairs of damaged tanks and personnel carriers at Sagami had saved the US military over \$18 million.
2. The *Chronology* in **JQ** 14 (Jul-Sep 1967) p. 402, says that on Japanese crewman was killed and four others wounded in a Vietcong shelling of a US Military Ship Transport Service LST in the Saigon River on 20 April 1967. It said that an estimated 1000 crewmen worked for MSTs.
3. Information and statistics on Japanese business activity in relation to the Vietnam build-up is taken from *Vietnam Special Procurement and the Economy*, in **JQ** 14 (Jan-Mar 1967) pp. 13-16.
4. Statistics on letters to the **Asahi** taken from Maruyama Shizuo's article *Japanese Opinion and the Vietnam War* in **JQ** 12 (Jul-Sep 1965) pp. 303-310
5. Tsuru Shigeto, *In the Magazines* in **JQ** 12 (Jul-Sep 1965) pp. 388-394.
6. Ibid.
7. The *Sekai* symposium of 1966 is covered in *Japan's Periodicals - Extracts: Japanese Views of the Vietnam War* in **Contemporary Japan** (hereafter cited as **CJ**) 28 (May 1966) pp. 634-638. Participating in the symposium were Ryu Shintaro, critic; Dr. Ohuchi Hyoe, scholar and former president of Hosei University; Sakamoto Yoshikazu, Professor of International Relation, Tokyo University; Kaiko Takeshi, writer; and Toyoda Toshiyuki, Professor at St. Paul's University.
8. The *Sekai* symposium of 1967 is covered by Obata Misao in his review *In the Magazines* in **JQ** 14 (Jul-Sep 1967) pp. 376-381. The participants of the symposium were four scholars and two journalists.
9. For a sampling of Japanese opinion as expressed in the newspapers and magazines of the Vietnam Era see Obata Misao's review *In the Magazines* in **JQ** 13 (Jan-Mar 1966) pp. 107-113; (Apr-Jun 1966) pp. 244-249; 15 (Jul-Sep 1968) pp. 379-384; and 17 (Jan-Mar 1970) pp. 92-98: The review of newspaper editorials *From the Editorials* in **JQ** 14 (Apr-Jun 1967) pp. 245-250: and Goto Moto's article *Crisis in Japan - U.S. Relations* in **JQ** 15 (Oct-Dec 1968) pp. 421-429.
10. Note: This reference was marked but not listed in the notes in the first edition.
11. Ditto
12. The scholars' appeal is mentioned in *Japan's Periodicals - Extracts: Japanese View of the Vietnam War* **CJ** 28 (May 1966) p. 634.
13. *Chronology* **JQ** 12 (Oct-Dec 1965) p. 549.
14. *Chronology* **JQ** 15 (Oct-Dec 1968)
15. Ibid.
16. *Chronology* **JQ** 18 (Jan-Mar 1971) p. 125
17. Ibid. p. 127
18. Minobe's actions are discussed in *Base Crisis* in **JQ** 20 pp. 5-7.

19. Ibid. pp. 3-4. This was an important event in US-Japan relations and will be discussed later in the text.
20. The information and press response on the *Sakurada Statement* was taken from *From the Editorials JQ* 17 (Jan-Mar 1970) pp. 85-87.
21. For a history of dissent in the US military and a good examination of what is wrong with the military system see Peter Barne's book **Pawns** (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972). For an individual case history of dissent during the Vietnam Era see Andy Stapp's book **Up Against the Brass** (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).
22. The only information that I was able to obtain on the so called "bonus law" was a position paper against it when it was still before the Diet, entitled *Our Party's View on the New 'Law for Adjustment of Surrounding Areas of military Bases'* in the **Japan Socialist Review** (hereafter cited as **JSR**) No. 296 (1 April 1974) pp. 22-25. I call it a "bonus law" because it gave citizens in base areas bonuses such as government sponsored construction of hospitals, parks, meeting halls, etc. 27
23. This is reported in Stuart Dowsey's book **Zengakuren: Japan's Revolutionary Students** (Berkeley: Ishi Press, 1970) pp. 265-66.
24. Sid Peterman says on page 22 of his interview of 14 February 1975 by Jerry West, that it was the realization that oil passing through Shinjuku (a district in Tokyo) was being used by the U.S. military that caused the formation of Beheiren in order to protest this support of American activity. I haven't located any other sources which give a definite and very specific cause and effect incidence for the founding of Beheiren, but as the trend of letters to the editor in Japanese newspapers during this period indicate (see Note 4) there was a pretty wide concern with war and with the implications of Japan's security relations with the U.S., and who had opposed U.S. policy before, I am sure that Beheiren was a product of not only U.S. oil in Shinjuku, but of the whole, sudden massive display of U.S. military aggression in Asia. The three slogans are quoted from Tsurumi Yoshiyuki's article "*Beheiren*" in **JQ** 16 (Oct-Dec 1969) p.445.
25. From the Asahi Shimbun staff's book **The Pacific Rivals** (New York: Weatherhill, 1972) p.353.
26. Ibid
27. All information of the *Shiso no Kagaku Kenkyukai* was taken from **The Pacific Rivals**, pp. 352-354.
28. Kishi is quoted from George Packard III *The Great Debate* in **The Japan Reader Vol.2, Postwar Japan, 1945 to the Present**, ed. Jon Livingston, Joe Moore and Felicia Oldfather (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973) p. 380. The quote also appears in Tsurumi Yoshiyuki's article "*Beheiren*" in **AMPO** No. 1 (November 1969) p. 8.
29. Information on the *Koe Nake no Koe* and its relation to Beheiren is taken from the Takabatake Michitoshi's article *Citizens Movements: Organizing the Spontaneous*, in the **Japan Interpreter** (hereafter cited as **Jl**) 9 (Winter 1975) pp. 319-320; and from **Pacific Rivals** p. 354. Also see Tsurumi's article Beheiren in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 8.
30. These groups are mentioned as Beheiren components in Dowsey's **Zengakuren**...p.265. No other information was turned up on them which is unfortunate because I think to really get into the background of Beheiren these groups should all be researched.
31. Tsurumi, *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16 p. 445.
32. Fukushima Junro, *The New Left*, in **JQ** 17 (Jan-Mar 1970) p. 30

33. For more discussion on the composition of Beheiren see the interview of Don Philippi by Jerry West of 1 March 1975, pp 3-5; Peterman interview pp 8-10; Fukushima's *The New Left* pp 30-35 and Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16 pp. 444-448.
34. **The Pacific Rivals**, p. 67.
35. Philippi interview pp. 7 and 11-12.
36. Individuals and leadership in Ebeheiren are mentioned in the Philippi interview pp. 4-5, 7, 9-12; the Peterman interview pp. 9 and 18; **The Pacific Rivals** p. 67; and Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16 p.445.
37. Fukushima *The New Left* p. 35.
38. **AMPO** Interviews Makoto Oda **AMPO** No. 1, pp. 10-12.
39. *The Next Phase of the Movement....Interview with Oda Makoto* **AMPO** No. 16 (March 1973) pp. 18-21.
40. *AMPO Interviews Makoto Oda*, p. 10. Concerning the functions of Beheiren and the problems as viewed by Beheiren also see the Peterman interview, pp. 7 and 21-22; and the Philippi interview pp. 4-5; Fukushima's *The New Left* pp. 30-31; and Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 8.
41. Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 8.
42. Quotation of Nakae Toju is taken from Inoue Tetsujiro's **Nihon Yomei Gakoha No Tetsugaku** (Tokyo Fuzambo, 1932) pp. 81-85, appearing in Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore DeBary and Donald Keene's compilation **Sources OF Japanese Tradition** (New York; Columbia University Press, 1958) p. 382.
43. Najita Tetsuo's **Japan** (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice Hall, 1974) p. 53.
44. Ibid
45. A brief description of Hansen Seine lin Kai is given in Dowsey's **Zengakuren**...pp. 263-265.
46. The 'teach-in' is mentioned by Tsurumi in *Beheiren* **JQ** 16, p. 446.
47. Ibid 28
48. Franz Schurmann's tour is mentioned in the article *Anti-war Movement in the Self Defense Forces* in **AMPO** No. 3-4 (March 1970) p. 43.
49. Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16, p. 448.
50. Information on *Citizens Treaty* and Hanoi medical aid taken from Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 8.
51. Information on the Tokyo *War Crimes Trials* is taken from the U.S. Congress House Committee on Internal Security (hereafter cited as HISC) **Investigation of Attempts to Subvert the United States Armed Forces**, part 2, 92 Cong. 2 sess., 9, 10, 16 and 18 November 1971, and 2 and 3 May 1972 (U.S. GPO, 1972) p. 7097.
52. Kansai Beheiren refers to the Beheiren groups in the Kansai area of Japan, the Osaka-Kyoto area.
53. Anti-war Expo 69 information taken from Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16, p. 446.
54. Lennon's peace message information taken from Dowsey's **Zengakuren**...p. 223.
55. For information on The Intrepid Four see *JATEC: The Story of a Deserter* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 6; Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16, p. 446; and Col. E.S. Murphy's affidavit dated 21 October 1974. However, it should be noted that Murphy has his dates wrong as he says 1965 when it should be 1967.

56. Reference to the sixteen GI's taken from Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16 p. 446; and Judy Merrill's article *GI's in Japan* in *Win* (1 December 1970) p. 15.
57. The case of D. Dennis taken from *JATEC* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 6.
58. Under Japanese law and existing agreements, any active duty member of the U.S. Military may reside in Japan without passport or visa. Deserters who were in possession of their military identification were still considered active duty personnel and thus is no violation of Japanese immigration laws.
59. *JATEC* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 6.
60. The Philippi interview, p. 10.
61. *Ibid*, p. 3 for information on the found of Gaikokujin Beheiren.
62. Don Philippi says on pages 18 and 19 of his interview that three girls from UC who held out to the end in the student struggles at ICU joined Gaikokujin Beheiren. William Allaway's memorandum to Pres. Charles Hitch of UC on the UC student problem in Tokyo in 1969-70 on pages 19, 20 and 22 identifies the three final holdout students as Sher, Ogata and Horikoshi.
63. The information of **AMPO** comes from the Philippi interview p. 8; and that on **Shukan AMPO** from Philippi's unpublished manuscript.
64. Gaikokujin Beheiren's GI work is mentioned in the Philippi interview on pages 19 and 20.
65. The actions of 15 and 16 May 1970 are described in the Philippi interview pp. 14 and 15.
66. *AMPO Interviews Yoshikawa Yuichi on GI Resistance* **AMPO** No. 2 (circa December 1969) pp. 4 and 11.
67. Konishi revolted by posting leaflets against Sato's visit to the U.S. around his house on Sado Island. He also opposed riot training and the use of the SDF against Japanese, and claimed ideological indoctrination and the resurgence of militarism in the SDF. For more information on Konishi see *Self Defences Force Member Arrested for Anti-war Action's* in **AMPO** No. 2, p. 10; and Konishi Makoto's article *Friends and Enemies of Members of the Self Defense Forces* in **AMPO** No. 6 (circa Jul-Aug 1970) pp. 10-17.
68. Information on the founding of committees to promote dissidents, the Niho and Founding Day actions is taken from *Anti-war Movement in Japan's Self Defense Forces*, p. 43.
69. Demonstrations at Omura Shuyojo are mentioned in Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 8.
70. *Chronology* **JQ** 13 (Jan-Mar 1966) pp. 132-133, mentions that both the Army on October 7 and the marine Corps on October 18 were stopped from artillery practice at Fuji.
71. Figures for the Tachikawa demonstration taken from *Chronology* **JQ** 14 (Jul-Sep 1967) p. 402 which attributes them to the police. Public figures are often below other estimates.
72. Oji housewives are mentioned in Goto Moto's article *Crisis in Japan U.S. Relations* in **JQ** 15 (Oct-Dec 1968) p. 421. 29
73. Camp Drake protest is mentioned in an article in the **GI Press Service** 21 January 1970 p. 14.
74. For more details on Sanrizuka see *A Visit to Sanrizuka* in **AMPO** No. 3-4, pp. 20-32.

75. Beheiren's part in the Aoyama Gakuin conflict is mentioned in Edward Schwarz's *A Chronology of Conflict at Aoyama Gakuin* in the **Japan Christian Quarterly** (hereafter cited as **JCQ**) 36 (Summer 1970), p. 184.
76. Zengakuren is the major student organization in Japan, and was once dominated by the Japan Communist Party. In what seems to be the natural proclivity for Japanese political groups of the left, however, Zengakuren fell out with the JCP over doctrinal matters and split into two groups, the dominate anti JCP group and a smaller JCP group. Not satisfied with one break, the anti JCP group then proceeded to split Marx's hairs until it had separated into a snakes nest of rival factions.
77. Okinawa Day 1969 is discussed in Dowsey's **Zengakuren**...pp. 181-183.
78. Rally statistics taken from Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **JQ** 16, p. 444.
79. Fukushima's *The New Left*, p. 30.
80. Reported by Tsurumi in *Beheiren* **JQ** 16, pp. 444-445.
81. The 10 October demonstration is described in the article *October 10 Demonstration* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 7.
82. The article *October 21, Japan's Mightiest Anti-war Day* **AMPO** No. 1, p. 12, says that police estimated 9,500 people at the demonstration while Beheiren estimated 20,000.
83. *Ibid*, pp. 4, 7 and 12 for the account of the October 21 activities.
84. The November 13 and 17 activities are covered in the article *Massive Armed Uprisings mark Sato's Departure for U.S.* in **AMPO** No. 2, pp. 3, 7, 11 and 12.
85. The *Folk Guerilla* movement is discussed in Tsurumi's *Beheiren* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 8; and its date of origin is referred to in *June Action against AMPO Renewal* in **AMPO** No. 6, p. 18.
86. From Omori Shigeo's article *June 1970* in **JQ** 17 (Oct-Dec 1970) pp. 387-389.
87. From *AMPO Interviews Makoto Oda* in **AMPO** No. 1, p. 11.
88. Information and statistics on the June actions taken from *June Action against AMPO Renewal* in **AMPO** No. 6, pp. 18-19. Omori in his article *June 1970* on p. 384, says that the NPA estimate was 774,000 with 689,800 for the Old Left, 49,300 for the Anti-JCP Zengakuren, 30,000 for Beheiren and 2,300 for Hansen Seinjin Iin Kai.
89. Information on Misawa and the newspapers taken from the Yoshikawa Yuichi interview *AMPO Interviews Yoshikawa Yuichi on GI Resistance* p. 4. At this point I am pretty sure that **We Got the Brass** which was also published in Europe, was a Beheiren enterprise. **Kill for Peace**, however, may have been a product of GI's in the Tokyo area with assistance from Beheiren, this is not clear and needs further research.
90. *Ibid*
91. Lonnie Renner in his *statement in response to the questionnaire of Jerry West dated January 1975*, mentions the racial problems on pages 3 and 4. I personally can attest to the racial situation at Iwakuni being tense and remember that on more than one instance during the winter of 69-70 there were violent flare-ups in the Enlisted Clubs. The assessment of general feelings and anti-war sentiment is also from personal observation and I should point out here that due to my close association with many of the events at Iwakuni until the end of August 1970, a fair amount of direct observation appears in the text for this period. For a good look at the feeling and situation at Iwakuni during this early time refer to Renner's entire statement.

92. Renner's statement p. 6.
93. Ibid p. 8 for information on the birth of **Semper FI** (hereafter cited or referred to as **SF**) except for the mention of Bob Dorton which is personal knowledge.
94. Ibid p. 9 for the data on the first contacts with Beheiren. The material on the growth of **SF** is from personal observation.
95. **Asahi** article and base PAO mentioned in a letter from Lonnie Renner to the **Ally** dated 14 March 1970.
96. Information on the transfers and surrounding events of early June 1970 is from personal observation. Contemporary accounts of the events are Elaine Iyanaga's letter to George Bacon dated 7 July 1970, George Bacon's letter to the **Ally** dated 8 June 1970 and the article *Brass Run Scared Start Purge of Anti-war Heroes* in **SF** (5 June 1970) p. 13. Also a recent account is given in Renner's statement of January 1975 on pages 10-11.
97. The right to pass out **SF** is mentioned in Bruce Hartford's interview by Jerry West of 31 March and 3 April 1975, on page 6.
98. Headquarters, 1 Marine Aircraft Wing. Fleet Marine Force Pacific, FPO, San Francisco 96602. *Intelligence Training Briefing, Dissident Activities*. Undated.
99. My information on the other papers is incomplete as to numbers and background but other known titles are **YAND**, **Fall in at Ease** and **Freedom Rings**.
100. Information on Jan, Annie and Peterman, and the opening of the project in Japan taken from the Peterman interview pages 3-5. The fact that the office was in Kagurazaka is from personal observation.
101. The Peterman interview p. 7.
102. The information on the spread of PCS is from the Peterman interview p. 4. The information on the Iwakuni meeting is from personal observation.
103. The Hartford interview p. 5.
104. From close association with the case, I know that Kemp and Tubman were enroute from Iwakuni to Tokyo and possibly Misawa on the train when they were arrested, without warrant, by Japanese plain clothes men outside of Iwakuni. A search revealed a small quantity of marijuana in the conductor's compartment which was not fingerprinted. Kemp and Tubman were clean. However, they were held by the Japanese in Iwakuni jail for several days and then in the MCAS brig until all charges were finally dropped. It is important to note here that both were known activists, that both were being kept close track of and that both were heading to Tokyo on leave to do resistance organizing which the military must have known about. It is a strange coincide that 1) they were given leave, and 2) were then quickly busted for dope by the Japanese so that the military would not have to provide any evidence for holding them under arrest, other than the fact that they were being invested for violation of Japanese law and that the Japanese requested their arrest. To this add the fact that Kemp was not a known user of marijuana or any drugs.
105. The Ewing case is mentioned in *GI Join Us* in **AMPO** No. 9-10 (circa Jun-Jul 1971) p. 68 and in Richard DeCamp's article *The GI Movement in Asia* in the **Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars** (hereafter cited as **BCCAS**) p. 112.
106. Hunt's court martial is covered in *Not Guilty* in **SF** 3 (16 March 1972) p. 2.
107. The Looney case is described in an undated unmarked press release circa March 26, 1972.
108. Dr Scotti's case is described in an undated press release by Yokota PCS circa April 1972.

109. The GI's lawsuit is covered in the article *Law Suit Filed* in **SF** 3 (3 May 1972) p. 14.
110. The lawsuit brought in the Hobbit case is mentioned in a letter to Congressman Ronald V. Dellums from Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Commandant of the Marine Corps, dated 29 June 1973, AIA-2-AAR.btv.
111. The details of Granger's actions taken from *Harassment of NLG Spreads to Japan* in **Camp News** 4 (15 May 1972) P. 18.
112. Information of the **Torii Teller's** attack is taken from Reber Boul't's *Open Letter to Gen. Brown* in **SF** 3 (15 Nov 1972) p. 13.
113. From *Lawrence Wins Over Corps* in **SF** 4 No. 24, p. 5.
114. Opening date of the Owl taken from DeCamp's *The GI Movement in Asia*, p. 114. Information on the Owl is contained in Murata Goro's letter entitled *War Seasons Greetings from Japan* dated 10 Dec 1970.
115. I haven't obtained any definite information on the New People's Center, but it is mentioned frequently in **GIPA**. Probable date its founding is in 1973.
116. The opening and layout of the Hobbit is described in the article *GI Coffee House at Iwakuni* in **AMPO** No. 13-14 (May-Jul 1972) p. 30; and in the affidavit of Col. E.S. Murphy , Commanding Officer MCAS Iwakuni, dated 21 October 1974. Murphy says Beheiren and one unidentified group opened the Hobbit, the other group may have been JATEC or PCS which would be natural. 31
117. **AMPO** No. 13-14, p. 30.
118. Beheiren meeting covered in the article *National Beheiren Meeting* in **SF**3 (4 April 1972) pp. 3-4.
119. Date of VanCampen placing Hobbit off limits mentioned in Murphy's affidavit.
120. The Hartford interview pp. 15-17.
121. The suit is styled *Allison v The Secretary of the Navy, Civil Action No: 1286-72*, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
122. Hobbit Mobile Bookstore is described in the article *Hobbit Mobile Bookstore* in **SF** 3 (24 December 1972) p. 15.
123. Account of race problems at Iwakuni are from personal observance. As I worked in the communications center, I can verify that information on the racial upheavals were handled delicately. It was usually classified "secret." Renner also mentions the racial problems in his letter to the **Ally** dated 26 January 1970, and in his statement on page 4.
124. The Johnson meeting and tapes are covered in *Behind the Barbed Wire Black Rebellion at Iwakuni Marine Base* **AMPO** No. 5 (circa May 1970) pp. 2-3 and in *Harassing the Brass at Iwakuni* in **AMPO** No. 6, pp. 20-37. The **AMPO** No. 6 article has a transcription of the tapes. The fact that Dorton was the agent involved is from personal knowledge.
125. The TV documentary is reported from personal observation. Sid Peterman says in his interview on page 6 that there was also another documentary filmed.
126. Mentioned in the article *July 4 Uprising; Marines Seize Prison at Iwakuni* in **AMPO** No. 6, p. 7.
127. Information on the brig riot is from personal observation except for Oda's presence.
128. The 23 February conference is covered by the article *Press Conference in Tokyo* in **SF** 3 (1 March 1972) p. 4.

129. The 22 April conference is mentioned by Col. Murphy in his affidavit and in the article *GI Coffee House at Iwakuni* in **AMPO** NO. 13-14, p. 31.
130. Ibid (Both Murphy's affidavit and the **AMPO** article).
131. Interview of Paul Neighorn by George Bacon (undated) page 18.
132. The articles *Iwakuni Base Question and the Security Treaty Setup* and Narasaki Yanosuke's *Presence of Nuclear Weapons in Mainland Japan Exposed* in **JSR** No. 239, pp. 3-7 and 10-15 respectively are the best descriptions of the evidence and results in the Diet. An article in **SF** 2 (5 December 1971) pp. 4-7 mentions the Iwakuni citizens flocking to the base on page 6. In **Great Speckled Bird**, 20 December 1971, the inspection by the Japanese officials is mentioned, Paul Neighorn talks about the suspicion of who released the information and the military's reaction in his interview on pages 18-21. The names of the transferred GI's are in *Four GI's Rushed Back to States* in **SF** 2 (3 December 1971) p. 2.
133. Gathering of 4 April mentioned by Lonnie Renner in a letter to the **Ally** dated 11 April 1970 and in the article *Peace Gathering Bugs Brass* in **SF** 1 (15 April 1970) p. 1.
134. 70,000 people reported in an article on the gathering in the **Asahi Shimbun** of 13 April 1970.
135. The gathering of 12 April is described in Renner's letter to the **Ally** dated 21 April 1970; in *Peace Gathering Bugs Brass* in **SF** 1, p. 1 and in an article in the **Asahi Shimbun** of 13 April 1970.
136. The 4 July 1970 gathering is mentioned in Elaine Iyanaga's letter to George Bacon; the 7 August 1971 one is described in an article *Saturday, August 7* in **SF** 2 (30 August 1971) p. 3; the 3 October 1971 gathering is described in Col Murphy's affidavit and in Paul Neighorn's interview pp. 10-11; and evidence for other gatherings is contained in Neighorn's interview pp. 1-8 and Hartford's interview p. 4.
137. The Kintai Bridge is a national relic built in the 16 century. It is the most famous bridge in Japan.
138. The 3 October sit-in is described by Col. Murphy in his affidavit and by Paul Neighorn in his interview. Murphy and Neighorn both agree on about twenty GI's. Neighorn gives the information on the charges against him and the other three.
139. The information on the Fussa festival is taken from the article *New Project at Yokota* in **CN** 2(15 August 1971) p. 12.
140. The Barbara Dane Show is described in the article *I am a GI Rebel* in **SF** 2 (11 November 1971) pp. 2-3. 32
141. The FTA Show at Fussa is reported in **HISC Investigations**...part 2, p. 7104.
142. The FTA Show at Iwakuni is reported in the article *Petition at FTA Show* in **CN** 3 (15 January 1971) p. 4.
143. The FTA Show at Misawa taken from **HISC Investigations**...part 2, p. 7106.
144. *American Services have Friends in Japan* **SF** 1 (15 April 1970) p. 1.
145. Renner's letter to the **Ally** dated 11 April 1970. Further similar observations are made in *Storm Troopers* in **SF** 1 (15 May 1970) p. 1.
146. The 12 July 1970 demonstration is mentioned in *July 4 Uprising: Marines Seize Prison at Iwakuni* in **AMPO** 6, pp. 7-8.
147. The 10 June 1972 leafleting is taken from Col. Murphy's affidavit.
148. From *Inauguration Demonstration* in **SF** 4 (30 January 1973) p. 13.

149. From Col. Murphy's affidavit.
150. Kite flying is described in Col. Murphy's affidavit and in the article *Kites Flew on May 5* in **SF 2** (14 May 1971) p. 7.
151. *Base Crisis* **JQ 20**, p. 4.
152. The Sagami actions are taken from *Base Crisis* in **JQ 20**, pp. 3-7 and from Kajo Etsuko's Thieu's *Tanks Stopped; U.S. Taken Aback by New Tactic* in **AMPO** No. 15, pp. 4-10.
153. The Hartford interview pp. 7-8.
154. Weddel's case is taken from *More News on the Action in Japan* in **CN 2** (February 1971) p. 8.
155. The case of Gilsinger and Foster is described in the article *GI's Tried in Yokota* in **SF 2** (20 September 1971) pp. 22-23.
156. The yippies demonstration is described in the Neighorn interview on pages 4 and 5 and in *How to Freak out a Marine Base* in **SF 2** (30 August 1971) pp. 2-3.
157. The Hiroshima demonstration is mentioned by both Harry Faries in his affidavit and in the Hartford interview on page 4.
158. The case of Zambanini is mentioned by Kaji in her article *Thieu's Tanks Stopped....* P. 9.
159. An account of Weaver's arrest and the activity that it spawned including Kerr's court martial is given in *Japanese and GI's: Free Doug!* In **CN 3** (15 November 1972) pp. 8-9.
160. GI involvement with the Kitafuji Mothers Group is mentioned in the article *Peasants' Guerillas on Vietnam Second Front: A report on the 25 year's struggle for the land of Kitafuji* in **AMPO** No. 13- 14, pp. 10, 18-19.
161. The Christmas bombing demonstration is taken from the Hartford interview pp. 10, 18-19.
162. The Armed Forces Day action is described in a letter from Dave Gillette to the **Ally**, undated circa May 1970; and in *Smith Goes Hog Wild on Armed Forces Day* in **SF 1** (5 June 1970) pp. 1-3, which lists the names of the five arrestees. An undated letter from David Mitchell to the **Ally** from the same period states that Mitchell was kicked out of Japan with a 'brother.' This brother undoubtedly is Gillette from the description. The letter leaves open the question of whether or not Mitchell was involved in the demonstration. He had been AWOL at one time and take care of by Beheiren, and it is probable that he was transferred because of this and was not involved in the Armed Forces Day.
163. The MP's tossing Japanese off base is mentioned in *Smith Goes Hog Wild...*pp. 1-2.
164. Some information on Beheiren's announcement and the marine Corps policy is contained in *Armed Forces Day* in **SF 1**(15 May 1970) p. 3; and in an untitled article on page 4; Dave Gillette says in his letter to the **Ally** that the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo ordered the 'invitation only policy.' Since he worked in the Public Affairs Office, his information is pretty reliable.
165. Navy Day 1970 is reported in the article *Navy Day* in **Yokosuka David** No. 4 (14 November 1970) p. 3.
166. Activities at Misawa in May 1970 taken from DeCamp's article *The GI Movement in Asia*, p. 114.
167. Navy Day 1972 and the following rally is covered in *Japanese and GI's: Free Doug!*, pp. 8-9.

- 168. The GI's posturing Iwakuni Base is mentioned in *Friendship Day* in **SF** 4 (15 May 1974) p. 3.
- 169. Quoted from Col. Murphy's affidavit. 33
- 170. Friendship Day 1973 is described by Col. Murphy in his affidavit, in the Hartford interview on pages 9-10 and in the article *Friendship Day*.
- 171. The request for permission is mentioned in *Declaration of Independence Banned* in **SF** 4 (15 July 1973) p. 3.
- 172. Names of the six are taken from the **Stars and Stripes** (Japan Edition) 6 July 1973.
- 173. The Hartford interview, p. 17.
- 174. The early period of the homeporting issue is described in Nagano Yoshiko's *The USS Midway's Homeporting at Yokosuka* in **AMPO** No. 18 (Autumn 1973) pp. 3-8. The later period in Ulysses Stanfeld's (pseudonym?) article *USS Midway Rocked by Revolt, 100 Crewmen Walk Out to Protest Racism and Brutality* in **AMPO** No. 21-22 (Summer-Autumn 1974) pp. 61-64.
- 175. Omori Shigeo *June 1970*, in **JQ** 17, p. 389.

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Murphy, E.S. Col. U.S.M.C.

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INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES

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Neighorn, Paul.

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Peterman, Sidney A.

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Philipp, Donald L.

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Renner, Lonnie.

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Murata Goro.

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Letter to the **ALLY** dated January 1970. Discusses the race riot at Iwakuni on 5 January 1970.

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An article explaining Konishi's protest within the Self Defense Forces.
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A letter to **SEMPER FI** and a rebuttal to it, discussing Beheiren's composition and goals.
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An account of protest activities in Japan from 13-17 November 1969 centered around Sato's visit to America.
- Merril, Judy. *GI's in Japan.* **WIN.** 1 December 1970: 12-15.
An interview with Rev. Robert McWilliams, Beheiren members, GI's and others in Iwakuni concerning the GI movement.
- Nagano Yoshiko. *The USS Midway's Homeporting at Yokosuka.* **AMPO** No. 18 (Autumn 1973): 3-8.
Discussion and analysis of the US trend to move its fleet into Asia on a permanent basis, and a report on Japanese and American opposition.
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Statement of the Diet Member who made public the charge of nuclear weapons being stored aboard MCAS Iwakuni.
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Article on the national Beheiren meeting in Iwakuni 19-20 March 1972.

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A short article on GI and Beheiren activity aboard Yokosuka Naval Base on Navy Day 1970.
- New Project at Yokota AFB.* **CAMP NEWS 2** (15 August 1971): 12.
Article on the opening of the PCS project at Yokota.
- The Next Phase of the Movement...* Interview with Oda Makoto. **AMPO** No. 16 (March 1973): 18-21.
Oda discussed the direction of the peoples struggle following the Vietnam withdrawal.
- Noam Chomsky and Makoto Oda.* **AMPO** No. 5 (circa May 1970): 35-39.
A dialogue between Chomsky and Oda on the direction of the New Left Movement in Japan and the U.S.
- Not Guilty.* **SEMPER FI 3** (16 March 1972): 2.
Article on the court martial of L Cpl. Clifford Hunt, defended by NLG, at MCAS Iwakuni.
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Obata reviews various opinions towards the Vietnam War appearing in Japanese magazines in late 1965.
- _____ 13 (Apr-June 1966): 244-249.
Several articles reviewed which all call for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.
- _____ 14 (Jul-Sep 1967): 376-381.
Rundown of the symposium held by Sekai in May 1967.
- Obata Misao. *In the Magazines.* **JAPAN QUARTERLY** 15 (Jul-Sep 1968): 379-384.
A review of magazine articles dealing with Japan and the US and the Vietnam War and Asian relations.
- _____ 17 (Jan-Mar 1970): 92-98.
Contains a review of an article questioning defense spending and indicating that American bases are the greatest threat to Japan.
- _____ 17 (Apr-Jun 1970): 207-214.
Contains a review of articles dealing with security problems of the 70's, among other things.
- _____ 18 (Jan-Mar 1971): 100-106.
Calls for struggle against the Vietnam War.
- October 10 Demonstration.* **AMPO** No. 1 (November 1969): 7.
First unified front demonstration 10 October 1967. Short news item.
- October 21, *Japan's Mightiest Anti-War Day.* **AMPO** No. 1 (November 1969): 4, 7 & 12.
Brief report on the Anti-War Day activities in Japan in 1969 with reference to previous Anti-War Days.
- Omori Shigeo. June 1970. **JAPAN QUARTERLY** 17 (Oct-Dec 1970): 383-392.
An article discussing the political problems of Japan centered around the anti-AMPO struggle of June 1970. Good brief on the LDP's tactics on the AMPO in 1970 compared to 1960.
- Our Party's View on the New Law for Adjustment of Surrounding Areas of Military Bases.* **JAPAN SOCIALIST REVIEW** No. 296 (1 April 1974): 22-25.
Socialist Party position paper on the law designed to appease residents in the area of military bases by providing special benefits for them.
- PCS in Asia.* **GI NEWS AND DISCUSSION BULLETIN** No. 12 (Apr-June 1972): 19-21.
A summary of PCS projects in Asia in early 1972.

Peasants' Guerillas on Vietnam Second Front: a report on 25 years' struggle for land of Kitafuji. **AMPO** No. 13-14 (May-Jul 1972): 7-16.

A short history of the peasants struggle for their land occupied by the Kitafuji firing range.

Peace Gathering Bugs Brass. **SEMPER FI** 1 (15 April 1970): 1.

An article on the 4 and 12 April 1970 public gatherings sponsored by Beheiren and anti-war GI's at Iwakuni and the military repercussions.

Petition at FTA Show. **CAMP NEWS** 3 (15 January 1972): 4.

An article on FTA show at Iwakuni.

Press Conference in Tokyo. **SEMPER FI** 3 (1 March 1972): 4.

A short article on Beheiren press conference about racism at MCAS Iwakuni.

Rebirth of a Movement. **AMPO** No. 20 (Spring 1974): 3-6.

This article has a short analysis of Beheiren by Oda at the beginning. It also adds more to Oda's portrait.

Report from Japan-GI Organizing. **NEWSLETTER, COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS**, September 1970: 1-2.

Report on CCAS activity in Japan.

Revolt of SDF Soldiers. **AMPO** No. 13-14 (May-Jul) 1972): 16-17.

A short news article on the demands of five SDF soldiers for overhaul of the military system and an end to imperialism.

Saturday August 7. **SEMPER FI** 2 (30 August 1971): 3.

Short article on the GI-Beheiren rock concert at Kintai, 7 August 1971.

Schwarz, Edward. *A Chronology of Conflict at Aoyama Gakuin.* **THE JAPAN CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY** 36 (Summer 1970): 184-189.

Brief mention of Beheiren.

Self-Defense Force Member Arrested for Anti-war Actions. **AMPO** No. 2 (circa December 1969): 10.

A short article on the arrest of Konishi Makoto, a sergeant in the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

SEMPER FI. 2 (5 December 1971: 4-7.

An article (title illegible) on the controversy over nuclear weapons at MCAS Iwakuni.

Sklar, Robert. *AWOL in Japan.* **RAMPARTS** 10 (October 1971): 26-27.

Short article on the GI movement in Japan discussing everything from Beheiren to base environments.

Smith, Clark C. *Marine Doves and the Baffled Brass.* **THE NATION**, 14 (September 1970): 199-202.

A good summary of the early GI movement at Iwakuni, however, a few minor errors do occur in names and dates.

Smith Goes Hog Wild on Armed Forces Day. **SEMPER FI** 1 (5 June 1970): 1-3.

Account of military and dissident activity at MCAS Iwakuni on 16 May 1970.

Sonntag, Joe. *Round Trip Ticket Back to the War Zone for Marine Corps Dissenter.* **SEMPER FI** 3 (15 December 1972): 4-5.

Article on the case of Sgt. Dennis L. Murphy who passed around a petition to President Nixon opposing the war.

Stanfeld, Ulysses. *USS Midway Rocked by Revolt, 100 Crew Men Walk Out to Protest Racism and Brutality.*

AMPO No. 21-22 (Summer-Autumn 1974): 61-64.

Article on the grievances of Midway sailors and military response.

STARS AND STRIPES (Japan edition), 5 June 1970.

Under the heading Marines Deny Pair Railroaded the **STARS AND STRIPES** published an article concerning the instant transfer of Cpl. Lonnie Renner and Pfc. Dennis Hahn.

STARS AND STRIPES (Japan edition), 6 July 1973.

Under the heading Six Marines Stopped from Distributing Paper the **STARS AND STRIPES** reports the arrest of six Marines at Iwakuni who passed out copies of the Declaration of Independence.

Storm Troopers. **SEMPER FI** 1 (15 May 1970).

Article on military reaction to Beheiren activities in Iwakuni.

Takabatake Michitoshi. *Citizens' Movements: Organizing the Spontaneous*. **THE JAPAN INTERPRETER** 9 (Winter 1975): 314-323. A translation of Shimin Undo no Soshiki Genri in Takabatake Michitoshi, **SEIJI NO RONRI TO SHIMIN** (Chikuma Shobo, 1971), pp. 223-34, by James L. Huffman.

A short critique of the modern citizens' movements in Japan.

TORII TELLER. 20 March 1970.

Contains a put down of Semper Fi in an editorial.

Tsuru Shigeto. *In the Magazines*. **JAPAN QUARTERLY** 12 (Jul-Sep 1965): 388-394.

Review of opinion on the Vietnam War.

Tsurumi Yoshiyuki. *Beheiren*. **AMPO** No. 1 (November 1969): 5 & 7 & 8.

Tsurumi analyzes Beheiren's activity, its philosophy and its function in relationship to society. Different approach from his JQ article.

_____. *Beheiren*. **JAPAN QUARTERLY** 16 (Oct-Dec 1969): 444-448.

A brief account and analysis of Beheiren and its growth from 1965-1969.

Usami Sho. *Zengakuren*. **JAPAN QUARTERLY** 15 (Apr-Jun 1968): 233-244.

A short history of Zengakuren in an article dealing with the relations of Zengakuren to the people and their effect as a movement. It indicates anti-war feeling of the population.

Vietnam Special Procurement and the Economy. **JAPAN QUARTERLY** 14 (Jan-Mar 1967): 13-16.

Short discussion of Japanese contribution to the Vietnam War.

VVAW, Beheiren, Hiroshima. **SEMPER FI** 3 (13 October 1972): 3.

A short article on a joint VVAW-Beheiren sponsored tour of Hiroshima Peace Park.

WASHINGTON POST. 6 June 1968

Editorial entitled Explosion of Anti-American Feeling warns against harassment of U.S. Forces in Japan.

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW OF SID PETERMAN

BY JERRY WEST ON 14 FEBRUARY

1975 IN SAN RAFAEL, CALIFORNIA

JW: First explain who you are.

SP: I'm Sid Peterman, a Unitarian Minister. I've been one for thirty years now. I'm fifty years of age. I believe in the expression of one's ethics or religion where social action is imperative. This was my most intensive period of work, this in Japan. I became active in the GI movement primarily because I had the church in Monterey, California. Monterey was a main center of preparation for the Vietnam War because Fort Ord is there.

I found myself becoming more and more active with GI resisters because of my own position which was very anti-war, and in the summer of '68 I became active in a group called "The Nine for Peace," which was a group of nine young men who resisted the military activities on the basis of conscience. The group was largely supported by a group of ministers, most them from up here in the Bay area. There was Joe Sonntag, Franciscan; Alan Miller who was a Presbyterian; Mark Sullivan, a secular priest; Presbyterian minister Don Errin in Marin City; a few people like this. They came down to Fort Ord to see some of the youngsters who were in prison then.

Because I was a local minister I was able to get in to see some of the youngsters and work more closely with them, and I became aware of the validity - of the real exciting validity - of what the GI's were doing. That is one of the most significant moral statements I've heard in my lifetime, I told you that in Japan, and it was not only significant but also effective. I became more and more involved in that gradually began to have meetings with GI's in my church in Monterey. We had people like Francis Heisler, the famous civil liberties lawyer some of his staff who would come down and inform the GI's of their legal rights.

Pretty soon I found this took up all my time, then in January of '69 I had an accident. I couldn't do full parish work; I was able, however, from my bed to do some counseling, and became really deeply aware of the pressures the GI's were under. By the fall of '69 it became apparent that I needed to take some time off from parish work and work fulltime on this; so we established the first counseling center. As far as I know it was the first one on the west coast independent of Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors. It was established by some money my congregation gave me and by some other funds we raised. We had a little office, helped publish a little GI paper, had meetings at the church, and we had monthly meetings to inform GI's of their legal rights. Part of this whole thing you see was made effective by the change in Army Regulations that allows a person to be discharged as a Conscientious Objector. If it hadn't been for that probably the whole thing would never have gotten off the ground.

We started out with monthly meetings, usually we had a lawyer, couple of clergy men, and other people present to answer some of the questions and help the men with their discharge applications. It came to be bi-weekly meetings, and became so successful that some of the other clergy men and lawyers we were working with in the area decided to set up other centers, so we established what

we called the West Coast Counseling Service. We had an office in Oakland, which was primarily run by a group of Franciscan priests who were in the counseling situation. Alan Miller, who was in United Ministers for Higher Education then, gave us a great deal of help. Phil Farnum, who is a Congregationalist minister active in the farmworkers movement for a long time, set up the office in San Francisco, and we found ourselves serving more needs so we expanded to San Diego, Los Angeles, and Tacoma, the main centers where there were GI's who needed the information they couldn't get from the service. What it came down to was that we weren't giving GI's any highly classified or secret information, we were just giving them the information that the chaplains or the lawyers on the base weren't giving or didn't.

This became, as I say, a real service so I found myself leaving parish work in December of '69. I thought I'd just stay down in Monterey and work in the counseling service, but in January of '70 after I had quit my church work, we got this letter from some of the groups in Japan. I was supposed to go over and spend six weeks with them talking about what was done in counseling here. After I was there for a few weeks it became apparent the Japanese would not be able to handle the kinds of things like counseling and information. Reasons for this were first of all the language barrier and the cultural barriers which were heavy. Then there was the fact that they had had no military of their own for some time, so they had no idea what a draft was, and also the concept of conscientious objection was not applicable to their old system of Japanese militarism. So, I decided to stay there. I did come back home and check with other groups here, but I had decided to stay in Tokyo and start an office there.

JW: When you were contacted by the Japanese then, are you saying you were contacted by Beheiren or was it more....

SP: I was contacted by Beheiren, and by two youngsters who started the work in Japan some months before, Annie and Jan. The combination of Annie and Jan, CCCO, and Beheiren said somebody needs to go to Japan; the money had been raised so my group, which was the West Coast Counseling Service, sent me over there, and I had recovered from my accident enough that I could walk around.

JW: Annie and Jan, they were affiliated with the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars?

SP: Jan was pretty much on his own, and Annie pretty much with Jan. They had some connection, but they were pretty much by themselves. Jan was a draft resister himself, Study Body President from Sacramento State College. He raised some funds from some of my friends to go to Japan to see what could be done in the area of resistance, and after four or five months of this he decided a lot could be done, but they didn't know many of the techniques of counseling, regulations and the like.

JW: In effect he enlightened Beheiren as to the existence of PCS and in return....

SP: It wasn't PCS yet, it was WCCS. In effect he enlightened Beheiren as to the possibilities, but as I say, there were cultural and linguistic and general information barriers. He informed them of the possibilities because Beheiren had been working with resisters before as you know, but they hadn't gotten anywhere because they weren't informed, they lacked information just like any of the GI's who didn't get very far because they didn't know what their rights were. So, on the basis of contact with Beheiren, both the Japanese Beheiren and the Gaikokujin Beheiren, I went over there and after I was there a few weeks it

became very apparent they needed to establish some sort of an operation. I went to Tokyo and looked around for six weeks, came back, checked the groups here and we thought we could raise funds to get people to go work over there, so I actually opened up an office in Tokyo.

The old Beheiren office had been publishing in about a quarter of its space, the *SHUKAN AMPO*, the Japanese comic book opposed to *AMPO*. *Shukan AMPO* went out of existence because, of course the *AMPO*, the treaty, wasn't rejected, so there was this empty space and they rented it to us. Therefore, we had this immediate working connection. It would have been impossible to do any of our work in Japan without having a Japanese group to work with and it was the analysis of most of the people whom I contacted over there who were in the resistance movement that Beheiren was the best group to associate with. I am convinced this was right because, though other groups tried to relate to us, they related to us purely on their needs without much consideration for ours. We established an office in Tokyo and then shortly thereafter, we found we were able to ask Annie and Jan to go down to Iwakuni and establish a group there. We established an office in the far northern part of Honshu up in Misawa, and we had an office Yokosuka and also down in Okinawa, first in a little community near Koza and then actually near the large bases. At the same time another person had been doing some resistance work in the Philippines so we all got together and established what then called the Pacific Counseling Service, and that's how it got started. By the end of 1970 we had these offices pretty much covering the major bases on the west coast and the major bases in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines.

JW: I want to establish some date here. About when did Beheiren send you the letter?

SP: January of '70.

JW: January of '70 and then you went there for you...

SP: I went there first for a preliminary because I wasn't clear and Annie and Jan weren't clear and CCCO wasn't clear and nobody knew what the situation was. My original intention was to go over there for six weeks and come back and continue working here. I thought it was primarily a thing of getting information, so I took over scads of books and pamphlets and stuff like that on the thesis that the Japanese would carry the work on by themselves. But I found out this was impossible.

JW: The first time I met you, I think it was in April of 1970...

SP: That was my first trip to Iwakuni.

JW: Was that your first trip to Japan?

SP: That was when I came back to stay. I made one trip down to Iwakuni and I stayed at Chris' house there and then I met with some of your folks.

JW: I met you at the meeting, the weekly church meeting, there was Iwai....

SP: That's right. Part of the impetus for my staying there was that meeting with Iwai. When I found the Japanese Kyodan leaders so really willing to put themselves on the line for something, it morally impressed me very much. You know my favorite story about this whole episode is that if we'd lost the war and Japanese troops had been in occupation over main population centers of the west coast, how many Americans would have helped Japanese resisters? I was

terribly impressed; I think this was one of the most impressive things in my life. People like Iwai made it very clear that there was a basis of Japanese support, concern, a real deep concern and commitment. But yet, because of linguistic and cultural barriers and lack of experience with the military, you see, a man like Iwai, who's 35 or 40 now, and who since his maturity really hasn't known the military, no draft, no experience with this, didn't know how to contend with the whole of it. I can remember the night before I first met you I had a meeting at his house with four or five local Kyodan ministers. They were so excited about this possibility. That and several other meetings I had in Japan sold me on the idea of starting an activity in Japan.

JW: When did you first meet McWilliams? (Rev. Robert McWilliams).

SP: At that meeting, actually he did the basic translation. He was more conservative, politically and socially than Iwai and his group were. But McWilliams was one to put his neck on the line for what he believed in. Of course, he speaks such beautiful Japanese.

JW: He was quite tickled over the television program that Vern got in.

SP: Yeah, I hope someday you can get a copy of that for your files. There were two documentaries on Iwakuni resistance. Full color. So I guess the thrust of what I'm saying is that by the spring of '70 it became very apparent that whereas the Japanese were very willing to do all they could to help, it was necessary for some Americans who had experience in GI work to be there. So we did set up these offices on that basis. Also of course you know, one of the things I want to point out at some point is that this was really an international-interracial kind of thing. I was so impressed, in the office in Tokyo there were about 20 youngsters who ostensibly were going to the university but actually they gave their fulltime to the GI work.

Beheiren formed a group which was a support for our work over there, though Beheiren did many other things besides anti-war GI support. This group of youngsters and some of their leaders took as their primary responsibility to Beheiren this relationship with the Americans who were working there. It would have been impossible to rent quarters, make contacts, all these things if we hadn't the complete thorough support of the Japanese and Okinawans.

JW: How would you compare Beheiren with the other organized student groups and protest groups that you came in contact with.

SP: Beheiren was a non-sect group and I was personally comfortable with it because I tend to think of broad coalitions as more effective than narrow ideological groups, though there was some concern, some division, and some tension within the PCS over the question of whether we shouldn't have had an ideology and have clung to it. Beheiren is a broad-front that covered people like Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, Tsurumi Shunsuke, Muto Ichiyo and Yoshikawa Yuichi, as well as Oda Makoto - all representing somewhat different points of view. In fact, they were some of the heads, or men-behind-the-scenes of some of the other sects. There was real conflict between some of these leaders once they got out of Beheiren because they then had their own particular ideology they were supporting; but when they got in Beheiren that whole thing was quite different. The function of Beheiren was very clearly to oppose any involvement of the Japanese people in the Vietnam War. So it was an umbrella, a front, a coalition embracing all the new left. Everyone was basically new left, or religious

supports or sympathizers. It was definitely not part of the old left. There was real conflict with the old left and Beheiren in Japan.

JW: There was quite a conflict between JCP and Zengakuren wasn't there?

SP: Well, JCP, see, is old left; Zengakuren is new left; so there's conflict there. The Japanese Communist Party tried to get into the act on the anti-war work...and they'd do stupid things. There was this beach near Tokyo where the marines from Okinawa would come up and practice their mortar works on what was actually the slopes of Fuji, which is kind of like pissing in St. Patrick's Cathedral, and Beheiren and our group had people down there, students, to greet the GI's from Okinawa and say, "Welcome to Japan, but do you have to make a mess out of Japan" and singing good peace songs and passing out GI leaflets and stuff. They'd get there in the early dawn hours when it's foggy and colder than hell and they'd work with the GI's, whenever they could of course, as there was great resistance, particularly on the part of officers, until the afternoon. The JCP would charter a couple of air-conditioned buses in the summer or warm buses in the fall, they'd drive out to the beach head, they'd sing some Japanese songs - they had no contact with the GI's or their needs - wave a few banners and go back. This was the kind of thing they did. There was real conflict between JCP and Beheiren. However, although Beheiren in large was new left or sympathizers, there was a lot cooperation with the Socialist Party, which of course is the main opposition party in Japan and is not new left in the political ideological sense. But they also are kind of a coalition type of structure. Beheiren is a common front, a very exciting kind of experience, you know, coming from the outside as much as I did, it was just wonderful to see people able to transcend their ideological barriers, which in Japan are so important, and work effectively together.

JW: Now, would you say that Beheiren's composition was mostly students from the different Zengakuren factions?

SP: No, most of the Zengakuren factions did not relate to Beheiren. The non-sect students did. Remember the colors of the helmets and stuff Beheiren had, they had non-sect colors. The new left was divided into seven or eight major sects, and another group that calls themselves non-sects who say that ideology is perhaps less important than activity. Beheiren is entirely non-sect. I don't know of any sect student who was really happy in Beheiren, though most of the student members of Beheiren were formerly sect people or formerly JCP people. Some of the most active people in our movement were people who had moved out of the JCP or people who had moved out of the more extreme forms of Zengakuren.

JW: Would you characterize Beheiren, then, more as a humanist movement?

SP: Oh very much so, and an effective one; it's the only effective one like that in Japan. Ideology matters so much in Japan.

JW: In some of their propaganda that I've read they've put a lot of weight on Beheiren being the movement of everybody not only the students.

SP: All the student sects there have their auxiliary groups - older adults, wives, high school kids, but in Beheiren the non-student groups were not the auxiliary, they were the main body of it. The main body of Beheiren was not students; the main body was housewives, a lot of professional people, and a lot of the leading intellectual people. They also had a small high school group, Beheiren numbered, maybe in Tokyo three or four thousand, so it's different, entirely

different from any sect organization. In a sect organization, you basically have students, particularly starting with the struggles of '48 and so forth, working their way up in leadership, and after they get out of college, they still in many ways manipulate the control of the student sects. Now some of the leaders of Beheiren were formerly student sect leaders who had gone through this process and were, as older adults, perhaps essentially more mature. They saw the problems involved in this so they withdrew from their student sect activities. Several of the leaders of Beheiren were adult leaders of an adult - not student, but adult sects - basically far left sects, Communist Workers Party and things like that. But the thrust of Beheiren is it's people's movement. It's quite logical for a GI movement to associate with this group because we were people too. I think Beheiren was one of the few Japanese groups that saw that. You know that racial prejudice in Japan is a real powerful thing, and it's not subtle, so the fact that Beheiren could work with us is really an indication of where their heads were at.

JW: It's easier too if you're a GI trying to proselytize other GI's to lean on a group like Beheiren rather than lean on somebody like the sects; the first thing that's going to be thrown at you is that you're a Moscow-dominated, organized Communist....

SP: Yeah, and also the fact is, the fact that your skin is white. I don't think we should kid ourselves about that. Racism is not a sole characteristic of America.

JW: That's very true.

SP: Although some of the student sects did help out on occasion. Kakumaru for example, incidentally this is the one with which I had my own personal ideological problems with, helped me out significantly in Okinawa in the initial stages; then when they tried to control, that's of course why we had to separate. The student sects are out to control Japan, and I really wanted to run the program.

JW: The Beheiren demonstrations, did any of them get to the point, like the Zengakuren demonstrations, where the demonstrators were carrying the Kaba stick, and did they engage in violent activity?

SP: No, usually in a Beheiren demonstration we had a group like Mononobe's lantern group, who were people who were apt to be in the Fellowship of Reconciliation kind of thing; older people on the whole, rigid pacifists, carrying their lanterns of peace. Also there's often be a housewives' auxiliary in this or that district, like the Shinjuku District which had a woman in charge who was just magnificent. These are not violent groups. The whole thrust of preparation for a demonstration was there was to be no violence. Now, I saw often the Kidotai commit violence against Beheiren, but I saw very little response to it. Sometimes their snake dances got out of line, but no one was really badly hurt, there was certainly no intention. I think you've got to take into consideration the aversion of the Japanese to violence, and what they consider violence and what we consider violence. After the demonstration in Berkeley and San Francisco State, the police and the students would have two or three bodies carried away, sometimes dead even. Now I can remember two three episodes in Japan. One day I was in my office after a Beheiren demonstration and a particular youngster that I was very fond of, came into my office with a great big bandage over his cheek. His whole cheek was bandaged up. He had been hurt at the demonstration, the police had hit him. So, I looked underneath the bandage and there was a scratch about half an inch long, and he said, "I really hit

that policeman, and he really hit me.” Another episode I can remember is about one of the youngsters over there who had been working with us a long time. We had a demonstration at Yokosuka for the Iwakuni Six in this case along with some of the students from Kanagawa, who had agreed there would be no violence. We had a big demonstration down the streets and ended up in the park at Yokosuka with the Kidotai attacking the demonstrators. I remember that I saw this one boy that I knew quite well under three or four of the Kidotai, and their clubs were going down on the guy and I thought, “God, Mori’s finished. This is it!” then after the cops left, Mori gets up and brushes himself off, looks for his glasses, finds them, puts them back on and dashes back. So Beheiren, I think, is very true to this whole anti-violence in Japan, but the students sects were unJapanese on this level. As you know, they committed assassinations, they’d fire bomb police stalls, the whole gag; but Beheiren, I think, is very typical of that element in Japanese culture which just abhors violence. I don’t know if you had the same experience that I did, but in all the time that I was in Japan, I would go to bars and see a lot of people terribly drunk, and in all the time that I was there, I saw only one person start to strike another person and that was it. So Beheiren is very typical of that strand of Japanese society. Violence is just....it’s not even wrong, it’s just inconceivable, so when the Kidotai had actually hit one of the Beheiren youngsters, they were crying not because they were hurt but because they were so shocked that someone would actually hit them. Then they’d come back and talk about it. Part of it was the influence of the Zengakuren on Beheiren, the students would come back and talk about how bad the police were when it was just a scratch here and there. They’d say how tough they had been, but I can’t imagine them hitting anybody very seriously. Beheiren had a certain kind of spirit there. I remember at the time Mishima committed suicide there was a great deal of talk. I was up in Misawa at the time, but when I came back to Tokyo, the main topic of conversation among the housewives, students, intellectuals and the leaders of Beheiren was Mishima’s suicide and what it meant. They felt that Mishima stood for one part of Japanese culture which they hoped was dead, not just old militarism but the whole feeling about people and their relationships, whereas they stood for the other part, they respected death and were terribly frightened by this particular type of violence. It is very clear that there are several strands in Japanese culture and Beheiren was one of them, just as Mishima represents another one.

Beheiren represents a whole strand in Japanese society that I think Americans should be well aware of and also Beheiren was almost uniquely internationalist or cosmopolitan. I’m not quite sure of the right word, compared to all the Japanese groups which I was with. They were able to adjust to tremendous cultural differences and one thing that comes to mind in this experience in Iwakuni with people like Iwai who is, of course, one of the leading ministers of Kyodan, the United Protestant group of Japan. We were talking about the problems of the demonstrations outside Iwakuni which were not too effective. This meeting was downtown in the offices in Hiroshima, and I was talking with a group of Kyodan ministers and they were saying, “What can we do, we demonstrate outside the gate but we don’t get any responses.” This was before Chris was very active too, by the way, and I said, “Well, what do you do?” “Well we go down and we sing some good songs, some church songs (of course Japanese church songs) and have banners,” (but of course they were in Japanese). I said, “What you should do, you know, is make it clear to the Americans that you’re Japanese Christians, churchmen, carry a few crosses, have a symbol or two or something in English, sing a song they know.” And then I

said, "For example, now what is the one song that most Christians know?" And of course everybody started laughing. What is it? - Onward Christian Soldiers. So we decided not to sing that one. As a matter of fact, in the middle of summer they were down there singing Christmas carols. What was important to me was the ability of this group to look outside their own culture, which is not too easy for Japanese, to see why they weren't communicating with GI's. Chris and a few groups were doing it very well, but on the whole the strong support of the Japanese wasn't clear to the GI's because they were using symbols and techniques that were not too understandable. To me this was a tremendous step, and this was the kind of thing Beheiren did, internationalist, cosmopolitan, stretching itself out, whatever you wanted to call it. Few of these Kyodan leaders, by the way, are Beheiren. Iwai, for example is not Beheiren.

JW: Well, while we're on Kyodan, were you aware of the schism or conflict within the Kyodan itself over whether or not they should be protesting the war in Vietnam?

SP: Well, there was a real split. You see, Kyodan, in the first place, was an artificial church. Like the Confessional Church that Hitler set up, Kyodan was set up by the Japanese government during the war as an artificial unity of all Protestants. What had been before an entirely missionary faith became somewhat indigenous. As a matter of fact though, after the war, the missionaries came back so they had Presbyterian churches and Methodist churches once again. But the Kyodan, being formed artificially, had some years in struggle, and several things it did should be commented on in regard to your question. The big split came over Expo '70. Should Kyodan have a pavilion at Expo '70 or not. The left wing of the controversy said, "Since Expo '70 is primarily an attempt to disguise the real question that faces our country of whether or not we should remove AMPO, we shouldn't have a pavilion there." The conservative wing said, "No, that's not true, we still should have a pavilion there." That was the real split. It wasn't so much over supporting the Vietnam War or not supporting it. It was really over Expo. I never met a Kyodan minister who supported the Vietnam War.

JW: Could you talk about risk here for a while.

SP: First, I want to say that I found I've never worked with a group that really meant as much to me as a person, even my own denomination, yeah that's true, as Beheiren. There were several things about this, and I want to stress the democratic nature of Beheiren. Now the reason I want to stress this is because early in the game I was a character witness, I guess, for a Navy man who had split from the service because of a real crisis of conscience. He had been out for quite a while and we worked with him on his CO applications, then he went back to the service and court martialed for desertion, of course. His military attorney, there were no civilian attorneys working in the whole area, as you know we changed that pattern quite rapidly, asked me to go on the stand as a character witness. When the prosecution came in, and in some way I think it was kind of a set up, they started to ask me questions about Beheiren not about the boy. The ostensible reason, of course, was attacking my credibility as a witness. I was asked questions like, "Have you ever been at a secret meeting of the Beheiren leaders?" This just blew my mind because you'd have to know how Beheiren functions. The Tokyo Beheiren which embraced all of the larger groups in Tokyo met every Monday night in the Beheiren offices, crowded and cramped as they were, and everyone who to come, came. Period. And at this point the decisions were made. There were no secret meetings. That just blew

my mind, have you ever attended a secret meeting! I don't know what the court martial records indicate, but I doubt that they indicate that I probably stuck out my tongue at them. There was the whole paranoid feeling about this, you know. I've read in various places and heard from other people that there's all kinds of strange money behind Beheiren. Russian money or Chinese money or God knows what kind of money. But since I was close to them, I was in the office and despite my language lacks, communication, I though, was so really deep and human, I have no questions about this. There were no secret meetings of Beheiren. Why should there be? There were no secret sources of money. If you knew how little we got along on, why you'd think either that Mao and Brezhnev were awful pikers or else we were awful stupid. There just wasn't that kind of situation. Beheiren consisted of open meetings. In fact one of the real exciting things that happened while I was there is that one of the men who was quite active in Beheiren got up in one meeting and confessed that he'd been sent originally as a police spy. He reported all this stuff and all of a sudden he became self-converted. I think the main thing that switched his mind is that he expected that there would be such secrets, underhanded kinds of things, or extra-Japanese sources of income, or this kind of paranoiac nonsense. This is not Beheiren. Beheiren is a most open group. Now, I've been in New Left groups in America, of that mold and stuff like this, and none of them operated as openly, as genuinely open as Beheiren did. You go to these meetings and it was so exciting because here would be high school kids, and here would be top intellectuals in Japan, and here would be housewives, and here would be just the businessmen off the street. It was the only place in Japan that I saw where this whole status thing was abolished. You'd have a Nobel prize winner having a debate with a high school kid, which is not conceivable in Japan, scarcely conceivable here, but completely inconceivable there. And this kind of thing went on with a great number of intellectuals of Japan who would go to the meetings, share their ideas and come up with some type of decision.

Now you asked me about the question of risk. It was my assessment that, perhaps as a foreigner, I felt freer in Japan. I certainly felt freer there than I do in the States because about all they could do to me in Japan was throw me out I guess, although a couple of the people spent a few weeks in jail. The risk in Japan is, again, difficult to compare to risk here. What happens here, in the Western world, not just in America, is that if you're a political dissenter, they'll put you in jail or perhaps they'll rig up an accident for you, or they'll take away your livelihood, your professional standing; and it really doesn't matter too much because most people who are going to be dissenters are willing to take on this particular cost, which is known in our society. The risk in Japan is quite different, it's social. As you know, most of the people who commit crimes in Japan are not put in prisons, they're given social stigma. I know that. I lived in a lower working class neighborhood near Nagano, and shortly after I was there, I was informed that there was this one woman in the street who had done something bad about five or six years before, and I wasn't supposed to be too friendly to her. Now what she did, I never found out, but I said, "Well why doesn't she move out of this section of town and into another section of town?" "Well she can't do that." "Why not?" "Well, she can't." Of course you find this in Japan, every so often you're told, "You can't" and there's no explanation of it, it can't be explained, it's just, you can't do it.

The types of pressures against the work in Japan were Kidotai (riot police) activity, and a lot of spying. For the younger people there was a lot of police going to the parents and saying, "Do you know what your child is doing?"

Economic sanctions were unimportant there; social sanctions were very important, and so for a number of these people to openly speak against the avowed policy of the Japanese government...well, remember Japan is a consensus nation, and that's all there is to it, it's a consensus nation and it can only exist by consensus. To threaten this consensus really brings down your own questions of yourself in a way that it never happens in the Western society, so risks were of a different nature and probably in the long term, much more painful that we in the United States suffer. Take the case of one of the people who was a leader of Beheiren in Kyoto, a man named Tsurumi Shunsuke, a man of considerable intellectual stature in Japan, and also a man of unusual ability to dissent. He spent some years in prison during the Pacific War because he did not support the war. He left several important university positions because he just couldn't go along with the university's relationship with students. He also got divorced and he has a younger wife. All these kinds of things....he's just very unusual, but even so, in my talking with him, he's obviously been subject to the kinds of social pressures which I don't think would bother us Americans a darn bit, but he has to live with them and he's never going to live it down. His kids will never live it down, although he happens to come from a family that before the war would have been nobility, I think he would have been a viscount or something like that. So, ancestors build up this wonderful family image and in a short time, he's worn it out and his kids and their kids are going to have to live with it, unless Japan radically changes. The risk element was that. Kids lost parental approval and that means a lot; even though a kid would say the parents were against him, the parents would still send him some money so he wouldn't starve, but they didn't have this belonging love that means so damn much to Japanese.

JW: Did you run into any incidence where, because of the child's activities, the police would ask questions around the community about the kid and cause the family to lose face in the community, and even for the father to lose his job because of the loss of face.

SP: I never came across it. You see again, you don't lose jobs in Japan, because you're not hired or fired there, you join a company and they're stuck with you. The usual police procedure was that, if they thought the family was highly supportive of the youngsters, they wouldn't go talk to the family about it, they'd talk to the neighbors, and the neighbors would talk to other neighbors, and they'd talk with the nearby shopkeepers and so forth, and so all of a sudden, people would be faced with this little bit of, not Coventry, but close to it. The Japanese society depends upon it for maintaining law and order really. Remember, Japanese don't punish in the same way we do and when they get punished there I gather they get punished pretty severely, it really hurts. Of course we do to, but the hurting is different from one culture to another. I never came across a case of a man losing his job because of his work with the anti-war movement. I came across a case of three women losing their jobs, but again, you've got to remember the position of women in Japan is so lousy in the first place that to fire a woman is not a very serious thing. I'm thinking of a couple of nurses, for example, and professional people. So, you see again the risk they took. This didn't happen often, as I said earlier, I think that they over-emphasized the risk, and all I'm saying is that from my perspective as a Westerner, it seemed to me that they were talking about a physical risk that I feel minimal; the economic risk were not severe, the political risks were relatively light compared to political dissent here or Japan forty years ago, but the social risk are obviously there. The result was that on the whole, anybody who was sympathetic to Beheiren felt free to come out so, if they were willing to take the risk. There were three or four people who

came openly to meetings, whose names I would not particularly mention because in their case, they have connections with the West, and they would be subject to the sanctions here. It's not important to mention their names. The main leaders were, of course, Oda Makoto, critic, primary literary person; Tsurumi Shunsuke at the University of Kyoto; his cousin, Tsurumi Yoshiyuki; Muto, he's the founder of AMPO and also continues the work in terms of trying to spread information around the Pacific basin about anti-imperial, anti-war activities; and Yoshikawa Yuichi, who is the general secretary of Beheiren. These are men of considerable stature in Japan at one level, though not obviously in terms of the LDP or the economic interest or establishment intellectuals.

JW: It's been mentioned that there's a possibility of a tie-up between Beheiren and the North Vietnamese government. Can you.....

SP: Well, there's no question that there was some type of open information sharing, the North Vietnamese Republic sent over information, but there were no secret meetings of the delegates of the two. There was correspondence between the two, information sharing, not on the level of espionage or spying, but on the level of what's really happening and how we felt about this; some of the movement papers, American movement papers I'm sure, were passed on. Information sharing. As far as being manipulated by any foreign government, they were not. Again, they were very Japanese and their loyalties to Japan were the kinds of loyalties that Japanese have which is to family, not to the nation. There was information sharing but I can't conceive of any of these men doing anything more than this. There was no great fear or anxiety about the North Vietnamese.

I think there were different types of connection from what I was told, and I have every reason to believe it. There were different types of connections in terms of student sects and the North Vietnamese Government. The general sympathy of Beheiren was with the Viet Cong not with North Vietnam and certainly not with South Vietnam. You have to put this into perspective that the Japanese people that I knew, left, right and middle, tended to view the war in Vietnam as a racist war of whites against Asians. Remember, the whole development in the last few years of Pan-Asian consciousness was very important. Take for example the attitude of most of the left wing of Japan towards Israel and the Arab countries, very bluntly they regarded Israel as a last colonial endeavor of Europe, the last endeavor of the Europeans, which really means whites, to colonize Asia. For me, I think of the Middle East as the Middle East. It was in Asia that I suddenly realized, by god, it is part of Asia. So there's a lot of the emotional, sympathetic, sentimental relationship, and I'm sure this carried over very strongly towards the Viet Cong.

Some of the people who were in Beheiren were from families who had actually been part of the occupation troops in China, and who had fought against, bitterly fought against, Ho Chi Minh, so I think they handled this in the usual fashion of feeling a little guilty. But, their strong sentimental attachment was to the Viet Cong, and there was a genuine attempt to share information about the struggles of peace, what anti-imperialism meant, and so forth with North Vietnam. There was no relationship that I know or can conceive of with the South Vietnamese Government.

Of course it was another thing about North Korea. The Japanese are a people that have been very hospitable and friendly to me; but they are racist, just like so damn many people are, and Koreans in Japan have the same position that blacks do in America. It doesn't really matter whether you are North Korean or South

Korean, you're Korean, So, we'd get a lot of information and have posters around the Beheiren office from the Viet Cong, but there was nothing about North Korea. About Kim Il Sung, they could care less, they knew they didn't like Pak, but there were not particularly infatuated with North Koreans. It was very interesting as an outsider to watch the Beheiren group dealing with their own racism against the Eta people, and against the Koreans. They were really trying but in this I think they were more liberals than they were radicals, like many of us in America tend to be liberal.

JW: Were there Eta in Beheiren?

SP: There were no Eta at first in Beheiren and there were some real pressures from the Eta on Beheiren because Oda wrote an article about racism and race prejudice which the organized Eta liberation group down south detested, and they came in the office and had a real rowdy row, there was a two day session on it. The three major racial prejudices in Japan are against this group (the Eta), against the Koreans, and of course, against the aborigines, the Ainus. Now there was a bond, a definite bond against the Koreans. By the treaty of peace between the United States and Japan we enforced the denationalization of a large number of Japanese citizens who were Koreans and whose grandfathers were not, and part of the whole deal about our settling the war was that we have almost 600,000 Koreans who had no real citizenship now. There was a lot of work Beheiren did with them, and at the time I left there was some beginning, exciting, but somewhat melodramatic and over-played relationship with the Ainu people. Some of the recent visitors here in this country have been Ainus who have been sponsored or helped by Beheiren. Of course this is a small minority, and one that doesn't deal with much.

JW: Why this trend to do this; is it the fact that the war's winding down and Beheiren is looking for something to keep going, or is it to broaden its liberal outlook, its total appearance?

SP: No, Beheiren is in a constant state of examination of itself. So many of these meetings, cabinet meetings and so called secret meetings were general open discussions particularly about our situations as people and how we related. They were, of course, very acutely aware of the black-white problem in the United States, so these questions came up. Beheiren represents a group of people who were very intensely aware of the Korean prejudice, and I think I was in Japan maybe two weeks before I was told of the fact that there was on deportation camp at Yokohama which is for Europeans and most other Asians, and one down in Kyushu which is for Koreans. The food allowance for Koreans is, I think, a quarter of what it is for the other people. I think I was very soon told this by Beheiren, so they're very conscious of this Korean racism. The other thing, the Burakumin (Eta) and the Ainu thing, I think is a bit of a glamour thing. I am not sure. But, what I'm saying is that the group wasn't "winding down" at the time these were considered. I was not there when they actually made the decision to wind down. They wound down because the peace treaty had been signed, and they felt there were other jobs they wanted to continue to work on at the anti-imperialist, anti-militarist level. However, they didn't wind down intellectually, I could never imagine these people winding down; I can imagine in some other room now they're still carrying on the same discussions about imperialism, racism, war and so forth.

JW: What I was trying to get at here is that Beheiren is the "Peace in Vietnam Committee," and the appearance is given that they were specifically created for

and devoted their time to the Vietnam War protests, and here you're talking about their dealings with the problems of racism in Japan itself.

SP: That is because their view of war, the causes of the Vietnamese War and their own involvement in it were that it is the nature of imperialism and that imperialism and racism are deeply tied up together. So, when they found traces of racism in themselves they had to cope with it. Now, the question we haven't really talked about is why did Beheiren do so much, why did the Japanese movements come out and support people like you. Part of it is because there's a great anxiety about the remilitarization of Japan. If Japan is remilitarized, if they're not effective on this one, they want to have something to go on, they want to build up the concept of conscientious objection. For example, I talked with very conservative groups, such as the very small handful of elderly Japanese who are the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and they would like to have, if they lose their first struggle against remilitarization, they'd like to have something to fall back on. They'd like to have the experience we've had working with dissenting GI's. So, it was a two pronged thing. In no way am I criticizing them for this, but this was very clear. They were in a broader sense human beings involved in a world struggle, and they were also Japanese who were concerned about themselves. The basic thrust of Beheiren was anti-imperialism, anti-militarism. Essential they are not a Heiwa people, they're a Hansen people; and you know the distinction between Heiwa and Hansen. Heiwa is peace in a much more passive sense, and Hansen has a much more aggressive implication of anti-imperialism, anti-war and the causes of war.

JW: In essence what you're saying is that not only was Beheiren in the Vietnam Protest and in the GI Movement to deal with the war and imperialism, but they were also building, in effect, a precedence for themselves should they someday be in the same position as the GI's.

SP: They're trying to get knowledge, sure. They were trying to be part of the international movement against militarism, colonialism, racism and imperialism. These things are all tied up together, you know, and I think Beheiren saw this very clearly. You remember how it got started and when it got started. It didn't get started as a group of people who thought Americans were bad for indulging in the war in Vietnam. It got started because people suddenly became aware that the oil that was flowing through Shinjuku was feeding our war machine, and the Japanese were involved in the war. That war was their own sudden crisis of conscience. That's why Beheiren got started; because they saw they were involved in something they really didn't believe in. It was not an anti-American movement.

JW: The only references that I've dug up so far on the founding of Beheiren say that Oda started it in April of '65 when the US started bombing North Vietnam.

SP: What really happened, I was told, was that a lot of oil feeding the American war machine was passing through Shinjuku, and some Shinjuku people suddenly became aware of this, and they said, "what the hell are we gonna do about this." Then it was started, Beheiren was started as "Peace in Vietnam." They didn't get involved in American GI work for several years, until the episode about that aircraft carrier.

JW: There wasn't really much of a way for them to get involved in the GI movement in Japan in the early years considering there wasn't a GI movement. The GI movement hadn't spread to Japan.

SP: That's right, well they couldn't have gotten involved in the sense of helping the GI's other than to hide them. What they did was to help some GIs hide out for various lengths of time. As you know they helped some of the GIs go to Sweden, but they felt that this was a dead end kind of thing, so when they found out the kind of thing we were doing, well, they got more and more involved in that.

JW: Are there any incidences along the line during the years that you were there that stick out in your mind as far as protests go before bases, or the marches, rallies, this kind of thing that you can nail down.

SP: Well, I might have referred to one before that was particularly moving to me. There was a riot in the Iwakuni brig on July 4th, and of course the GIs were moved from Iwakuni to Yokosuka under the rather unpleasant circumstances of being manacled to the floor of an airplane and stuff like that. The following week, because information did get up to us in the Tokyo area, Beheiren and some of the other groups in Kanagawa-ken got together and had a massive demonstration in Yokosuka, saying "Free the Iwakuni Six." I was very impressed that in less than a week the information got out and we were able to have a significant demonstration. The point of the demonstration was that they guys in the brig at Yokosuka would know that they were not lost, and even though they were in Japan, the American government wasn't going to be able to hide them out and deprive them of their rights to counsel and military justice, as poor as that may be. That was a very impressive type of support activity. Its purpose wasn't to build Beheiren or anything else but to give support to six GIs not one of whom they had ever seen or heard of.

One other story I might tell is that when the Marines from Okinawa would come up to the Honshu area to do their mortar practice on Fuji, there would be a group of mothers standing outside the area broadcasting to the GIs. Fuji still has its kind of sacred aura about it, but you can grow crops there and it's one of the best mulberry areas in Japan. I understand it was taken away, first by the Japanese Imperial Military and then we took it over from them, so the farmers in the nearby areas can't go out there. You know how gathering wood is important just to heat your house, well this whole area is closed off to them, and it's also profaning something else important to them, so every time the Marines got up there they were informed by the local Japanese, at first in Japanese and then later after we were able to help them, in English of what they were really doing. Now this is the kind of thing that goes on day in and day out, and here there are women, 60 and 70 years of age, who for so many years had seen something very important to them being taken away by militarism, instead of being anti-American, they were saying, "You know, we're together in this thing." This was not a direct Beheiren activity, although Beheiren people were in it, but it's a kind of texture of feeling that's so important.

Beheiren was tremendously supportive to individuals, although they often didn't understand the American GIs and their ways. I spent a lot of my time, I suppose, kind of sharing some of the American culture with the Japanese. I can recall one very interesting incident that occurred in the National Council of Churches, actually in their offices. We set up a condition there, like we did in the States, where we'd get a group of clergymen to talk to a GI (applying for CO discharge) so that they could see if his objection had groundwork and some type of a pretty valid, thought-out carefully, coherent religious system. There were a couple of boys who needed this particular thing, I think they were from Guam, so after the talk with the boys, the clergymen, none of whom had ever talked to an American GI before, were trying to cope with what this violence thing meant. I tried to

explain to them that most Americans have had guns around them or have had guns a good part of their life. Of course, in Japan none of them have a gun, so they really didn't believe me. But, there was one American working in the national Council of Churches there, a younger man, who was a clergyman also, and he said, "Well you know, I was raised in Texas and in my family we never had less than five guns in the house." Now he was a guy they knew, and they looked at him with such surprise then they went into Japanese and I completely lost the discussion. The whole feeling about this is kind of interesting.

JW: Yeah, the Japanese are pretty uptight about fire arms.

SP: As I say, it's one of those strands in Japanese culture that's so anti-violent. Beheiren wasn't that big, you know. I suppose in the history books it's not going to have that much play, but it represents very clearly one of the significant strands of Japanese culture going back many, many centuries, perhaps it's the best representative of it. I hope historians and scholars will take a look at this. Now of course the Beheiren spirit, I'm told, is not dead, it's going on in other forms of work; Beheiren as an organization, of course, has ceased, but the spirit of it hasn't.

The international aspect of Beheiren is important, although the relationship with such groups as ours were fairly late in their development it was something they were looking for, and one of the main things that they found of value was that they could work across these barriers or boundaries of culture with people to eliminate war and racism and all these kinds of things. In many of the Beheiren journals in Japanese, there were articles about the GI movement, there were articles about the Black Panthers, articles about all these types of things that in most Japanese political journals you don't find this type of information about the broader struggle of people.

JW: Can you sum up what impact you think Beheiren had on the Japanese people, what part it played within Japanese society, how much support it had and things like this.

SP: I met very few Japanese who did not know some of the leaders of Beheiren and what they stood for. Partly this is because the nature of Japanese society is much more oriented to persons than to occurrences on the outside. Beheiren's work with the GI movement affected very seriously the anti-war GI action on the part of the JCP who tried to take over this particular field of work, I know this as a matter of fact not only from local activity but from the meeting in Versailles, I guess it was in '71, when the JCP was telling about the GI work they were going to do, but they didn't do any. So, it had that effect. I think the major effect of Beheiren was on people, it was a kind of empowerment experience for many middle class who were born in the 30s. I think it's main impact was empowerment experience for people who had not felt significantly a part of the political system in Japan or felt very divorced from it, particularly the electoral processes. I'm thinking here now of individuals like housewives, doctors or dentists, who don't have the same status in Japan as they do here, economic or social.

JW: Could you say that Beheiren provided an acceptable active outlet for people who didn't have a part of the established political process and couldn't relate to the Zengakuren or the JCP movements.

SP: Yeah, I think people who were not content with conservatism of the LDP or the extremism of Zengakuren or did not find in Komeito or the other groups

satisfactory ways to express their real concerns through the electoral processes, had this chance to still take part in the political life in Japan.

JW: You say that Beheiren, then, played a relatively significant part in pulling, say, the “wind out of the sails” of some of the programs of the JCP and the other radical part of the opposition parties in Japan.

SP: Well you know you’re asking me to give an analysis of Japan that I can’t give. See, part of the whole problem again is you have to think of the consensus nature of Japan. If voices are raised, loudly, they’ve got to be heard in Japan. You know, it’s just like the fact that LDP may have the parliamentary majority, but it still can’t get through the bills it wants because the opposition really doesn’t want them. In a consensus society, if a voice is raised loudly, it has to be listened to. It did allow people to have their voices heard, and in Japan that particular technique is more effective, of course, than in America where if you have a majority, you pass a bill; and if the President agrees, he signs it. We don’t have a consensus society. Which I might say, “Thank God” because that presents terrible problems.

JW: Except, I guess, in cases like the AMPO that are run through against consensus.

SP: Well it was, frankly. During the first AMPO struggle in ‘60, enough people felt so strongly in opposition to AMPO that they at least had to cancel Eisenhower’s visit. In the ‘70s, the opposition was “We don’t really want this, but we’re not going to blow the world up if you don’t.” You see this is a kind of delicacy you get in this whole consensus type of struggle. The struggle against AMPO in ‘70 was regarded by the people who wanted AMPO not to be passed, as a failure. I was at a number of meetings when there was an analysis of the AMPO struggle and its failure, but in terms of the Japanese, they were saying, “This got listened to and perhaps next time we might win,” or else, “You didn’t at least make it any worse.” I got involved in this whole aspect of the Japanese culture which is so hard.

JW: Let’s talk about specific things, activities of Beheiren and GIs so that we can kind of bring out the connection between Beheiren and the GI movement in Japan. Now I know from Iwakuni where I was at, that the GI movement kind of reached and latched onto Beheiren indirectly, well, through Zengakuren really, and after this got started at Iwakuni, things began happening at other bases, and there were underground newspapers that came out, at Misawa I believe it was *Hair*, *Yokosuka David* at Yokosuka and the *First Amendment* at Yokota. Did Beheiren play an initiating part in any of these activities or were they just established?

SP: Well it varied from one center to another. Beheiren made the analysis with PCS that there was a need of some type of activity at Misawa, so as you know, they started a coffee house up there. The coffee house was a peace coffee house sponsored by Beheiren and GIs started to come to it. The reason they did this was because there had been a GI movement a year or two before in Misawa which they had only vaguely found out about too late to be of any help. Well, actually they knew about it but they didn’t know what they could do, this was the problem they were facing; by the time they got thing going in Iwakuni, they had some idea of how to respond. So, they started the coffee house, GIs started coming and *Hair* was revived. Now in Yokosuka, people out of our office and out of the Beheiren office did some leafleting in Yokosuka about the rights of GIs to have CO discharges. The initial leafleting was done largely by Beheiren

youngsters, and the American who were at universities nearby, and there was enough response so we started an office there. There were two or three papers in Yokosuka, usually started by individual GIs who felt a sense of outrage and involvement, and these were facilitated by Beheiren. There were preliminary attempts to do some work in Sasebo several times and at least there was always the availability of a counselor or later a lawyer to Sasebo. I would say Beheiren's whole attempt was to be able to support. If the GI wanted to start a newspaper, they got in contact with Beheiren and they Beheiren would be able to crank the thing out.

JW: Why were some bases more susceptible to activity than others?

SP: Well primarily the purpose of PCS and Beheiren both were supportive, and if there were GIs who needed it and wanted to organize the situation, why they tried to respond to it. Some bases were much tighter than others. At some bases the anti-war GIs were shipped out fast, while on some bases they got three or four or even four or five months. Individual commandants, however up tight they were about the GI movement, made this decision. Although the harder the commandants came down, often the result was the stronger the movement. Also, the nature of our bases were so different. You have a situation where you have a lot of husbands and wives living in Tachikawa and that area, so the GIs who resisted the ward generally took it out on their wives. You see, I think, this is probably important in terms of both Beheiren and the GI movement, that if the initiation had been done by the Japanese or by say PCS, then we'd have active movements in various places we didn't have; if they were regarded as primarily supportive in nature, then we'd have some bases that weren't covered and some bases that were.

JW: In essence, Beheiren would either wait to be called or after the movement got going.....

SP: Yeah, Beheiren would facilitate the PCS work and we did try to get out to the bases to inform the GIs of their legal rights and offer them whatever services we could offer them. Now on this level there were initiation, but they didn't insist. For example, Beheiren never told us where we should have a counseling office or anything else, they tried to tell us where the main bases were and whatever contacts they had with GIs, but there was no question about, "OK, now you start a group here or you start a group there." There was never that kind of feeling about the thing. We'd say, "Well there are enough GIs down here that they need to have a resident American counselor." They'd say, "Fine, how could they facilitate this?"

JW: In other words they'd go into an area and look around and if it looked like there was enough support then they'd go ahead....

SP: They wouldn't go into an area because they were already in the areas, but they would inform a group, say like PCS, that there was this need and ask what could we get together on. See, we would go into an area because we were the foreigners, but they were there.

JW: I mean, they would be not so much as trying to start movement as looking for people who were already motivated.

SP: They would be so glad to start a movement where they could find people who were interested. They had no master plan. We did develop a large number of offices in a short period of time, but that was partly because we were able to find Americans who were willing to come over and work there, and partly because GI

movements were well established or at least the rumbles of them. But it was no master plan. I'd turn around, I know since I was in a sense in charge of the office in Tokyo, I'd turn around and find we had a desperate need, and the next thing I'd know somebody would come over from American, and we were all set. It was a kind of spontaneous response. There was no master plan of "We'll start one here and start one there and start one there," perhaps the military thought so because it turned out to be quite an intensive operation in a short period of time.

JW: In the Iwakuni case, I know that the movement sprouted and hooked on to Beheiren, so it was probably that way on other bases.

SP: That's right. But Iwakuni was a much more organized level. I don't think it was so true on other bases, there were individuals more than there were groups. You have a group situation at Iwakuni. But even so, the group was given outside support and you had a lot of moral support too. Annie and Jan gave a lot of moral support. Iwakuni was the most highly organized of all the groups. Also, you guys were the guys who were going to go into combat. The guys on the air bases and so forth and the guys in the Navy yards were not.

JW: I don't think it was so much the combat thing as just the difference in discipline. I think that the Marine Corps discipline tended more to give rise to people who were disciplined.

SP: Maybe. It's hard to say without getting involved in your particular loyalties. I don't know if I can say that any one branch of the service is more susceptible to developing its resistance.

JW: I wasn't speaking in terms of developing, I was speaking in the vein of being the most radical, making the biggest change. People would be almost like Christian converts, real fanatics.

SP: Well, I think that's probably true. I guess the central thesis to be explained though, is how Beheiren reacted. It was eager and ready once it found an effective way to work with GIs and give whatever support they could to the American working over there. They were very proud of this, and they have every right to be, they spread the gospel heavily, as you know one of the things that struck me in Japan was how well informed the Japanese people were on television and in the national magazines about the GI movement. I can remember just before I returned to the United States to stay permanently there had been a young man on a ship who had come to this point of conscience where he couldn't continue, and there was a large public meeting at which he made his statement; the boy came from the Bay area. I came to the United States a few weeks later and here nobody had heard about it.

One of the things you should mention is that also one of the thrusts of Beheiren later on became a thrust of GI resistance within their own military organization. They never got too far with it but there were some really beautiful people involved in that.

JW: I guess in the Japanese military can't they resign?

SP: They can resign, but the anti-military thrust can still be there. A couple of the people refused to resign, they stayed within the military and wanted to fight against military things.

JW: In your run-ins with military authorities, what kind of problems did you have?

SP: The American military authority?

JW: Yes.

SP: Well, a lot of the people working on the bases were denied access if they were lawyers or clergymen. I'm sure you've been told the story about McWilliams. In my discussions with military officials, I felt that there were a lot of covert, dishonest activity. People were identifying themselves, say for example, as being chaplains; I would find out later that they were not chaplains. One particular man, through the Friends Service Committee, got in contact with me, identified himself as a colonel in the chaplains corps; I found out later he was not a chaplain. There was a lot of this kind of nonsense. In my conversations with the military, I felt that they really thought that we were over there working as Communist agents, un-American, over there to aid a foreign cause. I had no contact with a military officer where this didn't come up. They were distressed by this. They wouldn't cooperate with us. They'd deny the GI his rights to see us, to have religious and legal counsel. These were denied every possible and dishonest way I can conceive of.

JW: What kind of visa did you have in Japan?

SP: I had a tourist visa.

JW: You had to go out every two months.

SP: I went out every two months, but this was partly convenient because you know I had been doing work in other parts of Asia, in Okinawa which was then separate. So I went in and out and the Japanese government never gave me much of a hassle.

JW: What was the problem with Barbara Bye?

SP: Well, the problem I felt was publicity. I think she was unfortunate in getting a lot of publicity, and making the Japanese government lose face. I feel that the basic problem was that she worked at Iwakuni, and though this didn't bother them a hell of a lot, I think she gave a press conference and said she'd be back. She had not right to do that. Essentially, none of us had the right to be there. I think that was the problem, publicity, and that the Japanese government was losing face.

JW: Then it was not so much what she was doing as the fact that she was advertising.

SP: Large numbers of other people did it and if they did it in a fashion that was somewhat accepting of the sovereignty of Japan, there seemed to be no major problem. Sure the Japanese wanted to know what we were doing, and I know damn well they were pretty much on top of what we were doing and where we were going because I'd find out that this was the case. This was their country. But they could have kicked us all out; they didn't. I went in and out of Japan, I suppose, fifteen, twenty times, and many of our workers went in and out of Japan frequently as they were on cultural visas which were easy.

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW OF DON PHILIPPI

BY JERRY WEST ON 03 MARCH

1975 IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

JW: Would you tell what your name is and give a little bit on your background.

DP: My name is Don Philippi and I went to Japan in 1957 as a Fulbright Scholar at Kokugaku University in Tokyo for about four years. I was majoring in Japanese literature and I made a number of translations of Japanese classics. After 1961, I became a technical translator in Japan and worked for a number of Japanese companies, translating their scientific and technical materials from Japanese into English. At that time during most of those years, there wasn't any presence of the American radical movement in Japan, even during the 1960 Security Treaty struggles. There were no Americans that I know of who were active in supporting the movement of the Japanese Left. It all began about 1967 or 1968 when the war in Vietnam began to assume a very critical importance for everybody in Japan.

About 1967/8 there was an immense upsurge of student radicalism in Japan and these various student groups forming themselves into Marxist sects began to develop various tactics of street struggles. Occupying buildings and a number of other rather innovative forms of struggle were devised by the different student groups. There was also considerable radicalization among the Japanese workers; a number of the younger workers in the trade unions were becoming dissatisfied with the established leadership of the Socialist and Communist Parties. They also were becoming interested in allying themselves with the various student groups and mounting direct struggles to stop the war, and it looked as if these movements among the Japanese students and workers were going to have considerable impact on the course of history in Japan, at least it seemed to us at that time that was going to happen. Also, at the same time there was a sort of coalition of citizens' groups that came into being rather informally called the Beheiren movement, and it was aimed against the war in Vietnam. In time there came to be sort of a loose coalition between the three elements in Japanese life, the student sects, the workers' groups allied with the sects, and the citizens' movement. It seemed as if a new entity was emerging in Japanese politics, this three way alliance which included students, workers and citizens independently of the established radical movement of the Communist and Socialist Parties. Throughout the country there was really a very large upsurge in radical struggles in all the universities and many of the labor unions and certainly in the anti-war movement.

At that time in 1967/8, the movement was just beginning, it was just feeling its way around, it was experimenting in a number of different types of struggle, and the ideologies were being hammered out by a lot of debates within each sect and also between the different sects and between the different elements in the coalition. It was a very exciting time to be in Japan, you had the feeling that something very new was about to happen that had never occurred in the country throughout its entire history, especially this was true in 1968 and 1969 when there was an entire new atmosphere everywhere. Opposition to the war had become very vocal and all kinds of novel sorts of things were happening.

The foreigners in Japan obviously could not remain on the sidelines with what was happening because it seemed almost as if the Japanese students and workers and

citizens were fighting our struggle, because they were the ones who were being arrested and experimenting in all kinds of ways of protesting and of taking direct action to stop the war, which was actually being mounted by our government, though their government of course was supporting our government but it was really our government that was fighting in Vietnam. So it was utterly ridiculous that we just sit there on the sidelines and watch all these Japanese workers and students and citizens being arrested and beaten by the police and being put in jail for long terms of imprisonment just because they were struggling against the war in Vietnam which we felt a great deal of responsibility for ourselves. That was the reason why in 1969, I believe it was in June 1969, a number of foreigners in Japan founded the Gaikokujin Beheiren, which I also joined and was active in for more than a year until I left Japan in December of 1970.]

JW: Would you care to say who the founders were.

DP: Yeas, as I recall, the founders were Doug Lummis and Stefano Bellieni, Doug Lummis is an American who at that time was studying in Japan I think. He was married to a Japanese. Stefano Bellieni is an Italian. He was more radical than Doug Lummis at that time, and I think he was interested in the Zenokyo movement. The Zenokyo movement was a movement of non-sect radicals that had sprung up on the campuses in Japan. It was a movement which disclaimed, in a way, the roll of political ideology and was more interested in evolving new forms of struggle without hierarchical leadership and without rigid ideological barriers. He was interested in that because his Japanese wife was involved in the Zenokyo movement on one of the campuses, I forget which one. He had come to Japan in order to marry her and while he was there he joined with Doug Lummis and some Japanese to form the Gaikokujin Beheiren. One of the English speaking leaders of the Beheiren, his name was Muto, Muto Ichiyo, was also very instrumental in starting up the Gaikokujin Beheiren group.

JW: Can you talk a little about the leadership of the Nihonjin Beheiren. Where were they coming from?

DP: Well it was a very loosely organized type of a group more or less like a coalition, and basically it consisted of just local groups, there was a Beheiren chapter in almost every city in Japan, and in Tokyo there were many chapters in various parts of the city. There was a Shinjuku Beheiren and an Nakano Beheiren and then there were a lot of very, very old groups that had existed for years, they even dated back to 1960 some of them. Some of the groups, for instance, had grown out of the Security Treaty struggles in 1960. They were just spontaneously formed by groups of citizens that had gone out into the street and demonstrated without any leadership or any plan, and something about the motivation bound them all together and they had continued throughout the years, for almost ten years, to meet together regularly and to demonstrate occasionally about these various issues. There are many of these citizen groups including some which did have some ideology like some pacifist groups and non-violent groups, there were even some Christian groups; there were groups at universities also of Beheiren students who weren't affiliated with any sects, but they usually were a very small, tiny minority on the campus because the sects commanded massive followings and the Beheiren did not. Anyhow, all of these people would get together and have their own Beheiren rallies which included some students and some citizens. So, the group didn't have any cohesive organization, it was the exact opposite of a hierarchy, but they had a central office which was eventually located at a place called Kagurazaka, in the second floor of a building and this is where all of the

representatives of all the various members of the coalition were gathered, I think every Tuesday night, regularly to get together and decide what they wanted to do.

The prime mover of this organization was a novelist called Oda Makoto who had spent considerable time in the United States. He had written some books about his experiences when he was traveling in the United States way back in the early 1960s. It seems to me he began to write his novels maybe in the late '50s and certainly in the 1960s, and they were quite popular among the younger Japanese at that time because he was one of the first people in the post war period who broke out of Japan and just went around the world traveling just to see what the world was like, which was something the Japanese hadn't been able to do for a long time during the occupation. He was one of the first people that broke out of Japan and went around looking at the world with a novel sort of unbiased view, and his novels were very popular, not only novels but also travel reports that he wrote. So, he was one of the prime movers of this Beheiren coalition that emerged in 1965. I think that his idea the very beginning was that he wanted to spur the Communist Party and the Socialist Party into action. He sort of thought that the labor unions and these established left wing parties were not doing anything and he wanted to spur them into action, so he just took it upon himself to issue appeals to try to get people to come out into the streets and demonstrate with him. Later on it became obvious that that was what he was intending to do because recently he has been allying himself more or less with the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. There is a sort of pattern that emerges about his activities. See, he isn't affiliated in any way with any political party and he is sort of an anarchist, he doesn't really believe in government. He thinks that the less government the better. He's that sort of a person, very anarchical in his outlook but, he also sort of wants to galvanize the Socialist Party and the Communist Party to take action and that's what he's doing right now. However, at that time it was pretty obvious that the Communist Party and the Socialist Party were not interested, and they wouldn't cooperate with him because of the other alliances that he'd formed. The other people that he sort of allied himself with were people who were old Communists who had been in the Communist Party for just decades and who were very, very experienced in manipulative activities in the Peace movement.

The Peace movement in Japan dates back to the early 1950s, I should think, to the struggles against atomic bomb testing. Throughout the years, there had been a number of very tragic splits in this movement because of the influences of the Communist and the Socialist Parties, and then the splits in the World Communist movement between Russia and China had a very tragic divisive effect on the Japanese Peace movement. It turned out that there were something like three or four different anti-war groups in Japan which were always fighting with each other about whether they should condemn Russia and the Chinese nuclear testing in the same way as they condemned American nuclear testing. It was a very, very sterile type of a debate and it really split the movement, divided the movement and hamstrung everybody and prevented anybody from doing anything. But, these movements, the established sort of Communist and Socialist anti-war movement, still exist in Japan; they still mobilize perhaps millions of people, but they're very ineffective because they only want to pass resolutions and hand in petitions and have peaceful demonstrations which are just on the order of a sort of mob in the streets.

That movement of course was certainly valid at that time, during the 1950s and the early '60s shall we say, but especially after 1967 that type of movement became increasingly irrelevant to the youth because it was mostly middle-aged people who

were under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. Both of those parties are electoral parties, they're interested in more and more votes in the elections, they're basically not interested in any type of energetic, forceful type of struggle and they still oppose it. In a way, they sort of tend to side with the police against the radical students and they regard Oda Makoto as being very adventurist, allying himself with this sort of activity.

As I was saying, during all these years there had been a number of groups that split off from the Communist Party because of various debates and splits that occurred in the World Communist movement. One of these debates was when the JCP was becoming Maoist, I think this was in 1962, I can't remember, at any rate there were a number of people that were either expelled or that left the Communist Party and they called themselves the Structural Reformists. Their ideology at that time was based on Togliatti's ideas in Italy. They believed, evidently, that by nationalizing the industries and by increasing the weight of the nationalized sector in the economy, it was possible to change the structure of capitalism so that the transition to Socialism could be accomplished peacefully by means of elections, and it was called a sort of a parliamentary road to Socialism and at that time these parties espoused that viewpoint. They were basically a rather unstable type of a political group and they changed their ideas very frequently after they left the Communist Party and later on at the time that I'm referring to, 1967 and 1968, the Communist Party had renounced its previous Maoism and now was moving in that same direction that they had been moving before. The Communist Party had become a very, very legalistic and parliamentaristic, in fact a conservative force in Japanese politics, whereas the Socialist Party was slightly more leftist than the Communist Party. The Socialist Party to this day has maintained very close ties with North Korea, the Chinese People's Republic, and North Vietnam, and also with the Soviet Union, believe it or not. The Communist Party, on the other hand, has broken with all the other Communist Parties practically in the world.

JW: Except Italy.

DP: I'm not sure; at one time they were very interested in Allende in Chile, maybe sort of wanted to pattern themselves after Allende in Chile, it was pretty obvious that their idea in Japan was to establish a government in Japan similar to Allende's in Chile. When Allende was overthrown, it threw them into panic of course.

But anyway, in the meantime one of the Structural Reformist groups had formed itself into a group calling itself the Communist Workers Party, and two of the leaders of the Communist Workers Party were Muto Ichio and Yoshikawa Yuichi, both of whom have had immense experience in the past in the Communist Party's peace movement and they were very, very well acquainted with all the techniques of manipulating citizen's groups in the peace movement. I presume that they had arrived at a policy of participating in the Beheiren approximately in the same way that they had in the peace movement of the Communist Party, and so they were interested in going along with Oda Mokoto and being in the leadership of the Beheiren. I don't think he was on the payroll of the Beheiren, but he was a person who was more or less in charge of all the publications and of the decision making and the mechanical aspects of the work. He was always in the office, he would apply to the police for permission to have a demonstration; he was very influential in the organization, But I don't think that he intruded his own ideas too much on the movement. Muto, however, who was the only one who knew much English, was very closely connected with our foreigners group and he tried to exert his influence on our publications to a great degree.

JW: What did you publish, now, as the Gaikokujin Beheiren?

DP: In 1969 we began publishing something called *AMPO* which we thought was going to be the organ of the Beheiren and the Gaikokujin Beheiren, and reflect both the Beheiren's and the Gaikokujin Beheiren. We were interested in giving publicity to the GI movement and to any kind of activity that was aimed against the war in Vietnam. The first couple of issues were put out with the active support of Muto, who somehow found the money and arranged for all the technical things to be done like typing. We did most of the writing ourselves and I was one of the persons that did a lot of the translating.

The first issue was published in November 1969 and we had been preparing it for several months before that. We had been founded in June, and we had begun working on the first issue soon after that. We continued to publish articles about all these various struggles, the farmers' struggles, the struggles of the Vietnamese students and GI organizing. We also published a few analyses of elections and about Korea and various other things that were going on in Asia. We began to do a number of interview which I thought were interesting because they gave insight into the thinking of various types of activists. For instance there was an interview that I worked on with a Korean woman who was a leader in the Korean Community in Japan, and there was another interesting interview with a student leader at Nihon University whose name was Akita; there was this interview with a student who engaged in legal struggles to protect students against repression. We were just trying to make it man interesting publication which would deal with struggle and with people who were engaged in the struggle. Also, we wanted to make it our own organ so we could publish our own articles and express our own opinions in it.

JW: So how long did you control the *AMPO*; you said before that eventually the power behind the *AMPO* gravitated from the Gaikokujin Beheiren to the Nihonjin Beheiren.

DP: I think that basically we maintained our control until we had to leave the country. Most of us were forced to leave the country at the end of 1970, of course some people had left before that because of their own commitments. The people who were active in the publication were myself and Doug Lummis and then there were some Japanese also who were helping us. These Japanese had been brought in by Muto, you see, and evidently they would more or less reflect Muto's viewpoint. It was technically very difficult for just two foreigners alone in Japan to put out a publication, we needed people that could type and that could set print and do the production aspect of it. We knew of course that if we became too independent of Muto, we would not be able to count on Muto and his friends for technical assistance. We'd have to put up all the money and arrange for the printing, and we didn't have that much money at all. It became pretty obvious that Muto and his group had certain ideas about *AMPO*, they wanted to turn it into sort of a regular magazine that would reflect the current advance in East Asia from a radical viewpoint. His design was to make it into a publication that would not be the organ of our group, not the organ of Gaikokujin Beheiren, but a sort of general magazine that would reflect current events in East Asia. So, there was a divergence between some of us and Muto on this point. Doug Lummis tended to side mostly with Muto throughout these debates, he was very uncritical about Muto and it seemed as if he was sort of accepting Muto as his mentor in all of this. Eventually after we left the country, someone had to carry on the publication and of course it was Muto because he

was there, so he took the publication away from Beheiren” power and it became an organ of some other type of organization that he set up himself.

After we left the country in late 1970, the Gaikokujin Beheiren ceased to exist because so many of the members, the very active members, had left the country and also, I think, because many of them were demoralized because of the intense ideological debates that had taken place within the membership. The debates that occurred mainly amounted to a split between what I’d guess you’d call a sort of “Right Wing” and a sort of “Left Wing”, I and about four others or maybe five others. The others that were associated with me were students mostly, American students who were studying in Japan and who were engaged in student struggles on one of the campuses in Japan. They and I sort of came to a basic agreement about the direction that we wanted to move in and we thought that the only possible direction that we could ever go in would be to cement our alliance with the people of Japan, the students and workers who were actually engaged in these forceful struggles that I’ve been talking about. We didn’t necessarily want to side with one or the other of the sects, but it was necessary we thought to take a certain stand about what was going on in the country and we wanted to make our influence, if we had any, felt on the side of the left forces in Japan, in other words, the forces of the revolutionary left in Japan. So, we were pretty committed to the idea of coming out openly in support of these revolutionary struggles that we thought were being developed in Japan before our eyes. We couldn’t really remain indifferent to them. But the other groups in our organization was composed mainly of persons who were more liberal in their outlook, who didn’t have a political ideology or who weren’t even interested in ideology and who saw the anti-war movement in pretty much the same way the Beheiren movement saw it, as just being a sort of an unorganized spontaneous movement of people who were united by their indignation against bombings and against military bases, against the war. Our viewpoint about that was that that type of indignation is nothing but a starting point in one’s political education and it’s absolutely necessary to do something to raise the political consciousness of the people who were in movements like that. So, eventually, we became very critical about the whole idea behind Beheiren because it seemed to be an attempt to just fix permanently, solidify, that naïve kind of a spontaneous indignation. I think that our criticism of the Beheiren movement remains pretty valid to this day because even in this country you can see exactly what that type of movement will lead to. It very seldom leads to any heightening of political consciousness. It doesn’t seem to be able to perpetuate itself. So we thought we would like to ally ourselves more with the people who were trying to be serious revolutionaries rather than with the citizens’ groups. We began to develop very serious differences with the whole ideology of the citizens’ movement, citizen movementism. We became openly critical of it, and also we noticed the manipulative role that was being played in this organization by people that did have revolutionary ideology and who were concealing it in an effort to infiltrate the citizens’ movement and guide it in the direction that they wanted it to go.

JW: People like Muto?

DP: Yes.

JW: Would you talk about anybody else who was into Beheiren not for the broad appeal but for specific purposes, who wanted to use it for a base of power to move from, or like you say, to guide it in a certain direction.

DP: You mean of the Japanese?

JW: Yes, the Japanese.

DP: Well, the only people I could identify that were trying to do that were the people that were in this Communist Workers Party, Muto and Yoshikawa. Those are the only people that I was aware of. I think what they had in mind was something like what I mentioned before. There was the developing of a three-way alliance, the citizens, the workers and the students, and they sort of saw the Beheiren as becoming a member of that coalition. But during the process of building that type of coalition of the various left wing factions, a very tragic situation broke out because many of the sects, student sects mainly, were totally unable to work together. The mutual criticism and rivalry between the sects became so intense that violence would very often erupt between one sect and another sect, and it became impossible to have joint rallies which could be attended by all the sects without violence occurring. So, the situation became very, very complicated since there was constant manipulation and constant maneuvering as all kinds of groups were trying to maneuver their way into the position of being the big cheese in this coalition. As a result of that finally, all of the coalition just collapsed. I don't remember exactly when the coalition finally collapsed entirely, but I think it was at the end of 1970 or early in 1971. The student groups became unable to hold joint rallies and they all began to split up. There was a centrifugal sort of a thing that came into existence and they just broke up into about four or five different very, very antagonistic groupings. That situation still continues today and it's no longer possible to have joint rallies in Japan anymore because all the groups are literally at each other's throat.

Many, many people have lost their lives to actual assassinations and murders and very serious injuries have occurred with alarming regularity throughout the left wing movement. I think a great deal of that has to do with police infiltrators into the groups. The police will send people into these groups and try to make them into the leaders and then try to foment fighting between one group and another. They'll use telephones, and they'll use informers and they'll use anything that they can to foment this sort of thing, but even though the police are trying to do that all the time, it couldn't happen if these groups didn't want it to, I don't think.

There is a certain tendency among all of the groups in Japan to regard the other groups as being counter revolutionary. So they'll all call each other these names until it gets to the point where they just cannot relate to each other in a rational way. This was one of the things the Beheiren movement was founded to counteract. The Zenokyo movement too was especially based on the idea that sectarianism and fanaticism really doesn't have any place in the political movement and that it's an aberration that ought to be overcome somehow. They were trying to overcome all of this wildness, you know, but terrorism and fanaticism and dogmatism sort of won out in the end. That was after we left the country, but we could see it coming pretty clearly. So we were trying to sort of steer a middle course. We would attend all of the joint rallies, and we would try to attend all the other rallies that we could, irrespective of who it was sponsoring them. But, in time we sort of had to take a stand about certain things and our group did become closely allied with one particular sect called the Revolutionary Marxist sect.

JW: Kakumaru.

DP: Yes. I personally think that a lot of very serious mistakes have been made by the leaders of all of the sects in political work, political mistakes which have had very, very serious consequences for their movement. I personally am not at all uncritical about what's happened in Japan, but at that time the situation hadn't deteriorated to this degree and it was still possible to hope anyway that a normal situation might emerge with time.

JW: Can you talk now about some of the things you did with the Gaikokujin Beheiren in Japan?

DP: Yes. One of the things we did was that when the so-called Moratorium Movement was happening the United States in 1970, we decided to appeal to the Americans in Japan and try to do something in the line of a mobilization committee, and so we called ourselves the Tokyo Mobilization Committee and we had a number of activities on the weekend of May 15 and 16, 1970. So many things happened, it's kind of difficult to remember all of them. We planned it pretty well and we were going to have a rally, a number of rallies as a matter of fact. The main theme in our activities was national anti-war solidarity. This was when Cambodia was invaded and also that was when the massacre happened at Kent State. I think that was probably the high point in the anti-war movement, at least we thought it was at that time in Japan. We began that by protest activities on May 15 at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I think that three of us went into the embassy and tried to deliver a protest statement to the embassy while about seventy others were leafleting and were making impromptu speeches to Americans outside the embassy.

JW: Are these all Gaijins now, the seventy three or seventy four of you?

DP: I think so, yes. What happened was that we were actually trying to get into the embassy to have a teach-in inside the American Embassy, to shut down the embassy, to call for a halt in the route embassy business. We thought that we ought to protest the "business as usual" atmosphere that was going on in the embassy. We wanted to begin dialogue between American citizens in Tokyo and the embassy. We did get inside the embassy, some of us did, but the embassy called the Japanese riot police to prevent the Americans from getting in to have a teach-in, and some of the people who were trying to get into the embassy were brutally treated. One of them was even taken to a police station for questioning. Of course, we immediately followed him and succeed in getting him released from the police station where he was being held. But, this was just a preview. This was on May 15. On May 16 we had a rally and demonstration which was sponsored by ourselves and the rally was attended by about 1,500 people. Some of them were from the student sects, and many of them were Beheiren people and other citizens' groups. We had speeches by representatives of Vietnamese students and representatives of Korean residents in Japan, and we had a speech by Konishi who was a former Japanese soldier, and was the leader of the resistance movement in the Japanese military.

JW: Konishi Makoto.

DP: Yes, Konishi Makoto. After that we went on a demonstration. We passed in front of the American Embassy and at that time one of our members was trying to present a petition to the embassy and he was restrained by the riot police, so we tried stage a sit-down to protest against this. Also, the newspaper and magazine photographers that were trying to cover the demonstration were brutally manhandled and one of the photographers that was trying to take pictures of this was injured by the police and had to be hospitalized. Six of the

Japanese participants in the demonstration were arrested during this demonstration, which was a rather large number for such a small demonstration. The local Japanese press clubs lodged a lot of formal protests against the police for what they did, not to the demonstrators but to the newspaper men. We thought that it was quite an interesting rally and demonstration because it was the first joint Japanese-American action that was every organized by Americans in Japan and it had a pretty broad political make-up. It included all the Americans, the liberals and the radicals, and it also included a major section of the different types of Japanese peace movements. Also, we were successful in maintaining a militant tone in the demonstration. Moreover, we also had American high school students in Japan who were making their first appearance in any kind of an anti-war rally, and it turned out they were mostly sons and daughters of American military people. They also were determined to participate in this action. In the evening, we participated in a rally that was sponsored by Beheiren to support the American resistance movement. It was attended by about 4000 people. It seemed rather strange that there were more people at this rally than there had been at the demonstration. But it was addressed by someone from the new mobilization committee and a novelist and by Oda Makoto. We showed newsreels of the GI resistance movement.

JW: This was a rally to support GI resistance, then.

DP: Yes. The next action we had was a July 4th rally. It was supposed to be a rally of solidarity of the Japanese and American people in support of the Japanese and American anti-war GIs and this was not a demonstration but it was just an evening rally. It was attended by quite a large number of people, maybe 4,000 or 5,000 people. We had speeches by Konishi and by some other people that were active in the anti-war movement and we showed some films about the anti-war movement. That, I think, was the last of those large rallies that we ever had. Of course, many of the people in our group were contributing to and playing an active part in the GI movement on the American military bases in Japan. The Pacific Counseling Service sent a number of people to work with GIs and we were cooperating closely with them. In fact, generally speaking, our activities in time became more or less subordinate to the work of the PCS because we realized that that type of work was more important in the long run than carrying on the struggles about immigration matters. We were all aliens in the country and the Japanese government was constantly trying to deport us, and so most of our time was taken up with struggling against deportation. A lot of people had spent many years in court in these various court struggles. Of course, I think that's very important also, but in the long run we realized that the anti-war movement had to be carried on in that type of direction where we would have to give support to the anti-war GIs that were in Japan.

Most of us were forced to leave the country. Three of the American students who came from the University of California as exchange students had been engaged in the campus struggles in Japan since August 1969. They were able to stay in Japan until the early part of 1971. I think they came back to this country in May 1971. They were actually deported from Japan. I had to leave the country on December 1st, 1970. Another member of our group, his name is Ron McLean, came to Japan in May 1969 and he was working as an English language teacher and studying Japanese music. He participated in our activities and was refused an extension of his visa in May 1970. He was told at that time to leave the country by September. He went to court and finally won a favorable decision in September 1970 and eventually the case went up to the appeals court the court

decided after many, many months that Ron McLean had not done anything that was illegal, and there was some kind of a decision about freedom of speech. The court found that participating in anti-war activities was not grounds for deportation because it didn't amount to interference with Japanese internal politics. So, he was able to remain Japan. Another one of our members called Brian Victoria, who is a Buddhist priest, had been living in Japan for a number of years and in June 1969 he and another two or three Americans went on a good will voyage to China and after they returned they were denied an extension of their visas. They all went into court about that, and several times Brian was arrested and imprisoned by the immigration authorities. I'm not exactly sure what the status of his case is, but he was the type of person who would rather enjoy being in court having protracted legal battles going on.

JW: It's not hard to do in Japan, protracting legal battles.

DP: Yeah, they all become rather protracted in Japan. But anyway, as long as he was in court and the final decision hadn't come down, he kept appealing about something or other. He realized that it would be possible for him to stay, and I think he still is in Japan on that basis, and I'm not exactly sure what his legal status, but Ron McLean definitely won his case and his favorable decision was considered to be quite significant because it legalized anti-war activities on the part of foreigners.

This was another divergence in our viewpoints; we didn't attach very much importance to court struggles and if it were possible, we would prefer to engage in direct, forceful struggles to force the government to do something, and even though we knew that we would be unsuccessful in the long run, we hoped that we could mobilize large enough numbers of people in forcible struggle. That was what we were trying to do. We didn't really think that going to court in itself was very significant. The other people, like Brian Victoria and Ron McLean, had a civil libertarian sort of liberal type of attitude about the whole thing. They were really law-abiding, good people, that didn't intend to break the law and were being unjustly persecuted because of their moral or perhaps religious stand against the war. I personally thought that that actually was the wrong approach to carrying on an anti-war struggle and we had a lot of debates about that. But, of course, each person in our group had to make his own decision about what exactly to do.

JW: Are you going to talk about the GI work?

DP: A whole delegation of American students arrived in August 1969 from the University of California under the Education Abroad Program, and were going to study at the International Christian University which is in the suburbs of Tokyo, it's called ICU. At that time there were student struggles and the students had occupied some of the buildings on the university campus and most of the classes were not being held. The school had sort of been shut down. About six of the American students who had just recently arrived without knowing too much about exactly what was going on, decided that they wouldn't attend classes while a student struggle was in progress because they felt that it amounted to strike breaking on their part. They thought that it was necessary to show some solidarity with the Japanese students even though they didn't know all the background of the struggle. So, they did join the campus struggles, and as a result of that, they were very summarily expelled from the program by the director of the program. That automatically meant expulsion from the University of California and also expulsion from ICU, though it didn't

necessarily mean that they had to leave the country because they already had a visa for one year as students. They knew that they could stay in the country for about a year until that expired. At the beginning, there were six of them and then a few of them left the country and went back voluntarily for various reasons. Some of them became demoralized and had to leave the struggle or decided to register or something. The administration, of course, was always very careful to provide ways by which they could get back in if they wanted to compromise on certain things. But three students held out to the very end, all three were women. While they were continuing to struggle on campus with the Japanese students they joined the Gaikokujin Beheiren and were doing a lot of GI work around the Tokyo area. It was quite easy for me to relate to them because we seemed to agree on almost all of the issues and, in time, we identified more and more closely in our aims within the Gaikokujin Beheiren. We sort of formed a left wing. There were others also that were at ICU who hadn't been the victims of the repressive move on the part of the authorities and they too were coming to our meetings. All together there were about five or six radicalized American students from ICU coming regularly to the Gaikokujin meetings and working with us and doing GI work and helping to put out the publications. All in all, it was a pretty good group that we had put together and we were more cohesive and had, I think, more relevant ideas than some other people in the group who we thought were more interested in publicity or who didn't have any political consciousness to speak of at all. It boiled down to opposition between people who were interested in writing letters to newspapers and appealing to their standards, and people who see some meaning in forming an international alliance between revolutionary groups on both sides of the Pacific and really building some kind of a movement which would presumably be revolutionary. That was the difference.

I think that the things I have been saying kind of lead to a number of questions and I know that you're aware of the difficulties that we were having, and perhaps the difficulties that we created for other people who were more interested in the GI movement. We were always working, at least the three members I was talking about, were working very closely with the PCS and were doing a lot of GI work. We didn't have any doubts about the meaning and the significance of the GI work but at the same time I think we were rather critical of certain ideas about the GI movement that we encountered. Of course, we knew that it was necessary to approach the GI movement in a non-ideological fashion and we knew that the GIs were tired of violence and fighting and warfare and so forth. We knew that we couldn't apply the same criteria that we had for the Japanese left wing movement, which was all very gung-ho and militant and all that, immediately to the GIs, but we really hoped that it would be possible to eventually create some kind of movement that wouldn't only be aimed at stopping the war but which would somehow produce revolutionary consciousness among the broad masses of American GIs that would, after they came home, extend to the American people in general. That's what we hoped that we could accomplish eventually. The question is, whether we were wise in hoping that or not. I can't really speak for the PCS or for the other people in the GI movement because I don't know exactly what they were aiming at, but I presume that there was a great deal of, a spectrum of, different ideological perspectives on their parts also, and that they didn't have any one single goal that they were trying to accomplish.

As I think back over the whole situation, it seems kind of confused and I don't know whether we really accomplished anything that was very lasting while we were in Japan.

JW: You were talking about your meetings, and I have a question here concerning both the Gaikokujin Beheiren meetings and the meetings of Beheiren in general that took place every Tuesday night at Kagurazawa. Were these meetings wide open to the public or were they ever restricted?

DP: They were all open as far as I know. Our meetings were all open to any foreigners that wanted to come to them and we had no way of knowing who the people were who came to the meetings. In time, as we had many, many meetings every week, we began to know each other pretty well, so there were a lot of things that we didn't have to talk about at the meetings because we understood what each other's personality was and what their position was. If someone new would come to the meeting, we would want to know who they were and when they had arrived and what they were doing, and we would usually ask them to sort of introduce themselves. Usually, they were people that had perfectly valid reasons for being at the meeting, usually people who had just arrived from the United States and who had been doing anti-war work there, or were in some organization. Sometimes GIs would come to our meetings, but not very often. As far as I know, there was never any reason to regret having open meetings, and even if the meetings hadn't been completely open, I don't think that would have made much difference because we weren't trying to do anything that was illegal. There were some times, of course, when we had to be careful. When we were planning these rallies and demonstration we would prefer not to let the police know exactly what we were going to do. For example, when we were trying to go into the embassy and hold a teach-in inside the embassy, we didn't want the police to know that we were going to do that. But, I imagine that the police had ways of finding out. I'm sure that the offices, or at least the telephones, were bugged, obviously. So, we couldn't talk very openly on the telephone at the Beheiren office, ever. It's entirely possible that the whole office, the building, was bugged or something because they seemed to know what was going on pretty well. One of the problems with meetings at the Beheiren office was that it was right opposite from a subway station and it seemed that the office itself was under surveillance by the police. The police would probably take pictures of everyone that went in and out of the office. If a new person would come to a meeting at that office, they would always be followed by the police. A plain-clothes detective would follow every new person after the meeting and wait until the person got off of the train at his destination and then after that person was alone, after he said good bye to everyone else, he would be questioned. He wouldn't be harassed in particular, but they would want to know who he was and so they get his alien registration card and write down the name and address and everything from that. So, almost everyone who came to a meeting at that office was sooner or later known to the police. We knew exactly what was going to happen after we left the place because we would always be followed. But, of course, the police knew who we were, the regular people, and they didn't care much about that except occasionally there would be times when the police would, for some reason, begin to follow us around. If I was going to a meeting, I would ditch these policemen that were following me, which was very easy to do. I would run in quickly and get on another train and leave them behind me. I did have to be pretty careful about things like that because the police were definitely following me around. Eventually, they began to make threatening phone calls, and that was just before I left, like in September or October. The phone would

ring, and there would be people threatening me on the telephone. This was the police doing this.

APPENDIX III

INTERVIEW OF BRUCE HARTFORD

BY JERRY WEST ON 31 MARCH AND 03 APRIL

1975 IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

BH: Bruce Hartford is my name and I was born in Los Angeles to a working-class family. I'm 31, and I was a civil rights worker first in Los Angeles, and then for two years in Mississippi and Alabama, working with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the group that Martin King was head of. I did that for a couple of years and was active in the anti-war movement. I helped organize in 1967 the two big, first really giant anti-war demonstrations. One in New York on April 15 and then one at the Pentagon in the fall. After that I went to college at San Francisco State and was active in Students for a Democratic Society. There was a big student strike at the State College, which I was involved in. While I was going to school I worked as a longshoreman, and that was how I supported myself. After I finished at State, I didn't graduate, but after I stopped going there, I continued to work as a longshoreman and continued to do anti-war activity among longshoremen and stuff like that. I became involved with the struggle on the Coral Sea, the Stop Our Ship movement it was called, SOS. I became active in that and through that became active in a group called Support Our Soldiers, which was a general GI movement support group. After working with that for a while, I went to Asia to work at Iwakuni.

JW: You went to Iwakuni then with PCS?

BH: Right.

JW: When did you arrive in Iwakuni?

BH: August of '72.

JW: Did you have any contact with the Beheiren people?

BH: Well, I don't know if it was like this when you were there, but there was a chapter of Beheiren at Iwakuni. There were a lot of local chapters of Beheiren all through Japan and this chapter of Beheiren was basically people who had come from other parts of Japan to work with the GI movement in Iwakuni. Iwakuni is in Yamaguchi prefecture. Yamaguchi is pretty conservative as prefectures go, sort of described as the "Alabama of Japan." You know, Hiroshima and Yamaguchi and that area. There wasn't really a local Beheiren except in Hiroshima, the Beheiren in Iwakuni was mostly ex-students, student-aged type people who had gotten involved in Beheiren while they were students or young workers and had volunteered to come to Iwakuni and to do GI work. Of course, we worked with them very closely. Occasionally the honchos from Tokyo would come by and we'd see them but basically we didn't have much of a working relationship with them.

JW: Did you know the Rev. Iwai?

BH: Yeah.

JW: What kind of a relationship did the Gis have with Iwai and his church at this time?

BH: Not much.

JW: Did you ever meet Rev. McWilliams?

BH: Yeah.

JW: Can you say anything about him?

BH: Well, he's a nice guy, but a little screwy. He was never clear about what he was driving at. Or if he was clear, it didn't seem to make much sense or relate to what was going on. But he was a real nice guy.

JW: He was a real pacifist.

BH: Yeah...but I think that things were different when we were there from when you were there because we had a center. There was a much more organized project. Were there civilians there when you were there?

JW: Just Jan and Annie and Sid and then Barbara Bye.

BH: And they were all living in Iwakuni?

JW: Well they were there at different times. Sid was in Tokyo and he came down and saw us a couple of times.

BH: And Jan and Annie lived in Nishi Iwakuni up the river by the park?

JW: I don't know where they lived. We got a house downtown for Barbara Bye in RTO, and we had a house with the Japanese out in Kintai by the park for the *Semper Fi* staff. We didn't live there, but it was kind of like a flop place.

BH: Well, after they put the Hobbit off-limits, we rented a house right near the main gate.

JW: Can we put a date on it? After they put the Hobbit off-limits when?

BH: The Hobbit went off-limits in, I think it was July of '72, maybe it was June; June or July of '72, so we rented a house near the main gate in that off-base housing tract area, and that became the *Semper Fi* house which was used as the movement center. I lived there. The house was rented a little bit before I got there. The civilian staff of PCS lived there and that was where the library was and where the meetings were and where the Fi was put together and all that kind of stuff. Some of the Beheiren people lived there too.

JW: What kind of relationship did you have with McWilliams, if any?

BH: Nothing really beyond saying hello on the street and occasionally if we ever had a movie, which was practically never, we would borrow his projector. We just saw him around, not much of a relationship at all. He came over once or twice. They have this Serendipity center which is kind of a religious place, and we went over there a couple of times. They were afraid to have us come over there because they had a relationship with the base chaplain and they were afraid if it was known that *Semper Fi* people came to the Serendipity they would lose their accreditation with the base.

JW: He was back in good with the base at this time?

BH: Well, his wife was running and he was off doing something else, he was hardly ever around there.

JW: He was banned from the base in '70.

BH: I think he may have still been banned and it was just that his wife wasn't or something, or that they had base chaplains working with the Serendipity or something like that. I never went into it too deeply because I kind of felt that they didn't want us to.

JW: I guess Iwai and the rest of the Kyodan were tied in with that more than they were with you.

BH: Well, yeah, but they worked fairly closely with the Beheiren. But because we had our own center, and our own printing facilities and stuff, there was much less of a role for them than in earlier years. They still had a hand in, though, and we still cooperated on different projects when something came up.

JW: What kind of projects?

BH: Oh well, like on the '72 Hiroshima Day a delegation of GIs went there against base orders. I mean everyone was confined to base, but people still went with signs. That was partly sponsored by and supported by the Beheiren and local people in Iwakuni and in Hiroshima and we went as a group. Another time later on we went on a tour of Peace Park as a special thing, and then they organized a tour of all the military bases both Japanese and American in the Hiroshima area, which we supported and then they had some demonstrations which we supported and a couple of other things like that, like maybe a speaker would come co-sponsored. We had some rock concerts and a barbeque, sort of a joint enterprise kind of thing. But day to day there wasn't a thing.

JW: That's with the church?

BH: With any of the churches and several other ministers and missionaries who were active. You see, after they put the Hobbit off-limits, naturally the number of GIs dropped who started going there and also about that time the Beheiren people were beginning to make in-roads among the Iwakuni people and so they increased the amount of programs and activity that they were doing with the people of Iwakuni. Of course, Iwai and the other ministers then did a lot of work around that aspect so they had a much closer relationship with the Hobbit than they did with the GI movement.

JW: The Hobbit then became a Japanese center after it was put off-limits, more or less?

BH: Well, there was still a lot of interconnection. My partner lived at the Hobbit and our printing facilities were at the Hobbit. We would have meetings between us and Beheiren there. Also some of the Beheiren people lived at the GI house because we wanted to keep ties. That was deliberately done for that reason. The cadre GIs, that is the GI activists, they went to the Hobbit a lot, and then, of course, there was collaboration on the Hobbit cases. The Hobbit people helped to pass out the Fi and put up posters: there was an interchange but the main thrust of their activities shifted more and more toward the Japanese community.

JW: When you say Hobbit people, you mean Beheiren?

BH: Yeah. We never called them Beheiren particularly; we called them JATEC or the Hobbit people or something like that.

JW: You said the printing stuff was at the Hobbit at that time. It was still Beheiren's mimeocutter and their mimeo machine?

BH: Well, it was our mimeo machine.

JW: It was your mimeo machine? You had purchased one by then. I know that when I was there, we were doing the printing at Hiroshima University.

BH: Right. It was used by both groups but it was our machine, not that it really makes any difference. They used it as much as we did, but it wasn't the machine at Hiroshima, it was a different machine, and we had a cutter too.

JW: How often were you putting out the *Fi*?

BH: Every payday, twice a month, like clockwork.

JW: Were you still putting out the folded sheet or had you gone to the stapled?

BH: The stapled. The full sheet, about the size of the *Daily News* in New York or something like that, but not folded over.

JW: What was the reasoning behind that? Was it easier labor-wise or what?

BH: Less margins, you got more words to the page because you didn't have all those margins. Actually, it was much harder to read the full sheet, but you, you couldn't get it all in, so we went that route.

JW: We went the other way because it was easier to handle, and we didn't have to staple anything.

BH: By this time there were so many people involved that on *Fi* nights there would be 15, maybe 20 people collating, stapling, folding, doing all that kind of thing. It would be a big party, a big operation, it took us a couple of hours to put it together after printing.

JW: What was your distribution?

BH: Well, we printed about 800-1000 of which about 500 got onto the base, and another 75-200 were subscriptions to mostly Marine in 'Nam or Thailand or the Philippine Islands, along with a few sailors. Roughly 100-150 went to other peace organizations and to exchanges with other newspapers and then Beheiren also took a number of them, a lot, and spread them around to different sources and places.

JW: Beheiren was spreading them around Japan?

BH: Right.

JW: Were they helping you distribute them on the streets in Iwakuni?

BH: Well, yes. Shortly after I arrived, we were able to force a thing where GIs were able to distribute the papers off base which lasted for about a year, for about three or four months after I left. Once that happened, the number of Beheiren people that helped distribute went down, although there were always some, two or three there. We felt it was better to have as many GIs passing it out as possible because that increased their involvement in the movement. They felt more like it was their paper. You know, if had seven or eight GIs passing it out on Four Corners, and on the strip, it wouldn't make any sense to have another four or five Beheiren people.

JW: Well then I guess at this time the GI movement was growing considerably, and the corresponding Beheiren involvement was decreasing.

BH: Right. Also, the fact that the Hobbit was off-limits made it difficult for Beheiren. They were tied to the Hobbit because they had to run their programs and

function as a restaurant which meant they were tied to cooking and cleaning and stuff like that. They weren't free to do a lot of stuff, so that cut down their ability to participate. Also, we were concentrating more on GIs and the language problem was certainly an obstacle. For example, when there was a meeting of GIs and the flow of discussion was going very good, which was good for helping organize the GIs, it meant that there was difficulty for the Beheiren people in following it because people were talking and interrupting each other. There was a lot of excitement and energy being generated, and if we had said, "Wait a minute everybody, we've got to stop and translate this, or speak slower," that would have inhibited people from getting their feelings out. So, naturally, we felt that we should put as our first priority working with the GIs and in those cases generally we tended not to try to slow down or stop the conversation. If there was a formal meeting between Beheiren and us, naturally we would make sure everything was translated, but I'm talking about general rap sessions and bullshit sessions and things like that.

JW: What kind of Beheiren activities did you support?

BH: Well, they had mostly demonstrations against the base, which we marched in a couple of times. Usually our support was getting GIs out to give them the fist and cheer and say "right on" and stuff. It was too dangerous for the GIs to actually participate in those demonstrations as demonstrators. We would stand on the sidelines and wave and cheer and clap and talk to other GIs who were seeing it and yell at the riot patrol and stuff like that.

JW: Were they letting the GIs out on the street during the demonstrations?

BH: Well, not during the big ones, but the Beheiren ones were only 15 or 20 people. Beheiren at Iwakuni wasn't very big, it was a conservative area. When the big demonstrations came up, which happened four or five times during the year, they would try to restrict the GIs to the base but if we knew about it in advance, all the GI activists would just not be on base. When the restriction came down, they would just leave a day earlier and not return or leave in the morning before they locked the gates.

JW: Were the Beheiren demonstrations more or less spontaneous in that they weren't publicized in advance, or were they publicized demonstrations?

BH: Well, they were regular, it was like every third Friday or something like that.

JW: It was such a routine then that the base knew they were coming?

BH: Oh yeah. Well, they had to get a permit you know. The base always knew when there was a demonstration coming. They always had to get a permit. This was just kind of a regular thing, it was more to maintain a Beheiren presence and more oriented to the Iwakuni people than the base.

JW: Were you there when they were flying the kites?

BH: Well, they did that once while I was there, but the conditions were not very good and it didn't work out very well. Apparently the earlier time they had done it, it had been much more successful. The weather was wrong that day, it just wasn't a good day.

JW: Were they still operating *Radio Camp Must Go* while you were there, the taped broadcast across the fence?

BH: Not very much. They did it generally if there was a big demonstration or for some of their demonstrations they would do that, but it wasn't a regular thing. I

think it wasn't a regular thing because the GIs had said, look most of the time nobody can understand what anybody is saying over that thing anyway because the sound system was so blurry. To get it high enough so that people could hear it from where they were, which was not near the fence, made it so blurry that nobody could understand what was being said.

JW: Were you there for Armed Forces Day?

BH: Yeah.

JW: It was '73, right?

BH: Yeah.

JW: What happened then, did anything happen on Armed Forces Day?

BH: Well, let's see. They had the open house. In fact they didn't have Armed Forces Day. They had Open House Day. It wasn't called Armed Forces Day.

JW: It was opened to everybody?

BH: Yeah. Except to demonstrations. Beheiren had a demonstration, some of us went on base, I went on base. I'd gotten about thirty feet from the gate when this dude comes up to me and says, "Coming to see the base, Mr Hartford?" And I says, "Yeah, I thought I'd come to Open House Day, who are you?" And he says, "Oh, I'm Inspector Shithead of the Naval Intelligence Department." I forget what his name was, anyway he was the Lord High Poobah of Naval Intelligence, and so he says, "Well, I'd be happy to give you a guided tour." I says, "Oh, that's not necessary." He says, "I insist." So I says, "All right." He gave me a whole tour of the base. He was trying to find out what I was up to and I was trying to find out what he was up to, and we kind of fenced around. There was all these cops and pigs and NIS agents around to make sure nothing happened. I wandered around and they took some pictures and I took some pictures of the, and then I went back out and helped with the demonstration. It was not a bad demonstration. There were a lot of people coming on to the base of course, they had a good presence there. It was a pretty good day.

JW: I know the last year that I was there, they had it open by invitation only, they were so afraid of demonstrations they didn't open the base up to the general public.

BH: This one was to the general public. We also had a demonstration on the Christmas bombing which was a better day. There were 40 or 50 Japanese involved in that we had about 5 or 6 GIs getting as close as possible to being involved without being busted. The Japanese had a sit-in at the gate. It was a night demonstration and a good demonstration. We put out an Extra of the Fi because of the bombing and all that.

JW: How many GIs were active at this time?

BH: How do you define active?

JW: Doing something within the organization.

BH: Oh, well, see there were so many different levels of involvement, let's say to the extent of coming by to the house and from that up. For the year I was there, let's say, it would vary from a low of four or five to a high of twenty five or thirty. It would go in cycles up and down. In terms of real activists, that is people who actually worked consistently, day in and day out, or regularly that you count on, we never dropped below a minimum of about four or five and sometimes we

were up to maybe a dozen *Semper Fi* hard core activists. We called them cadre GIs, that was our name for them. So there were anywhere from four to twelve generally.

JW: How were the *Fi*'s received, you say you distributed about 500 of them.?

BH: Let me go back to the cadre a minute. Once a GI became a cadre, he only lasted about three months before he was discharged, so there was an overlap.

In terms of how the *Fi*'s were received, I thought they were received very good. I don't know how it was when you were there, but in the entire time, the full year that I was there passing the *Fi*'s, I think only twice was any of us hassled by average GIs. I'm not talking now about Naval Intelligence or CID, but just your ordinary GIs. The first time it happened, I wasn't the one being hassled, Lana was being hassled and immediately there were 15 to 20 GIs defending her say, "Look who wants to beat this crud up?" and just hoping he would do something so they could cream him. The one time I was hassled, it was by a drunk and my biggest problem was keeping other GIs from fighting him. I said, "This man's just drunk, we'll have a big incident, you'll all get busted, stick around if we need you, but don't let him provoke you." He was running around screaming "Communists" and all this buzz. Now, of course on the other hand, we were always being hassled by CID and NIS and all that shit.

I would say that *Fi* had become pretty much of a real institution by that time, to the extent that in the *Torii Teller* they would have little jokes like for example on April Fool's Day, when they always put a listing for the television Armed Forces Network, they put that there would be a panel shown on the war sponsored by the *Semper Fi*. Every once in a while, they would allude to something that was in the *Fi* or say something about the *Fi*. It was practically an institution on the base. That was good, but I think it was also bad in that I think that we should have been more controversial. I mean we certainly were controversial, but it got to be the point where people were beginning to take the *Fi* for granted and the problem was that the existence of the *Fi* wasn't an issue. What we said they didn't like, but its existence was taken for granted, and I'm not sure that was good.

JW: I can disagree with that because I think that by having your existence accepted, you'll get spread out a lot further, you'll get a lot more exposure.

BH: But I think people tended to think less about what we were saying because they felt, "Oh, here's the *Fi*, right on..." and breeze through it but not really think about it because it was so accepted, just like reading the *Torii Teller* and the "*Stars and Lies*." They would breeze through it, you know, and it didn't mean anything. I don't think that really happened with the *Fi* but as we became more institutionalized, there was that tendency. Of course, by the time that happened, we were a pretty "militant revolutionary rag" and they certainly didn't agree with a lot of what we said, the brass didn't anyway, and the brass would try and harass the *Fi* as much as they could.

JW: It's a different world from the one I knew.

BH: Well, I think that's also because the attitude of the Marines was different, people were waking up. Realities had percolated and the work of the *Fi* had been successful too.

- JW: Did you have a lot of response as far as articles of contribution and letters were concern?
- BH: Most of the articles were written by people who came to the house, and offhand I would say roughly 40% of the articles were written by GIs and about another 40% were taken from other kinds of literature, other newspaper that we would get at the house, and the other 20% were written by civilians or Beheiren.
- JW: Who had the final say so on all the newspapers?
- BH: Usually there would be a kind of ill-defined and undefined collective. We always tried to get it more organized than that but usually we didn't. Anyway, generally, it was this collective which would pretty much decide. It usually wasn't much of a problem as our general policy was that if anybody wanted to write anything, they could put it in the *Fi* but that the *Fi* reserved the right put another article alongside of it saying why we disagreed with it. Of course, very, very few, I mean maybe once or twice in the whole year, did anybody put an article in the *Fi* who wasn't a *Fi* supported because those who were against the *Fi* wouldn't want to support the *Fi* by writing for it. It very rarely happened where we had to write an article that disagreed. Usually when it was, it was in answer to an article by someone who thought they supported what the *Fi* was for but in such a way said things that we disagreed with. Maybe, for example, they would be against the war, but write in a way that was really sexist or racist, so we would then run an article saying why we thought this was racism, what we agreed on what we disagreed on. There was only about four or five times when an article was ever rejected and usually they were rejected simply because they were so garbled nobody could understand what was being said. As far as I can recall, there was one real super-racists article I think we didn't run, but other than that it was never a problem.
- JW: Would you care to talk about the legal work that was done with the GIs, some of the problems around it and how it was organized?
- BH: Well, we took different types of cases. First there was conscientious objector cases, GIs wanting a CO type discharge. Then there would be the cases of other kinds of discharge like hardship, etc. and then also there would be the regular type of punishment cases, like those where someone was late for formation or was UA or things like that. Our policy was generally that if a GI wanted civilian representation in a court martial case, we would give it, with the exception of drug cases. It was our policy not to take a drug case unless it had some other aspect to it, like for example, if somebody who was active in the movement would be framed on drugs or something like that. That would be the only time we would handle drug cases. Then also, a lot of our cases grew out of the movement itself, from guys being harassed because of their work with the *Semper Fi*, or with VVAW, and being transferred because of this activity. Another kind of case we had a lot of was where guys were being transferred to the war zone when they did not want to go to the war zone. Sometimes what would happen was that a guy would get his transfer notice and realize that he didn't want to go, so he would come to us and we'd try to keep him from going. From there he might either become active in the movement or decide that he wanted a CO discharge. Finally, there were large cases dealing with fundamental political issues. For example, we had a big struggle to allow Marines to pass out the *Semper Fi* while they were off base, out of uniform and all that. The Marine Corps said that even on their free time off the base, they couldn't do it. Well, we fought a case, we won that case and then after I left, they put down some new

rule or something that knocked it back, I don't know what the status of that is now. But while I was there for most of the time, the Marines could pass out the *Fi*. Another example would be the Hobbit case. To me the Hobbit case just always really typified the Marine Corps "justice."

In the spring of '72, they started shipping squadrons to Thailand and Bien Hoa to take part in one of the big bombing offensives. About a week before the squadrons were moved south, of course, everybody on the base and everybody on the bar row and everybody in Iwakuni who had anything to do with GIs was talking about it, and all the bar owners were running around trying to find out which squadrons were moving so they could quickly collect all the bar checks. Everybody was uptight. Beheiren put out some leaflets saying, "Hey, you know people are being sent to Thailand," and talking about the war. Well, the brass got uptight about that we think that that's the reason they put the Hobbit off-limits. There's a law that says if the military wants to place an establishment off-limits, that it's necessary for them to go through a long procedure, notifying the owner of the establishment that they're mad at him and saying what is wrong and giving him an opportunity to correct whatever it is that's wrong, and have a hearing and all of that. Well, they did none of that with the Hobbit, later on in the case we said, "Well, why didn't you do any of that?" And they said, "Well, we didn't have to do that because the law only applies to Americans, if it's owned by a foreigner, the law doesn't count, only for American establishments." This always seemed to me a little chicken shit being as they're in Japan. But they would only follow this law for Americans. Anyway, it was also an illegal order on a number of other bases. According to Navy regulations, the guy that issued the order didn't have the authority to issue it, it was supposed to come from someone else. So there were about 15 or 20 procedural screw-ups that made the order illegal. Anyway, the order came down and was publicized and everything. This was before we had rented a house near the base to use as a center, so we had no place to put together the *Fi* except the Hobbit and if GIs were coming to help the *Fi*, they would be violating the order, so we decided to collate the *Fi* outside the Hobbit on the sidewalk. Actually, this was a little bit before I arrived, I'm saying "we" meaning the project. Anyhow, the MPs drove by and there was this real enthusiastic MP, Corporal Bailey I believe it was, who jumps out and busts this guy Bo, saying he went in the Hobbit. Actually, he didn't go in the Hobbit, he was just leaning by the door talking to Sandy who was an NLG lawyer.

JW: Sandy Carp?

BH: Right. So. He's busted, and then a few months later comes the trial for this crime. Of course, our first line of defense was that the order was illegal. We hoped to get the order thrown out. So, our first line of defense was that the order was illegal. First of all, we went through all the procedural hoopla, and then the case was delayed while they'd rearrange their footwork and everything. They cleaned up a lot of the screw-ups and they got the right guy to issue the order again, all this, and so finally it came down and we really were fighting away on whether the order was a legal order or not, because of course, if it was an illegal order, Bo didn't have to obey it, and thus couldn't be convicted. So, there were a whole lot of things that went on and finally we came to a point in the trial when we were finished presenting our case, and the military judge says to the prosecutor, "Are you finished?" and the prosecutor says "Yes, we rest our case." Then the judge looks around and comes back and says, "Well based on the evidence presented to me, I would have to rule that this order is illegal, so I'm

going to suspend the trial (there's a legal word for that, I forget what it is), and I'm going to suspend the trial for 30 days and tell the prosecutor to go out and get some more evidence before I make my decision." Now they had already rested their case, we'd rested our case, and he said, I'm going to give them 30 more days to find some more evidence so I don't have to rule this order illegal. Well, see the issue here was that the point we were winning on was they never told us what we'd done wrong. We wanted to have testimony from the guys who issued the orders so we could say, "Why'd you do it, what was your justification?"

JW: Col. Van Campen.

BH: Van Campen, right. And they brought out this garbage that classified information was leaked at the Hobbit. What classified information? Every bar owner on the strip knew about that thing, that's where we'd heard it from, it was from the bar owners. So we wanted to know what classified information which would have revealed that they'd had the Hobbit bugged, and all this kind of stuff. Well, they didn't want to do that, so 30 days go by and we come back into the court. We expect Van Campen to be there and in fact Van Camper was there, but they must have had a conference and decided that he would have to answer a bunch of questions in terms of illegal surveillance and CIA activity and shit like that that they didn't want to get into; so they come in and the prosecutor says, "Your honor, we're ready to go; we have all this fine evidence to show that these are real no goodniks, but since Major Shithead (I forget what his name was) who's on the jury has happened to overhear something that might tend to prejudice him against the defendant, in the interest of justice, we're going to move to dismiss the case." Then the judge says, "Oh, that's really noble and that proves that Marine Corps justice is really right-on and I'm dismissing the case." This meant that the order was never overturned. They would have had to overturn the order. So ever since then, every new GI that comes to the base is told very strongly, "If you go to the Hobbit, it's a violation of the order," and every year the order is republished in the Torii Teller and there's a big thing about it, but they're very careful not to arrest anyone, because if they arrested anyone, it would give us a test case, and if we had a test case, we'd clearly win the test case. So, what they do is they're enforcing an order they know is illegal, and they're enforcing it by threatening and frightening everybody with it, but never busting anyone.

The great Declaration of Independence arrest is another example. It was really funny, the guys arrested were so disappointed that the Marine Corps chickened out and discharged them instead of trying them. They were studying up on Patrick Henry and the quotations of Thomas Jefferson, I mean they were going to go to town, "Have the British taken over Iwakuni?" and all that. They were just going to make the brass look like idiots.

There was quite a big crowd scene too, when they were busted, and a lot of people went down to the MP shack, even officers and dependents, and they were shouting, "What is this, are you crazy, how can you arrest somebody on the Fourth of July for passing out the Declaration of Independence?" The Corps had just had this Admiral, Lord High Poobah, come down and talk about the Fourth of July and all that shit, and this was a lot of fun, probably the funniest thing we did the whole year.

- JW: You talked a while before about sponsoring speakers and stuff with Beheiren, could you elaborate on this a bit, tell us who the speakers were and how it happened and so on?
- BH: Well, actually, we didn't have all that many different speakers, it wasn't like it was a big formal thing, but sometimes Beheiren people or anti-war people or somebody might be coming and since the project in Japan was pretty famous throughout Japan, particularly among the Japanese anti-war movement, a lot of people wanted to come down and talk to the Marines. It wasn't like we wrote to someone and said, would you please come down, or like we would set up a thing, though sometimes if we knew in advance, we might even put out a leaflet or a notice in the *Fi*, but usually we didn't. People would just drop in and talk to whoever was around or we'd say, "Tell everyone to come out here tomorrow and talk to or hear so and so."
- JW: These were mostly Japanese people then?
- BH: Well, the Japanese and let's see, we also had a Vietnamese woman who was a leader in the third force, the neutralist element - kind of the Buddhists, who spoke, and then some Americans, that's basically it.
- JW: Were these people sent down by Beheiren or aided by Beheiren to come down and speak, or did they just come?
- BH: Well, Beheiren people did come, of course, and some people came once from Gensuikyo, but it's really hard to say because first of all, Iwakuni is sort of on the main rail line south and second of all, it's near Hiroshima, so a lot of people in the anti-war and peace movements going to Hiroshima for, say, a conference or a meeting or the Hiroshima Day Memorial Services, would come to us too since we were only just down the tracks forty clicks (kilometers). I don't know exactly who was sponsoring the, but Beheiren leadership came, certainly.
- JW: It wasn't really formal organized programs then was it? It was just more or less people dropping in and saying hello.
- BH: Right, except for things like the FTA show which we sponsored. That was arranged.
- JW: You talked once before about a demonstration at the main gate where the GIs sat in.
- BH: That was on the New Year's or Christmas bombing.
- JW: I think it was the Christmas bombing. Did the GIs themselves actually have a sit in at the gate or was it Japanese?
- BH: It was the Japanese. The GIs were sort of standing around and half participating and yet keeping their participation just fuzzy enough so that we could make a case on different things, though since actually none of them were busted anyway, it didn't matter. But, our policy was that we would never discourage GIs from participating in demonstrations, as long as all they did was bend the regulations, but not break them. Now, if a GI said, "Look, I want to participate," we said, "OJ. But we always said - look if you go too far, we won't have a very good case to defend you, though, of course, we will defend you, if you want to." And we always said, "Look it's our responsibility, we have to tell you, beyond a certain point, we could have a weak case." Generally, the movement GIs wanted to participate as much as possible and we didn't try to discourage that as long as

they could say, “Oh, I wasn’t in the demonstration,” so we could have some hope of a chance of a defense.

JW: The demonstrators then were Beheiren people?

BH: Yeah, Beheiren or other non-Beheiren Japanese. There was a lot of outrage, of course, about what was going on. There were quite a few people, maybe 30 or 40 of them.

JW: But it was more or less Beheiren organized or Beheiren instigated.

BH: Well, it was sort of a partnership in terms of the instigation and organization in that we had a part for the GIs; for example, while the Japanese were sitting in, the GIs were doing a ‘mass’ distribution of an emergency Extra *Semper Fi* issue which we wrote up for the bombing. There were 15 or 20 GIs standing in one spot handing out the *Semper Fi* just doing what we were always doing, but of course, in effect, it was a demonstration, technically it wasn’t; technically it was distributing literature, it was legal at that time.

JW: Then it was a joint operation?

BH: Yeah, we sat down and planned out....

JW: Between Beheiren and the GIs?

BH: And others.

JW: Did you ever pass out things in Japanese?

BH: No, none of the Americans ever did. Beheiren did.

JW: I get the impression that you’re saying with this legal activity, you were encouraging GIs to work through the laws, through the rules to turn the rules against the military, rather than to actually break the rules, other than rules that were obviously illegal in a court case.

BH: Right, and to push the legal rules to the limit, and in some cases to bend the spirit if not the letter. Of course, we were against the spirit in most of those regulation, but you know not to violate the letter. What is a demonstration? Our position was that it had to be something that they could clearly prove was a demonstration. Fine, that’s their problem.

JW: What about the *Torii Teller* during the time that you were there? You said before that they’d gotten to the point where they were mentioning the Fi and stuff. I know when I was there the existence of *Semper Fi* itself was something that was hotly denied. I mean the *Torii Teller* only once ever printed an article on it, and that was just a brief warning after our second issue that such crap wasn’t authorized and that people shouldn’t read it. After that, the base position on the *Semper Fi* was that there wasn’t a *Semper Fi*.

BH: Yeah, I think that their position was that they didn’t know what the hell to do. I think a lot of the officers wanted to take that position here too, but other people said, “Look, who are we kidding; it’s like pretending Red China doesn’t exist.” So, occasionally, not regularly but three or four times in the course of the year, the *Torii Teller* mentioned something about the Fi or quoted the Fi or made jokes about the Fi. Also, they would do their red baiting, smear things, like they wrote an article red baiting the National Lawyers Guild, dredging up all this HUAC garbage. They made the claim that Reber, that was the lawyer, was using his 13 year old daughter to sexually lure GIs out to the *Semper Fi* house and

then implied that we got them out there and brainwashed them or some bullshit. It was just absurd kind of stuff. Pissed us off a little; it was so absurd, but it pleased all those Marines that were adamantly against us from the jump; however, anyone who was trying to make up their mind wouldn't be convinced by it.

JW: What about the dependents on the base. Did you have a lot of involvement with the younger dependents, the high school group?

BH: No, a few, two or three and a couple of wives, but generally when I was there, pretty much the only people who could have dependents were officers or real career lifers who had been in for years and were like E-5 or 6 and above, and they tended to be pretty uptight about their wives or children associated with us as it would affect their career. Some of the guys whose wives did come around the project were transferred to sea duty and to 'Nam and sent to Siberia or something. In fact, one guy, a Navy guy, which is much more liberal than the marines, they really landed on like a ton of bricks and they were going to send him to a carrier and this whole business. He was a pilot.

JW: Was the project receiving money from Beheiren?

BH: In cash money, no. As a matter of fact, we were contributing to Beheiren. But, of course, we used the facilities at the Hobbit, and we contributed some money to the up-keep of the Hobbit, so in terms of cash money, no; in terms of the use of their facilities, yes. Who could equate if our cash money was equal to the use of the printing room and stuff.

JW: So it was just more of a co-existing relationship?

BH: Yeah, we actually gave them money regularly.

JW: It was different when I was there, we didn't actually get financed by them but depended on them for a lot of things.

BH: We weren't in any way financially dependent on them for anything.

JW: What kind of problems did you have in the project with the Japanese government; did the GIs have any problems with the Japanese government about their activities?

BH: No, not because of their activities.

JW: Well I can give you two examples from my time; one where Barbara Bye got her neck in hot water and spent quite a bit of time in the airport hotel in Tokyo; and another one was where the NIS, in conjunction with the Japanese government, set up and busted two of our guys on dope charges.

BH: Well, in terms of visas and that, we didn't have much problem, we had worked out a fairly intelligent procedure. Naturally, they knew who we were and what we were doing. But we very carefully stayed within the law, so we never had that kind of trouble. We never had any dope trouble because our policy was very anti-dope. Not only was it the policy of the civilians to never, in fact ever, be in a place where dope was being used and to make it well known; but also politically it was policy to write articles about the use of drugs and struggle against it. Generally, we won the activist GIs, cadre GIs over to that position fairly quickly because it was an obviously correct position, so the drug use among *Semper Fi* GIs was very minimal, limited to only the people coming in new who hadn't been around the Fi for very long or to those who were peripheral to the Fi. Drugs weren't any problem. Occasionally, some Japanese cop would

stop to ask for identification and stuff like that, but after they got to know us, that stopped too. So, I don't think we had trouble with them at all.

JW: What about the US government and the Naval Intelligence, what kind of hassles did they give you?

BH: Well, naturally, they were wildly enthusiastic about us. They did a whole lot of surveillance. In fact, I'll tell you how heavy the surveillance was. Once we were sitting around at a meeting and a new guy was there who hadn't been around very much. We mailed a lot of *Semper Fi*'s and had a regular subscription with Marines in Thailand, so they were constantly harassing us in terms of the mails, trying to prevent us from mailing the *Fi*'s to the guys subscribing, and one of the problems we had was that they kept rotating people out who were getting the *Fi*. A guy might have been gone for two months and we were still trying to send him the *Fi*, so we were discussing this whole problem and this new guy says, "Oh, you know, I work in the office (I forget what office it was, but one of the H&MS or MAG offices) and we have the current roster (for whatever, you know, I forgot what it was) and it's always out there on the desk. I'll tell you what, I'll xerox it and bring it out. It's always available, and we can just go through it and see who's left and cross out all those people who've been rotated." And we said, "Far out." And he says, "I'll bring it out at noon tomorrow." So the next day, he come out at noon and he says, "I couldn't get it." We said, "Oh?" He says, "Yeah, I came in there this morning and it was off the table and there was a sign that said anybody who wanted to use the roster had to get written permission from the CO since it was now locked in the safe. It's crazy, we're always having to go the safe to get the goddamned roster." So we felt that that indicated that they had fairly close surveillance on us. I assume it was electronic.

They were always taking pictures and coming up and demanding to see our IDs. One guy in particular, was always coming up and demanding to see our ID, and as civilians we always refused to show it to him, so he would try to run this number, he'd say, "You know, after six o'clock this is all under military law, under military jurisdiction, you have to show it." And we said, "No it isn't and we're not under your jurisdiction and stop bothering us, we're passing out the *Semper Fi*." Another guy's big thing was taking pictures, and he would always come up and say, "Oh, hello Bruce, I see you're losing a little weight." He was always letting us know how much he knew about us and stuff, I think his name was Mike, Mike something. They would flutter around, and I guess it was really a thrill for them, I mean how much was there for Naval Intelligence to do in a back water station like Iwakuni? And then all of a sudden here these "Red Communist" agitators; it must have given them a real thrill, something to do, and I'm sure they were really happy in that sense; they could feel they were out there combating the Commie menace, saving America from the Red Tide and all that stuff, so they went at it. I assume that some of the people that came around the *Fi* house were agents, but they were always really up shit creek with us because we didn't have any secrets. That was a real problem for them because nothing we were doing was secret or illegal, and we didn't give a fuck about them knowing about it. That must have really disappointed them. Once in a while, we toyed with the idea of giving them a thrill, acting like we had a secret or something, but then we decided, what the fuck, why should we make their lives happy, and just went on about our business. We didn't have any secrets so they were frustrated.

JW: You don't really know then if you had informers in your group?

BH: Well, we can make the assumption that we did.

JW: Well, I know when I was there, we had pretty well identified one informer who was quite high in the organization.

BH: Yeah, it was our policy, we discussed it, but it was our policy not even to look, even if we were suspicious of someone, not to bother about it because we felt that it wasn't worth the damage that would be done to people's morale and sense of unity. If we acted suspicious or even said, "Look, we know Joe here is an informer," that would create suspicion and disunity in the group. There were some people I was suspicious of, but generally they tended to be very good workers, and very diligent in passing out the *Fi* and stuff like that, so we said, "Fine, if they want to send us some manpower, good dedicated workers, why should we look a gift horse in the mouth and create disunity and suspicion by trying to expose them or ask questions? So, it was our conscious policy never to bother with that kind of stuff. We figured the only danger they could do would be pinpointing who was active as a *Fi* member, which may have been a problem, but we could never have cleaned up the electronic surveillance and since the most active thing people did with the *Fi* was writing for it and passing it out, they were immediately made identifiable anyway. So really, what would we gain, nothing.

JW: That was the kind of position I tried to sell, because informers were actually in the balance more good than bad, since they had to do something productive and what they turned up was common knowledge anyhow.

BH: Of course, now that position is only for a very particular circumstance in the GI movement. I mean I would not take that attitude towards informers in most other situations. In that particular situation where we were living in a goldfish bowl, and since, in fact, the worst punishment they could inflict on a *Semper Fi* supporter was discharge, which was generally considered more of a reward than a punishment anyway, an honorable or general discharge, we took that attitude. I would not take such a *laissez-faire* attitude towards political informers, say, in the peace movements back in the States which would be a different matter.

JW: Were you there during the protest at Yokohama when they had the trouble with the tanks?

BH: At Sagamihara?

JW: At Sagamihara.

BH: Well, I was in Iwakuni. I was up in Yokosuka for a while, but I didn't go to Sagamihara.

JW: Did a lot of information get down to Iwakuni?

BH: Only what was in the *Mainichi Daily News* and *Stars and Lies* and AFN. We followed the news fairly closely in the media.

JW: But no real active solidarity with them?

BH: The VVAW Chapter at Iwakuni sent a telegram of support which I suppose was read up there and we published that telegram in the *Fi*.

JW: Talking about the media, how were your activities received by the Japanese media, did you get a lot of coverage?

- BH: Oh yeah, tremendous. We couldn't hardly sneeze without it becoming major news. I mean any time anything was happening, they would come down. For example, when we first had Marines passing out the *Fi* and we knew that they were going to arrest the Marines thus setting up the test case which allowed us to get that order overthrown, two or three Japanese TV stations came down and filmed the arrests. That was strictly a Marine Corps GI movement thing, it had no ramifications really to Japanese society in the way that the nuclear weapons issue did, but they covered everything we did very closely.
- JW: Did they cover it in the English language press or just in the Japanese language press?
- BH: Well in the English language newspapers, I don't remember much.
- JW: It seems like, at least when I was there, that the English language newspapers more or less catered to the business community in Japan, and I think they pretty carefully edited them to not upset anybody's feelings.
- BH: That's true. I don't remember any articles in the *Mainichi*. We got the *Mainichi* and I think the *Asahi* English papers and I don't remember much in there; there may have been a short article once in a while. There was something in one of them about the Fourth of July arrest. They wrote an article, but they didn't understand the significance of the Fourth of July and the Declaration of Independence so their article didn't really have much point to it, but they did cover that. Certainly the Japanese language press, of course, covered everything extensively.
- JW: Yeah, that was true when I was there too. You could open up the *Mainichi* in the English and the Japanese editions and there would be a world of difference in the articles. How would the GIs as a whole accept Beheiren, how aware were they of Beheiren and what it was doing?
- BH: You mean the GIs working with the movement or the average GI?
- JW: Well both, let's split it and talk about the movement GIs first.
- BH: Well, they knew Beheiren, they went to the Hobbit and were friends with all the Beheiren people, we did joint activities like the rock concerts and the picnics and the demonstrations, different demonstrations. We went on trips to Hiroshima and we went out to an island once. We did that sort of stuff. They were very close with Beheiren. Now, the average GIs probably didn't know Beheiren from a hole in the wall as the name Beheiren; they knew that some certain Japanese people were always out there passing out anti-war literature, *Semper Fi*, they knew there were demonstrations all the time and they saw the demonstrations, but Beheiren as Beheiren probably didn't mean much to them.
- JW: What kind of programs was Beheiren having as to their own education? I remember Shinji was here in the States for a while. Were they habitually sending people abroad for diversified education?
- BH: Well, I don't think they sent anyone abroad for education, they would occasionally send somebody abroad as a delegate to meet with someone or attend an international conference, as it happened many Beheiren members may have traveled but they weren't sent by Beheiren; Beheiren was not the kind of a disciplined tightly organized group that had such a structured program. It was sort of a loose association of individuals with a really broad range of politics around a very minimal basis of unity; as I recall, I think the basis of unity was

only opposition to the war in Indochina, opposition to US bases and opposition to the remilitarization of Japan. You had everyone in there from the vaguest of liberals to the reddest of Marxists and anarchists and all other kinds of trends as well. They worked very consciously about that, they didn't want it any narrower than that, they wanted a broad base and each individual Beheiren chapter could pretty much decide whatever they wanted to do and was practically, totally independent. In fact, when they dissolved, I think some chapters said, "Aw, we don't want to dissolve, we'll continue," when the central office dissolved.

JW: What about a subjective opinion on Beheiren. How did you feel toward Beheiren?

BH: Well, I didn't have particularly strong feelings one way or the other. I think it was a good thing.

JW: The different people I've talked to have had different opinions.

BH: Well, they were what they were, and what they were wasn't a bad thing, it was a good thing. They weren't trying to pretend they were something they weren't; and they weren't doing things they were pretending they weren't doing. I mean they were very up front. I think that on that level, there's not much you can say. There may have been some other forms of organizations I wished were also in existence, but that's largely academic. I think some people felt Beheiren was weak or strong in this area or didn't do this, or shouldn't do that, but that might be a personal opinion but really it doesn't have much relevance, I don't think.

APPENDIX IV

STATEMENT OF LONNIE RENNER

IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF JERRY WEST

JANUARY 1975

Lonnie Renner is currently residing on a small farm near West Plains, Missouri. He served in the Marine Corps as an enlisted man from January of 1967 to June of 1970. From August of 1969 to June of 1970, he was a Corporal aboard the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan where we worked as a communications center man until his security clearance was revoked. Then he worked in supply communications.

Q. Describe your political and philosophical viewpoints from time of enlistment to discharge.

A. I grew up in Nebraska, one of the most conservative states in the country. Folks there have little of what Thomas Jefferson would have described as a healthy suspicion of government authority, especially in the area of foreign affairs. So when Lyndon Johnson began escalating the Vietnam War, there were no protests that I recall - indeed many of my fellow Nebraskans were loudly clamoring for even stiffer measures to ensure the defeat of the communist menace. Everyone, it appeared, accepted without question the statements of political and military leaders concerning the rightness of what was being done; no one that I know of questioned the authority of the US to intervene militarily in the war in South Vietnam.

My political views at that time were generally those of the overwhelming majority of my contemporaries. I was certain that the government of the US was the most nearly perfect of any in the world, that communism was the greatest evil, and that to fight against this evil at any time and at any place was my solemn duty to my country and to mankind.

Needless to say, there was no thought of my feigning physical disability, attempting to win conscientious objector status or fleeing the country to avoid the draft. In fact, when the time came, I went even farther by enlisting in the Marine Corps for four years.

Basic training in the Marine Corps served to reinforce and intensify these beliefs. An incident will illustrate. I was sent to communications school just after boot camp. When the instructors, Vietnamese veterans, found it difficult to maintain the interest of the students, they would amuse them with accounts of their exploits in the war, such as throwing enemy prisoners out of helicopters, burying them alive, and mutilating their bodies. The students found these stories hilarious. I myself laughed as loudly as anyone upon hearing such things, an indication of my mental state at that time.

My attitudes remain unchanged through a year in Vietnam, even though many of my fellow enlisted men turned against the war during their tours of duty there. I saw much in Vietnam that contradicted what the American people had been told by their government, but my faith remained unshaken. I had access to classified material which told a story of the war which differed considerably from the official version. I saw the contemptuous manner in the Vietnamese

people were treated by the Americans. For example, in my battalion, two enlisted men were brought before the commanding officer after they had taken a few playful shots at a Vietnamese farmer working in his field. The CO was about to let them off with only a warning when one of the enlisted men remarked, "But it was only a gook." Thereupon the CO, filled with righteous wrath, levied a small fine on the two - for a crime that would have sent them to prison in the US.

It was only after I returned from Vietnam that the gravity of what I had seen there finally struck me. The instrument, I believe, of this realization was a book of essays by Leo Tolstoy on civil disobedience and non-violence which I happened upon in a sleazy bookstore in Oceanside, California, just outside Camp Pendleton. His words swept away the assumptions I had held since childhood and led me to reject the political and moral values which could justify what I had seen in Vietnam. I became a vegetarian and a pacifist but made no resistance to military authority.

Only when I was transferred to Japan some eight months after my return from Vietnam did I put my principles into practice. I did not wish to be sent to Japan and made my feelings known, but it did no good. It was this incident of the exercise of arbitrary power that pushed me from acquiescence to active resistance. I resolved to work for the end of the Vietnam War and the unjust conditions within the Marine Corps. This activity eventually caused me to be released from the service more than six months before my enlistment was due to expire.

- Q. What were the physical and psychological conditions on the bases in Japan where you were stationed?
- A. the physical conditions at MCAS Iwakuni were about average for Marine Corps bases, i.e. living quarters were not overly crowded and in good repair; the food was poor but edible; a theater, enlisted men's club, hobby shop and athletic field provided some entertainment. Psychologically, the discipline was less severe in some ways than at stateside bases, but the screws were gradually being tightened as time went on; inspections were stepped up, overnight liberty was sharply restricted and weekly military training sessions were established. Racial tension, unapparent upon my arrival in August 1969, had flared into violence by the end of the year.
- Q. What were the differences in treatment by the military between EM's, NCO's and Officers?
- A. Officers and enlisted men were segregated in housing, in eating facilities, in entertainment facilities, on military aircraft, even in restrooms. Officers were always first in line. The same distinctions existed between staff NCO's and junior enlisted men, and between junior NCO's and lower ranking enlisted men.
- Q. While in the military in general, and Japan in particular, could you identify any kind of discrimination, either official or unofficial, against persons in the military, by the command or structural hierarchy based on distinction other than that of rank (i.e. race, religion, political beliefs, moral codes, etc.)
- A. Unofficial discrimination on the basis of race was the most pervasive distinction of the Marine Corps in general. Blacks were often given the most undesirable jobs and subjected to racial epithets and degrading acts on the part of senior NCO's and officers. Discrimination on the basis of personal appearance also became obvious, inasmuch as certain habits of dress and grooming were

associated with anti-establishment attitudes. Thus, those who wore mustaches, hair as long as regulations allowed, beads, wire rimmed glasses and flamboyant civilian clothes often experienced various forms of harassment from MP's, senior NCO's and officers.

Q. How did it appear to you that these various problems mentioned in the three previous questions were viewed by the command? How did you view them?

A. the command's official position for a long time was, apparently, that such problems did not exist. The reaction to repeated racial incidents on the base was an official silence with an accompanying crackdown on black EM. Only after accounts of the disorders appeared in the base underground newspaper, and ultimately in the Japanese press, were admissions of trouble made and steps taken to air grievances and correct some of the more intolerable conditions which had led to the disturbances.

My own view of these problems was that the military authorities subtly encouraged a certain degree of discrimination, especially on the basis of race and political ideas, in order to keep the enlisted men distrustful of each other. Such distrust would ensure that they did not organize to demand the rights supposedly guaranteed them under the Constitution. Divide and conquer.

Q. Did you ever see or hear about anti-war or anti-base demonstrations by the Japanese? If so, how did you regard them? How did the base the authorities regard them?

A. Anti-war and anti-base demonstrations were frequent during my stay at MCAS Iwakuni. At first, I was somewhat apprehensive when a demonstration took place near the base. Newspaper accounts and unofficial statements from officers and senior NCO's referred to the demonstration as "anti-American" and described the violence which sometimes resulted. The demonstrators' appearance, moreover, was not reassuring; many of them wore helmets and masks and carried banners bearing unreadable though sinister looking messages.

However, I soon learned that the demonstrators believed in many of the things I did, i.e., an end to the Vietnam War and the military occupation of Japan, and the return of Okinawa to Japanese control. I also found that they were not anti-American but anti-US government, as I was.

The base authorities, however, had quite a different view of such demonstrations. To my knowledge, there never were any official public statements from them regarding such matters, possibly because large numbers of Japanese people appeared to sympathize with the goals of the demonstrators. However, command policies in this area served a most useful function. Whenever a demonstration was scheduled in Iwakuni, the command cancelled liberty and drafted varying numbers of EM for guard duty. Consequently, the EM blamed the demonstrators, rather than the command for the resulting hardship; the EM's anger was directed against the demonstrators so that there would be less inclination to view their goals sympathetically. It must be conceded that this tactic by the command was highly successful. The Japanese anti-war and anti-base movement would have had a much more favorable influence on the American EM if it had refrained from demonstrations near bases and used instead more gentle means to get its views across.

Q. Did you ever see or read underground newspapers while in the military in general, and Japan in particular? If so, do you remember which ones they were and how you got them?

- A. Early in my tour at Iwakuni I read in magazines of underground GI newspapers published by EM at various bases in the US and overseas. I wished to see an example but, of course, the magazine articles did not include subscription information. Then a copy of *The Ally*, published in Berkeley, fell into my hands. It was being distributed on base (legally at that time) by a Marine sergeant named Fitzpatrick, who bore a striking resemblance to Art Garfunkel. Therein, I found the names and addresses of dozens of underground GI newspapers. I wrote for copies and received several, among which were *Duck Power* (San Diego area); *The Bond* (American Servicemen's Union); *Fun, Travel, Adventure* (Fort Knox); and others which I no longer remember. Somewhat later, a paper published by Beheiren (Peace for Vietnam Committee) in Tokyo made its way to the base. And, of course, there was Iwakuni's own *Semper Fi*.
- Q. What was your opinion of underground newspapers?
- A. It seemed to me that those papers which hit first and hardest at military injustice and proceeded thence to the Vietnam War and finally to the conditions of life in the US, were the most influential. Those which adopted a more extremist philosophy were less successful. In other words, one could not expect to win over a Midwestern farm boy by giving him a newspaper with quotations from Chairman Mao on the front page.
- Q. What was the military authorities' position as you perceived it?
- A. As mentioned above, distribution of such material on base was not illegal prior to February or March (memory fails me) of 1970. One can assume, then, that the few copies of *The Ally* floating around did not alarm the authorities to the point where they wished to call attention to such material, and arouse the curiosity of the EM, by banning distribution. But all that changed with the appearance, in late January of 1970, of *Semper Fi*, the locally produced underground newspaper. The command thought the event significant enough to report in classified messages to Washington and to assign naval intelligence agents to investigate. Not long thereafter, a base order was issued banning distribution of unauthorized literature on or off base by American servicemen.
- Q. How were underground newspapers regarded generally among the people you worked with?
- A. The reaction was generally favorable among the EM with whom I worked at the base communications center. The reaction among the senior NCO's and officers was generally unfavorable.
- Q. Were there any other kinds of anti-war or anti-military activity observed by you in the military, especially, but not exclusively, in Japan, such as but not limited to: strikes, legal protests and legal action against authorities, discussion groups, rallies and demonstrations, and direct and indirect sabotage of both equipment and bureaucratic process?
- A. Anti-war and anti-military expression took only mild forms during my stay in Japan. During the racial troubles on base, a few meetings were organized off base between anti-military white EM and black EM to see if some sort of alliance could be formed. These meetings were not successful. Off base gatherings were organized, ostensibly for music and good times, where anti-war and anti-military literature was passed out by Japanese civilians to the Americans. Each such gathering usually resulted in the overnight transfer of one or more of the participants. On Armed Forces Day 1970, about half a dozen EM wore black

armbands to protest the war. Sabotage of aircraft on base was reported now and then.

- Q. If you were involved in anti-war, anti-military activity, would you write a short narrative history of what you did, how your operation functioned as to GI and non-military support, financing, and leadership. Also include the obstacles and any official and unofficial harassment and investigation which confronted you and your group.
- A. My activities while in Japan concerned mainly the publication of *Semper Fi*, the local underground newspaper. If dozens of military bases in the US and overseas could publish their own underground GI newspapers, why not MCAS Iwakuni?

Without the assistance of Japanese civilians, *Semper Fi* would not have been possible. When my group first decided to publish a newspaper, it was proposed that duplicating equipment be purchased off base and set up in one of the houses, rented by group members. However, a check of what was available revealed the cost to be prohibitive. Outside help was necessary. I had heard of student disorders at Hiroshima University several months earlier, so that seemed like a likely place to find a sympathetic ear. I journeyed to the campus and made a few rather clumsy inquiries, asking for Zengakuren, an organization which, according to *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, was the principal troublemaker in Japan. I was eventually taken to Sakurai Joji, a teacher of physics and the chief faculty collaborator with the student activists. He listened to my story and my appeal for material assistance in publishing *Semper Fi*. He then questioned me at length, in the presence of two student activist leaders, about conditions on the base at Iwakuni and my views on the war and the US military role in Japan. He must have been satisfied with my answers, because he agreed to publish the paper using the facilities available to the students. His group would furnish the labor and the materials. I would make a stencil for each page. The first issue was ready about a week later and was distributed around the base under cover of darkness.

Shortly thereafter, I became acquainted with Beheiren and its local representatives, Ebisu Masao and Chris Cowley, and Englishman, and his wife. Much of the logistics involved in publication was taken over by Beheiren; an electronic stencil cutter was located, so that it was merely necessary for our group to make a typewritten copy of each page. Actual printing, though, was done at Hiroshima University by a rather crude process which yielded a result which was rough but readable. More importantly, the distribution of the paper was taken over by Japanese civilians, who passed out copies of *Semper Fi* to Americans outside the base itself.

My contact with Beheiren was made not long after I found a copy of their GI-oriented newspaper, *We Got The Brass*, on the base. A newspaper aimed directly at American servicemen in Japan would be helpful, I thought, in acquainting the Em with the Japanese anti-war movement. So I ordered a hundred copies, the bundle to be delivered to the owner of the house I rented off base. A few days later, the newspapers were delivered to my house by Ebisu Masao. He had a copy of the first issue of *Semper Fi* and was anxious to know more about it. However, he spoke little English at that time, and I had no Japanese, so he gave me the phone number of Chris Cowley in Hiroshima, whom I then contacted.

In the first couple of months after the founding of *Semper Fi*, there was no interference by the command, primarily because a strict secrecy was maintained by those involved in the publication, and their identities were most likely not known to the brass, but it is very difficult to organize a mass movement while remaining anonymous, and our group gradually came to the attention of the base authorities. The off base gatherings described in one of the previous answers above, organized to involve more EM in the anti-war and GI rights movement, also gave the command the opportunity to identify the most likely individuals. Accounts of these gatherings in the Japanese press proved embarrassing to the command, so action was taken. After the first such gather in April 1970, Bob Dorton received what became known as an overnight transfer, or deportation, to the US on a few hours notice, probably done in that manner to prevent word from getting to the Japanese press. However, word did get to the press; accounts even carried excerpts from a statement Dorton had written before his departure. Much embarrassment to the command resulted, so that on subsequent deportations, the interval between notification and departure became less and less. In the case of Dorton, he was notified the day before he was going to leave, but by the time the brass got to me two months later, the interval had shrunk to an hour and a half. And still word got out to the Japanese press.

I received my share of command intimidation. Shortly after the Bob Dorton affair, I was deprived of my access to classified material and moved to communications supply. A few weeks later, I was called to the office of the squadron executive officer, where the order prohibiting political activity was read to me in an apparent attempt at intimidation. The higher-ups also had a chance to show their feelings toward me during a strike of mess hall workers, who were Japanese civilians. I was put on mess duty, although I was an E-4 receiving commuted rations and did not eat at the mess hall.

But it became clear that the command did not intend to prosecute anyone for violations of the political activities order, apparently due to the adverse publicity that would ensue as we had fairly good contacts with the Japanese news media. In fact, I seemed to enjoy a strange immunity from legal action for almost any minor infraction of military regulations. I was late for formation one morning; such a thing had always been punished by at least four hours of extra duty, but nothing was said to me. One week, I did not clean my rifle, an offense which also rated extra duty, but again nothing was done.

The harassment and the overnight transfer continued, but *Semper Fi* published regularly nonetheless. It was decided by the brass that Dennis Hahn and I were the ringleaders, so we had to go. One morning early in June 1970, we were told that we would be on a plane out of MCAS Iwakuni in 90 minutes. We could take only what we could carry; there was not time to ship anything else to our homes, so much of our personal property was lost. We were ordered to sit behind the pilot so he could keep an eye on us. On Oki8nawa, we were met at the plane by the sergeant-major of the air facility and taken to headquarters in his jeep. From there, we were taken in a truck to the transit facility on the other side of the island and placed in a room by ourselves and ordered not to talk to anyone. Our meals were brought to us, and those senior NCO's in charge referred to us in awe as "those two political people." We were rushed through processing and put on another plane for the US in less than 12 hours; the normal processing time was five days. Upon arrival in the US, I was informed that I was

getting an early out. Three weeks later, after some delay due to the availability of my services record book (naval intelligence was holding it), I was a free man.

Q. Did you observe any noticeable changes in official military attitudes and/or policies as a result of radical GI activities during your military tour?

A. Changes were few during my tour, however, a greater respect for the rights of EM seemed to be one result. I think that is because *Semper Fi* made the EM more aware of what legal rights they did possess; such men were not likely to accept non-judicial punishment when they knew there was not enough evidence to convict them in a court martial. The brass were also more cautious in proceeding against EM in an unjust or illegal manner when they knew that there was a good chance that word would get out.

Q. Is there anything else that you would like to relate?

A. It was a lot of fun. It was also a great source of satisfaction. I think I helped knock one small chink into a racket that was begging to be busted.